Interview with Dennis Kux

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR DENNIS KUX

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Q: I would like to make clear at the beginning of the interview that people need to read your book, "India and the United States, 1941-1991, Estranged Democracies," which was published in 1993, because I do not intend to repeat or ask you questions about material which you have already covered in that book. That book and, presumably, the one which you are writing on U. S. relations with Pakistan should be read in conjunction with this interview.

Let me then start with the usual questions about your background - where you were born and your education. I would also like to know how you became interested and involved in the foreign affairs field.

KUX: I was born in England on August 11, 1931. My father had come there from Austria in the late 1920's. He was a stockbroker and shifted from London to New York in 1932. In 1933 my mother crossed the Atlantic to the United States with a little baby—me. So I arrived in New York City and the US in 1933.

As a kid, even when I was eight or nine years old, I had already become a news "freak." I was always interested in what was happening in the world, reading newspapers and listening to the radio. I remember the 1940 Republican Party convention and listening to

the proceedings on the radio. I was then nine years old and was fascinated by it. Then the United States entered World War II in 1941, and I followed what was happening throughout the world. I knew that I wanted to be involved in some way in news events—though not necessarily in foreign affairs. This interest continued.

I went to high school in Riverdale, in New York. There were a lot of foreign students there. My father's relatives had come over as refugees from Austria after Hitler took over in 1938. So I was always around people who were interested in international affairs. I debated in my own mind whether I should get involved in international affairs, domestic politics, or teach history, which was my major. I didn't really resolve this question while I was in college at Lafayette in Pennsylvania. When I graduated in 1952, I sent off three different sets of graduate school applications—one for international affairs, one for law schools, and one for further study of history.

Then I went into the U. S. Army, as one did in those days. That experience really tipped me toward the Foreign Service. For me, personally, the US Army was a good experience. I started in the Infantry and ended up in Intelligence. I had been in the ROTC [Reserve Officers Training Corps], so I was lucky and wasn't a private, but a Second Lieutenant, which made a hell of a difference.

Until I joined the Army, I was very much an insulated New Yorker. The Middle West was New Jersey, and the Far West was Ohio. Washington, DC was the Deep South. My universe was pretty circumscribed. The Army mixed you up with people from all over the country and from different sorts of backgrounds. It was good for me. Just before entering on active duty in the summer of 1952, I took the written Foreign Service exam. I wasn't sure I wanted to join the Service, but felt there was no harm in trying the exam. A government professor at college, Eugene Parker Chase had worked in the State Department on United Nations affairs and urged me to try. Then I remember an appealing recruiter from the State Department coming around and making the Foreign Service sound alive.

In those days, the exam was a three and a half day ordeal. There were three days of essay questions—three hours in the morning and three hours in the afternoon and then a half day on foreign language. I took the test in the Federal Building in Atlanta, GA, as I was going to enter the Army in nearby Fort Benning. It was August and very hot. There was no air conditioning. I really suffered as I was not used to Southern style heat. I think that just getting through the ordeal was a major achievement. I can still remember sweat pouring down my arms as I took the exam. The exam was given in one of those old schoolrooms, where you shared a combination wooden desk and bench with someone else. There were, maybe, 20 or 25 persons. Some of them dropped out by the time the ordeal was over. It was a pretty rigorous affair, consisting of history, economics and English writing sections. I remember “boning up” on economics. The foreign language part was not so difficult. It just involved reading comprehension. I passed the exam, somewhat to my surprise.

As I said, I started off in Ft. Benning [GA]. I was there for three months for basic training. Then I was transferred to California to Camp Roberts as an instructor in the 7th Armored Division. It was also a basic training camp. From there I went to Ft. Riley, KS, in January or February of 1953 where I enrolled in the Intelligence School and was trained as a prisoner of war interrogator. I think that I was on leave in the summer of 1953, before going to Korea when I came to Washington to take the Foreign Service oral exam. In those days everything was done in Washington, and you had to travel there at your own expense. That was not too difficult from New York. However, I didn't pass the oral exam. You either received a pass, a fail, or a “try again.” I got the latter. My main recollection of that test was that Walter McConaughy, later Ambassador in Pakistan and Assistant Secretary for the Far East, was one of the examiners. It was given in one of the apartment buildings near the “Old New State” building where the State Department used to have offices.Then I went overseas to Korea, and that really “tipped me” towards the Foreign Service, because I discovered new worlds in Japan and Korea. I had the opportunity to travel around Korea a lot because I was in an “odd ball” unit—20 or 25 people in a “prisoner of war” interrogation platoon. There were four or five officers. A captain, who had

more experience, was the commanding officer of the platoon. There were three or four second or first lieutenants, like myself, who were in their early 20's. The enlisted men were mostly Japanese or Chinese Americans.

I was very lucky. I got to Korea a week after the Armistice was signed in July, 1953. So I interrogated only one prisoner, a Chinese deserter who, somehow or other, had wandered across the De-militarized Zone (DMZ). Given all the mines and other barriers, this could not have been easy for him.

I was assigned to the 500th Military Intelligence Group attached to Eighth Army. I went from Tokyo, where I stayed about a week, down to Sasebo [Kyushu], where I spent about three weeks. Then I was put on a boat and sent to Korea. Eighth Army in Seoul had a Military Intelligence company or battalion, under the MI Group in Tokyo. I was attached to this unit and then sent down to the 7th Division, where I was assigned to the 505th MI platoon. We were really part of the Eighth Army Interrogation Group.

It was rather interesting. The barracks or the house the unit had in Seoul previously belonged to Korean President Syngman Rhee's rival, Kim Ngu. Seoul at the time really impressed me, because I had never seen a city which had been so totally destroyed. There wasn't much left. It had really been obliterated. There were individual houses still standing, but damaged. I remember that the Korean Parliament building was destroyed. The Presidential Palace [Blue House] somehow still survived. I had seen pictures in the movies and newsreels of World War II—Seoul was very much like that. Still, Seoul was well populated, even with all that destruction. Cars were running, but everyone was very poor, and we were very wealthy (by comparison). There was very little economic activity.

Some aspects of the Army were rather funny. For example, I was supposed to be able to speak French, because I passed the interpreter's test which consisted of a true or false reading exam and nothing spoken. When I took this test at Ft. Riley, Kansas, somebody had told me that the way you score well was to avoid guessing. I passed the test because

I didn't guess. I didn't have many “wrong” answers—I just left blank the questions I didn't know the answers to—so I scored passed even though my French was fairly weak. Still, the Army said I was qualified to be an interpreter. As a result, on two occasions, I took groups of French and Vietnamese military officers around Korea to witness Korean civil development and the progress made by the Korean military forces. We traveled all around the country.

That escort experience was very interesting in itself, but also because I got to talk a lot with the young Vietnamese. Actually, the French defeat at Dienbienphu in May, 1954 happened during one of these trips. The French officers in the group were thunderstruck, because their friends had been captured, and so forth. However, there was a clear cleavage between the French and the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese said privately, “We'll never get our independence as long as the French are around. We'll never win against the communists.”

Another group I remember escorting was a couple of senior French officers who were, I think, connected with military government functions. We attended a briefing given by a special envoy of President Eisenhower—the Governor of Texas, Alan Shivers—who was either in charge of the economic aid program in Korea or was sent over to Korea to make a report on it. I remember during the briefing, in what I think was the Chosun Hotel, it was stated that we would be lucky if, 50 years from then—2004—, South Korea would really be a going concern economically. This comment was made in 1954. There was no electric power, little economic activity, nothing but problems. Americans thought South Korea was hopeless. I always remembered that briefing in later years when I dealt with South Asia, Africa and other poor places. South Korea was so poor in 1954.

However, the Chosun Hotel—the only acceptable hotel in Seoul at the time, owned by Mrs. Rhee—was one of the benefits of being assignment as an interpreter. I got to stay at the Chosun. This was a great treat for a young Lieutenant living in a tent in the countryside 30 or 40 miles to the north of Seoul.

Our unit was first stationed in a place which I found was still there 25 years later—Camp Casey, the headquarters of the 7th Division. Then, at some point, our unit switched places with the 24th Division, whose headquarters were north of the 38th parallel. As I recall it, Camp Casey was about 25-30 miles north of Seoul, on the “main road” which, in those days, was an unpaved, mud strip. When we switched with the 24th Division, we went north to an even wilder and less developed area, where we actually carved out our own camp site on a hillside with bulldozers. At least around Camp Casey there were towns and villages around. Uijongbu, I think, was one of the towns . The people there were terribly poor. They lived in paper huts and flimsy houses. Really, the economy was at a very basic level—very much like the poorer parts of India and Pakistan. This really impressed me. We were in the middle of farm land, which was just barely being worked; it was subsistence farming.

I was also listed as a Russian interpreter, because I had taken Russian in college and studied it a bit further during the summer. Well, I knew some Russian, but it wasn't all of good. At some point there were supposed to be a lot of White Russian refugees coming from North to South Korea and our Intelligence Group was supposed to interrogate them. A big camp was set up to receive them, either in Taegu or Taejon. But in the end I think that there were only about 50 White Russians who showed up.They had lived in North Korea since fleeing after the Bolshevik revolution. A very few were allowed by the communists to come over to South Korea. I hardly did anything except to spend a month in this place. We had more interpreters than we had people that we were supposed to question. The Army was mainly interested in conditions in North Korea, about which we debriefed these White Russians.

For me, at least, it was a very bizarre and exotic experience. Our unit was located right next to a MASH [Mobile Army Surgical Hospital] unit. It was not all of that different from the TV show. There were three units together. There was the Norwegian hospital, or

NORMASH, as it was called. There was a CIC [Counter Intelligence Corps] unit, and then the interrogation platoon.

I had the opportunity to travel around Korea quite a bit. I had my own jeep. We used to visit the interrogation platoons in the different divisions which were deployed across the waist of Korea. My recollection is that the British Commonwealth Division or the First Marine Division was over on the left, and then we were next. Then came the 24th Division and a couple of other American divisions strung across the waist of Korea.

I visited Pusan. I think that I went through Pusan when I left Korea. Both the city and most of country were desperately poor and shattered. Some of the other towns were not that bad. I think that Seoul was the worst. As I recall, you could see the infrastructure that the Japanese had put in. There still was a rail system. You could travel by train. They weren't bad, run by the Army. However, the country was really very, very poor. You could hardly buy anything. It was a subsistence economy. In fact, we, the United States were keeping Korea alive.

The roads were largely mud. Of course, when it rained, it was a real mess, and you had to travel by jeep. The poverty was overwhelming; people were trying to siphon off things from the Army. I remember that you had to watch for thievery. Sure enough, somebody came to my tent and stole my pen and my camera. There was a lot of trouble with young kids stealing things. This was a big concern in the U. S. military.

I was in Korea for about a year. When I got the unit, we did nothing for the first six months. The Americans in the interrogation platoon who had been there during the fighting were still there. They just believed in relaxing. The commander had been a professional gambler at Harold's Club in Reno, Nevada and was an Army Reserve Officer recalled to service during the Korean War. Our day was typically like something out of “Mash.” We got up around 8:30 AM and had coffee. We had a joint mess with the CIC detachment. We went back to our platoon, had more coffee, and then broke for lunch. After lunch we had sports.

Then it was cocktail hour. There was a regular “black market” run taking cigarettes down to Seoul, bringing booze back, and trading things. I remember that on New Year's Eve 1954 there was a big party. Everybody got drunk and we had a big free-for-all in the tent.

That all changed about six months after I arrived. Another Commanding Officer came and played things “by the book.” He asked, “Where's the training program?” We said: “What training program?”. He said: “Of course there has to be a training program,” and there was. The Army has programs for everything. We soon started training for eight hours a day on how to be an Intelligence Platoon.

When I fist arrived in the Far East, I spent about two months in Japan. I was in Tokyo and then spent a week in Kyoto. I spent about three weeks in Sasebo [Kyushu]. Japan was much more developed than Korea, but there was still plenty of damage left over from World War II even eight years after the end of the war. We were so wealthy, relative to both the Japanese and the Koreans. I remember that the exchange rate of the Yen was 360 to a U. S. dollar. We had access to U. S. Government-controlled hotels. There was one in Kyoto on a lake outside the city. You could get a lobster dinner for a dollar and a filet mignon —Kobe beef—for a dollar each. So our money went a long way in those days.

I left the Far East in August, 1954, having been there for a year. We left Korea from Pusan and spent 14 days on a troop ship—boring as hell. Then I spent seven days on a troop train going across the U. S. I ended up, I think, at Fort Dix, [New Jersey], where I was discharged.

Then I waited until the final week to decide whether I would go to graduate school at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Boston or to Harvard law school. I had been accepted for both. It was a “crossroads” decision in terms of my career. In the end, I went to Fletcher and chose a career in the foreign affairs area. Thinking back, I'm sure that the experience in the Army in Korea “tipped me over” to the Foreign Service.

I went to Fletcher in the fall of 1954, under the “GI Bill” [Veterans' Administration scholarship available to those who had served in the armed forces]. I kept asking the State Department when I could take the oral exam. Whomever I spoke with kept hemming and hawing. Ten years later, when I was working in Personnel, I found out why. It was a reflection of McCarthyism. Checking my administrative file, I found the answer for the delay. It reflected the way things were done back at that time.My father had a good friend who knew a man named Gerhart Eisler, a German communist. Eisler came to the United States as a refugee and ultimately went back to East Germany and became one of the “big wigs” in the Communist Party there. I never met Eisler. I doubt that my father ever met Eisler. However, the circumstances were considered sufficient to put a “stop sign” on my security clearance. Eventually, the State Department had to issue a “waiver”—and it's still in the file. In those days—1954 and 1955—you had to have a security clearance before you took the oral exam. So Carlisle Humelsine, then Deputy Under secretary of State for Management had to issue a “waiver” for me to take the oral exam. This was the time when Scott McLeod was in charge of State Department Security. I ultimately took the oral exam during the summer of 1955. I remember that very vividly. It was given in Boston. By this time the Department was sending teams around the country to administer the oral exam. I was at Middlebury College [in Vermont], studying Russian that summer of 1955, having finished my year at Fletcher. The oral exam was given in what I guess was the Federal Building, right near Boston Common. There were three examiners. One of them had been Consul General in Manchuria at one point. He kept asking a lot of questions about the Far East. I had taken a course in Far Eastern history at Fletcher, so I knew a lot about it, and of course had spent a year in Korea.

I think that one of the things that they tried to do in those days was to “rattle” you in the exam, which only lasted an hour. Before the exam I wandered around the old burial ground in Boston Common. The question which was intended to “rattle” me was: “Could you give me the name of someone buried in the old burial ground?” I said, “Yes,” and I gave a name. I don't remember who it was—John Hancock or whoever. The examiner

said: “Can you give me the name of another person there?” I gave him another name. Then he said: “Could you give me the name of another person?” I gave him another name. He said: “Do you know any other names?” I said: “Yes.” So they were the ones who became a little “rattled” and impressed; they never knew that I had just wandered through the cemetery.

I seem to recall that in 1955 they told you right away whether you had passed the exam. They told me that I had passed the exam. Fairly soon afterwards—I think that it was a week or so later—I was asked by the Department of State to report for duty. I think that I reported the last day of August, 1955.

I came to Washington and was assigned to the Bureau of Economic Affairs. The reason for that assignment was that I had taken a course at Fletcher from Harry Hawkins who was, if not the father of the trade agreements program pushed by Secretary Cordell Hull, was the key implementer in charge of the Commercial Policy Division in the State Department in the 1930's. In the 1940's, I think, he was in charge of Economic Affairs and then in 1950 briefly became the Director of the Foreign Service Institute. He was Secretary of State Cordell Hull's “man” on tariffs.

I did not take the A-100 course at the FSI. There were only six of us who entered the Foreign Service in August, 1955. The only orientation that we had came during a round-the-table discussion with a man named Max Krebs in one of the apartment building [annexes to the State Department]. We then had about a several-day orientation with civil service people. Our group included Bob White, Don Born, Jack Downs, Gerry Friedman, and Bill Nenno. All six of us were assigned to a Washington office. So we all began to work almost immediately after reporting for duty.

As I mentioned before, my assignment was to the Trade Agreements Division in the Economics Bureau. This was the heart of EB and the heart of commercial policy in the U. S. Government which was still a responsibility of the State Department at the time. It was

only later, in 1957, under the Eisenhower administration, that a White House office was set up to handle trade policy. The chairmanship of the interagency review process shifted to the new White House office and was taken away from the State Department. Other agencies acquired a larger role. It gradually developed into what it is now the STR [Office of the U. S. Trade Representative]. STR is essentially what the Trade Agreements Division was in earlier years.

Trade policy even in 1955 was regarded as very important. When the Republicans took office after the Democrats had been in the White House for 20 years, they distrusted the civil servants who had been handling things under the Democrats. The elected officials wanted control of the trade program, which was very politicized even when I was in the Trade Agreements Division.

So I started to work on commercial policy. I had no choice; that was the assignment given me without any discussion. I found myself in a large bureaucracy and a very unhappy group of people, at least the office where I was assigned. This was the era of the Wriston program under which the civil service and the Foreign Service were forcibly amalgamated. That was a major reform. The Foreign Service Staff corps was virtually abolished. The Foreign Service Officer corps increased from about 700 before the Wriston program to about 3,500. A lot of civil servants were affected in the economics area.

I had heard about “Wristonization” while at Fletcher. It was a more significant and drastic change, I think, than any that has taken place in the Department since then. On the first day I reported for work, I called on the Office Director—a very senior person and very fine man—Willis Armstrong. The conversation started with his comment: “You came here to join the Foreign Service. I didn't.” He proceeded to spend the rest of our talk to complain about the Wriston program. Armstrong had been “Wristonized” and was very unhappy about it. In fact, he went on to have a very distinguished career in the Foreign Service, but initially it was a very jolting experience for him. Essentially, before the Wriston program, civil servants spent their careers specializing in a subject—either a country or a function.

They stayed in Washington. The Foreign Service largely stayed abroad. Members of the Foreign Service came back to Washington from time to time, but their life was really spent overseas.

I was struck by the organization of the Department. The Foreign Service or the Civil Service employees held all the positions throughout the Department, in the European tradition, except for the very top ones. There were then relatively few “political jobs” in the Department, unlike today.

The Seventh Floor [office of the Secretary of State and his immediate deputies] amounted to two people in the mid 1940's. Well, by the mid 1950's, it was much bigger, but it was not like today. It was sort of at a mid point, between the situation in the 1940's and today. As I said, Willis Armstrong was unhappy about being “Wristonized.” Everybody was unhappy. Most of my Civil Service colleagues didn't like it. The Civil Service people didn't like the idea of having to serve overseas. They felt that they had gone to work for the Department of State in Washington, not to go overseas. The senior people had been handling commercial policy for 20 years or so, and they didn't think that Foreign Service Officers knew anything about the subject, or were very interested.

The Foreign Service Officers who were assigned to commercial policy didn't like it. As I recall, if you were an Economic Officer, an assignment to the Office of Commercial Policy was not considered desirable. I remember Bruce Lockling, a very senior Foreign Service Officer who, I think, was then an FSO-2 [in the old ranking system]. He clearly didn't enjoy working for his GS-14 [civil service rating] boss, who was a woman. Actually, my two bosses in commercial policy were women, which was unusual for those days.

My own job was to serve as the assistant recording secretary of what was called the Trade Agreements Committee. This was an interagency group that took decisions on commercial policy. It was chaired by a State Department Division Chief, a GS-15 employee, at the time a man named Carl Corse. There were eight or nine agencies represented on the

committee, including the Department of Defense, the Tariff Commission, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Treasury, Interior, economic assistance agency and maybe one or two others. Every issue that came up was considered and decided by that group. The chairman had a very big role to play in leading the discussion and setting the agenda. If there was a disagreement or dissent, the issue went directly from—and this shows how times have changed—this GS-15 to the President of the United States. There was no Office of the Trade Representative. This Committee was, in fact, the equivalent of FTR [Office of the Foreign Trade Representative] today.

Detailed records were kept of the meetings, perhaps one or two meetings a week. I was assigned to keep the minutes with the recording secretary. It was not a very happy situation. I was told that I was to “work with” the recording secretary, a little spinster named Margaret McCoy. She was told that I was to work for her. I was then 24. So I was a brash, young fellow, working with this “old maid.” She was also a victim of the Wristonization program. She was later assigned overseas and then “selected out” of the Foreign Service. She never should have gone overseas. Her life had been writing up the minutes of the TAC meetings.

For somebody like myself, having just come out of graduate school after serving having served in the Army, the assignment was not an agreeable one. Indeed, when I started to work there, there weren't any meetings. Everybody was getting ready to go overseas for a round of tariff negotiations in Geneva under the GATT. One of my first jobs was to help wrapping packages to be sent to Geneva. I wasn't exactly thrilled with the job.

I was part of the U.S. Delegation to Geneva. The American Delegation was very large. I think that there were 90 people in it. About half came from the State Department, split between the Economics Bureau and regional economic officers. Other members of the Delegation were from different Washington agencies, particularly from the Department of Commerce.

We were negotiating tariff accords with about 25 countries and the Delegation was split up into “teams” of about three people: a senior State Department officer, a junior officer, and someone from another government agency, to negotiate bilaterally with the other 25 countries. The key— the heart—of the whole reciprocal trade agreements program was the concept of “Most Favored Nation” status. When we negotiated a tariff change with country X, that change was made available globally to all countries that were parties to the GATT. So the importance of the tariff concession was not just the bilateral impact.

When a negotiating team came up with a specific proposal and negotiated it “ad referendum,” it was referred for review to the Trade Agreements Committee—in the case of the U. S.—which met in Geneva. The TAC assessed whether we should go ahead with agreement or not. The evaluation was usually made in terms of how much economic damage American domestic interests would suffer. In other words, the question was always: “What is the down side”? The Committee would try to estimate the effect of the tariff concession on American domestic industry.

That judgment, of course, was very subjective although the TAC assembled the best statistics available. However, ultimately, it came down to a judgment call, often how much of a howl the protectionist groups would raise in the United States. There were obviously certain areas, like textiles and farm products, where, even then, we were very, very sensitive.

I don't remember any representatives of the private sector as members of the delegation. There was a “New York Times” correspondent and representatives of other newspapers in Geneva who reported on developments. The conference went on for quite a while, for several months as there were a very large number of details involved. The head of the delegation, Carl Corse, had a pretty free hand within general guidelines and instructions worked out before we left Washington. And the representatives of the different Washington agencies were there—Commerce, Agriculture, and Defense. They participated actively in the TAC and were a helpfull voice even though State was in the chair. At the time, the

“national security” argument was beginning to be used in certain areas. That is, the US couldn't make concessions in a given manufacturing area because we had to maintain a domestic capability to produce that commodity. Part of the argument was based on the perception to keep a “warm production” base, but there also an element of protectionism.

One of our major concerns was to keep the field of agriculture pretty well “off the table.” There was, I think, a general exception for agriculture. I will always remember how the TAC handled one issue—and this concerned mangoes. At the time, there was only one mango farmer in the whole United States—in Florida. He had a Congressman supporting him, and that was enough to prevent the TAC from making concessions on mangoes.While in Geneva, I became the junior member of a team put together to negotiate with the European Coal and Steel Community, on, I think, steel tariffs. The team leader was Joe Greenwald, then the secretary to the delegation and later Ambassador to the EEC and Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. The TAC did not accept our first recommendation so we went back to the bargaining table again with the Europeans. The TAC finally accepted the deal we worked out.

I stayed in a pension in Geneva. I recall that I paid a dollar a day for room and board and that the per diem allowance was two or three dollars a day. This was enough for me to save my salary and then spend a month traveling around Europe (on leave without pay) after the conference ended.

The GATT conference came to a sudden end—the US side ran out of money! We had been there about three months when the alarm bell rang, and Washington said, in effect, “Pull the chain. We are spending too much money. You have got to finish up quicker.” It was decided that, instead of six months, we would be allowed to spend another 30 days in Geneva, in addition to the three months that we had already been there. I remember that everybody in the Delegation said: “Impossible! It's terrible! It can't happen. We'll never finish in that amount of time.” But we finished and got the job done.

I always remembered that experience. It seems to me that in a bureaucracy you can always cut the time allowed to do a job. Frankly, we had too many people in the Delegation. Those were the days when the U. S. traveled with “big battalions” of people. We probably had almost as many people in our Delegation as the total number of people in all the other 20 odd delegations. Admittedly it was easier for the Europeans to shuttle people in an out of Geneva from their home capitals.

Anyway, we wrapped up what I think was the Sixth Round of tariff negotiations of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] at the end of May 1956. The conference achieved its goal of a partial reduction of tariff barriers to world trade.

So in May 1956 I returned to my office in Washington only to find friction in my office. By this time I had received my first efficiency report. It wasn't a very good one, and I was very unhappy. It was clear that there was a problem between me and my boss, the GS-9 Civil Servant, although the actual report was written by the Branch Chief, a GS-14. I think that the problem was that there was a “mismatch” between the GS-9 civil servant and me. She was very unhappy that I had become involved in negotiating a GATT agreement. Apparently, she hadn't been asked to take part in the negotiating team.

So, a colleague of mine said: “Why don't you try to get a transfer? Go to the Executive Director or the Deputy Executive Director in the Economics Bureau.” The Executive Director was Frances Wilson, who was widely known throughout the Department. She was “Miss Economics Bureau.” I went to see her. She said: “Why didn't you come to me sooner? I have told those people that they don't know how to deal with FSO's.” So in the summer of 1956, she got me transferred to another part of the Economics Bureau—the Fuels Division.

This was a very, very different situation. The Trade Agreements Division was a large bureaucracy. I don't remember the exact number of people in it, but it had about five branches with, perhaps, as many as 50 or 60 people. By contrast, the Fuels Division

had only five officers. They have a vacancy." The Division Chief was a man named Earl Beckner, a GS-15 Civil Servant. There were three mid-level FSO's, and a junior FSO. I replaced a Civil Servant who had transferred over to the Department of the Interior's Oil and Gas Division. My job was to monitor world energy questions—particularly petroleum, but also coal—and to serve as the office statistical specialist and general gofer.

We were particularly involved in promoting the interests of American oil companies. In some countries there were laws which harmed their interests—I remember that Italy was a case in point. The Italian Government was "nationalizing" the petroleum industry, and the American Embassy in Rome was very much involved. The Fuels Division backstopped the Embassy and was the contact point for oil industry liaison people with the State Department.There was no particular policy aspect of my job as my main task was to do the statistics. I had no special training in this, but I liked crunching numbers, which were mostly about on fuel production and consumption. The middle level FSOs divided the world up geographically and I backed them up with "facts." Like a lot of things in the State Department, the jurisdiction of the Fuels Division was not very clear. There were other offices in the State Department which had a lot to say on fuels policy—the Near East and European bureaus. Ed Moline, de facto adviser to Secretary of State Dulles on petroleum in the European Bureau. Our Division Chief was often on the sidelines, but always trying to "get into the act" which naturally led to a lot of "turf fighting."

This didn't affect me particularly. I was very happy because the Fuels Division was a small office, and the people were congenial. There wasn't much "backbiting." As I remember, the senior FSO's weren't very happy with their assignments. They didn't want to be there, particularly, but they were good people. One was Bob Rutherford, an "old China hand." Another was Stewart Anderson, who had bounced around in economic assignments. I learned a lot from them and it soon became evident that FSO's generally disdained assignments to functional bureaus and considered the regional bureaus as the

mainstream. I stayed in the Fuels Division about a year and I enjoyed it. I was very busy. I don't know whether what I did was all of that useful but it kept me occupied.

I had my own tasks but was not my own master. I was given assignments. An interesting aspect of the assignment was that we were “port of call” for a lot of lobbyists. Each petroleum company had somebody who would come around to the State Department, come to our office, and who would often take us out to lunch. Basically, they were trying to find out what was going on. A lot of it was pretty low level, just talk. Although these petroleum lobbyists were comparatively senior, I had the impression that we in the Fuels Division had a lot more say than they had. They were trying to get information on this or information on that. In effect, they were intelligence officers for the oil companies.

Congress did not show much interest in the work of our office but certainly was concerned by the subject. There were various antitrust questions about the oil industry. Under the Truman administration there had been a lot of antitrust concern directed against the major oil companies, but the Eisenhower administration watered things down.

We were one step away from all this. We saw our role as supporting the oil companies where they had disputes with foreign governments. Most of the issues concerned matters where national oil companies were trying to step in and take the “turf” away from American companies in exploration or marketing. We were kept pretty busy, following and promoting the interests of American companies.

I also got involved in and became the office “expert” on coal, although I don't remember exactly why—maybe because nobody else was doing it. There we were promoting American coal exports. I used to put out a “newsletter” which we sent to various posts on American coal exports. I remember becoming friendly with the Coal Exporters Association of the United States. For some reason, it was considered “anti” State Department. I don't remember exactly why. I became friendly with Mr. Estes, a staff member of this

association. He was a crusty old fellow, but invited me down to Norfolk to see how the whole coal export system worked—how they shipped the coal and so forth.

The other thing that I recall vividly about the assignment dealt with the period of the Suez crisis [1956-1957] and the role of the US in meeting Europe's energy needs after the Canal was closed and the main pipeline shut, cutting off supplies from the Middle East. European consumption of petroleum was only about one or two million barrels a day. The United States was able to meet the “gap” [shortfall in supplies of petroleum to Europe] by raising the production of oil in Texas to the “full allowable” limits. Oil production in Texas was in the hands of a state level office called the Texas Railroad Commission, which set production limits. It was a major development when the Texas Railroad Commission met and agreed to produce enough to fill the gap.

The point is that the U. S. had sufficient oil production capacity in 1957 to supply Europe when the Suez Canal was closed. The situation has changed drastically since then. Our production now is about the same as it was in 1957. But our demand has greatly increased and we have become a major oil importer.

After about two years in Washington, it was time to go overseas.

Q: We are now in 1957. You had never had any Foreign Service training. Who told you that it was time to go overseas?

KUX: The system told me. It was understood that I would have a two year assignment in the Department and would then go overseas. I was initially assigned to the Philippines, for no particular reason. I had developed an interest in the Third World, but not in the Philippines. I also remember being offered Cambodian language training—out of the “blue.” I said, “No,” because I didn't want to spend so much time on one small country.

What interested me most was South Asia. This grew out of interest in India and the Third World. I was much taken with Nehru and had a certain sense of idealism—perhaps

misplaced idealism—that this was an area of importance to the United States. I thought that helping people with economic development would be interesting and valuable. In any case, no one really cared about my interests; I was assigned to the Philippines.

First, I was assigned to the FSI [Foreign Service Institute] in one of the A-100 introductory officer training programs. My memory is that it consisted of about six weeks of general orientation. We had a very big group—maybe 50 or 60 members in the class. Then there was a consular segment of very explicit training for consular work. During the course, I became friendly with a fellow student—Ed Peach, who was an administrative officer. When I told him that I really didn't want to go to the Philippines, but preferred South Asia, he said: “Look, what you need to do is to go to the Post Management Office of NEA [Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs] and find out from them whether there are any vacancies in South Asia, because they keep the records.” I think he had worked in that office.

So I went around to NEA. Somebody pulled out a little card with posts and names slotted against positions. It turned out there was a vacancy for a Third Secretary/Economic Officer at the Embassy in Karachi, Pakistan. The post management officer confirmed that there was a vacancy there. Then I then went around to Frances Wilson, told her that I wasn't very happy with the assignment to the Philippines, that I was really interested in South Asia and that there was a vacancy in Karachi. She said: “Let me see what I can do about it.” About a month later Frances told me: “You're going to Karachi.” They probably thought that I was crazy, but that is the way it happened. I eventually formally got a formal note from somebody, confirming my assignment to Pakistan. I assume that Frances stage-managed the whole process.

I remember very little about the A-100 course except that I didn't think it was very good. It was a mishmash. Some of the lectures were good. The focus was on the Washington inter-agency process to which I had been exposed for a couple of years; so that I didn't learn much new. Then, I went to the consular course, which was also not terribly good.

They taught one thing—which was important—and that was to use the consular section of the “Foreign Service Manual.” Basically, the whole program was fairly boring.

In fact, because I was going to Karachi, I got interested in studying Urdu, the main language of Pakistan. I started cutting some of the classes in the consular course and got in touch with the language people at FSI. The linguist who ran the language program for South Asia arranged for me to get training for about a week not learning Urdu but learning how to learn it. In fact, that week of language preparation was probably the most valuable time I spent at the FSI. They taught me how to pronounce the language, how to make the sounds, how to use a “native speaker” in learning the language, and how to take the FSI material and teach yourself. That was very, very valuable. You can't really teach Urdu to yourself. You have to have somebody to work with. However, I learned the system, and the process of studying Urdu.I then went to Pakistan. I did not have any area training at all. The country desk people didn't give you much time either. I was a very junior officer, a Third Secretary in a seven-man Economic Section of the Embassy in Karachi. I think that it was a new position, and nobody was quite sure what I was going to do. But I read up on Pakistan and on India.

As was the custom in those days, I took a ship—first class—to Britain, where I had relatives. Then I went by train across Europe, visiting various friends. I flew from, I think, Frankfurt [Germany] to Beirut [Lebanon] and from Beirut to Karachi. They were long flights in those days—this was before jet aircraft had entered service.

I arrived in Karachi at the end of November. For me, at least, it was hot as hell. It must have been 90 degrees outside. I still remember the ride in from the airport. The poverty was worse than I had seen in Korea and shocked me. I was met at the airport by Stanley Schiff, who was in the Economic Section and driven right to my government-furnished quarters, introduced to other people, and, perhaps, invited to dinner.

For a few days, I was still a bit “shell shocked,” from my first impressions of Karachi. Some 10 years after partition with India, there were still a lot of refugees, living in squatter camps along with their animals in dirty mud huts. There was one such camp right outside where I lived. They were living under very, very poor and very, very dirty conditions. It was depressing.

Karachi was an old, city built by the British that hadn't changed much at all physically after 1947, but its population of approximately 200,000 people had grown to about two million people when I arrived. It was overcrowded. It is pretty much the same city now, except that it has grown to seven to nine million people.

We didn't live in compounds. We lived in housing which was scattered here and there. The Embassy had U.S. government apartments either rented or owned. I lived in a two-story house with four apartments. The apartments had marble floors. There was a secretary from USIS [United States Information Service] upstairs and a communications officer in another apartment. I had a two-bedroom apartment. In those days you had air conditioning only in the occupied bedrooms. The area was then quite nice. Now, that area looks like the Bronx [in New York]. At the time it was what I would call “South Asia Southern California Modern.”

It was my first experience with domestic servants. I had five. There was the gardener, the “bearer,” the “assistant bearer,” and the “sweeper.” and a laundryman. Some of them were employed part time. Jamal Din was the “bearer.” He was a Punjabi with a turban and mustache and looked like someone from a Hollywood movie on British India. He had started working as a bearer in 1917—this was 40 years later, so he was about 60 at that time. He was very much a servant of the “Raj” [British India] and then later for Americans. He was the cook, bought the food, served and ran the house generally. It was amusing. If you have read in books about British India about servants, and the young Englishman, it was sort of like my relationship with him. I ended up owing him money all the time. I

figured that this was one way to “keep him honest.” He was always “ripping me off” at the market but I liked him and we worked things out.

At the time, in the late 1950s, the U. S. had a very close relationship with Pakistan, because we had an alliance which had been established in 1954. That was really quite controversial. We wanted the pact to bolster the area against the Communists and the Pakistanis were really concerned about India.

A seven officers Economic Section seemed large, but because Pakistan was a U. S. ally, we were concerned about its economic development and wanted to know what was going on. At that point in Foreign Service life, the Embassy was like a “vacuum cleaner” in terms of reporting. Washington wanted to know everything, and we had very extensive reporting requirements. We needed to have a large staff to meet these. Whether it was really needed is another question.

During the first six months I was in Pakistan, we were attached to ICA [International Cooperation Administration]—the predecessor agency to AID. The head of the Economic Section was also Deputy Director of ICA. We were integrated in the sense that we were located in the same building. However, in fact, we were not integrated. We were doing economic reporting, and ICA was handling the assistance program. We were not in the Chancery. We were located in downtown Karachi with the aid people. My recollection is that this arrangement didn't work out too well. There was little interaction between us and the aid people and we were annoyed that we were not in the Chancery.

My job was to report on various subjects, including transportation, and textiles and agricultural policy—the part which the Agricultural Attach# didn't do. I had a certain amount of guidance, but for day-to-day activities, I was pretty much on my own. I was given an area to work in, and some suggestions were made that I might do this or do that. After that, I was given a fair amount of leeway. This arrangement worked pretty well for what we were trying to do. The Economic Counselor was Tom Robinson, a very good man. He

arrived in Karachi about six months after I did. There was a Commercial Attach#—Hugh Curry who was quite good. And there was Stan Schiff, a bright financial economist. There was another junior officer named Gordon Chase who also was good. There was a woman officer, Frances Highland. She had an apartment in the house where I lived. She had been, I think, a Foreign Service secretary in China before World War II. She successfully "Wristonized" as an officer. She did industrial reporting—for example, on petroleum and was quite productive.

I remember one interesting report I did on the textile industry which was then growing rapidly as Pakistan was a major cotton producer. I visited all of the major textile mills, mostly around Karachi, but I also traveled around Pakistan quite a bit. In fact, after I had been there five months, I was told: "Look, we don't know very much about the major irrigation dams and the irrigation system in West Pakistan. Why don't you take a trip and write a report on it." So I got in my car by myself, and drove about 3,000 miles all over West Pakistan. I visited six or seven major irrigation projects. Life was such as that time that even as a Third Secretary of the American Embassy, I could do that. When I went up to Lahore, about 800 miles from Karachi and the capital of West Pakistan, I called on the Chief Engineer, the head of the water program for West Pakistan. He had perhaps never seen an American looking at his operations in such detail, although undoubtedly the aid people had been there. But as far as I could tell, he was pleased by our interest and didn't seem to resent the questions I asked.

The countryside was poor, particularly in the southern area, the Sindh. The area was very arid, mostly desert. If you didn't have irrigation, you couldn't farm. There were certain areas that were covered by irrigation, where the farming results were not bad even though farming techniques were poor. But there were lots of people even on the desert areas. One of the things that always hit me about Pakistan was that you would be driving around and you would stop your car in the middle of nowhere in the desert to eat a sandwich or

what have you. Pretty soon there would be 50 people around. It wasn't clear where they came from.

Apart from the density of the population, you were struck by the poverty in the cities—both in India and Pakistan. That hit me at first, although after a while I got used to it. Otherwise, you couldn't survive. Karachi was somewhat worse than other major Pakistani cities because it had a lot of refugees who fled there in 1947 and were still living in mud huts and squalid conditions a decade later.

For me, at least, Pakistan was a wonderful learning experience about the Foreign Service. The greatest value of what I did at the time was that it provided a good basis for me to become a South Asia specialist. I learned an enormous amount about Pakistan from reporting, traveling around, talking with people. Americans were generally well liked at the time so contacts were relatively easy. I continued to work on Urdu. I took early morning classes at the Embassy, which didn't amount to much. I kept this up and then I hired a fellow at my own expense for further study in the evening. Surprisingly, none of the American officers in the Embassy knew how to speak Urdu well. A couple of people had taken the FSI course. However, South Asia is unusual in that the educated population spoke English and business is conducted in English. Urdu or Hindi are good only for two things: one is to talk to the “man in the street,” who doesn't know English. Two, if you really get fluent at speaking Urdu or Hindi, it is a terrific public relations gesture. People like it. However, you can function as a diplomat without the language in South Asia. You can, for example, read the main newspapers and magazines in English. They carry most everything that is in the Urdu or vernacular press. The civil servants and people in the foreign ministry and business circles all speak fluent English, etc.

But Urdu helps you enormously to get around, especially when you are on your own. In their day-to-day living a lot of the Americans [in Pakistan] were terribly frustrated because they couldn't speak to the common people. Knowledge of English is very limited when you get beyond the elite and the educated. So my knowledge of Urdu was very helpful.

Indeed, after about a year, my Urdu was pretty good. I used to go around the countryside, giving talks for USIS [United States Information Service] in Urdu. In the end, I was the only fluent Urdu speaker in the Embassy. The work was interesting—I enjoyed reporting—but learning Urdu “made” my tour in Karachi. While there, I was finally promoted after nearly four years in the bottom grade. I think that I spent longer as an FSO-7 before being promoted to FSO-6 than it took me to go from FSO-2 to FSO-1.

On one occasion, I was given an assignment which had nothing to do with economic reporting because I could speak Urdu well. We had gotten wind, somehow, that there was a plot to assassinate Ayub Khan. The Political Counselor asked me to meet the “key man” in the plot who was a fortune teller or a numerologist. This “key man” was linked to a Pakistani religious and political leader who supposedly behind the plot. The Political Counselor said: “Can you go down and meet this fellow and see what you can find out—without giving away that this is what we were trying to do?”

The reason I was needed was that the fortune teller didn't know any English. I spent several hours having my palm read and my fortune told—trying to get to know the fellow. I never really found out anything, but it was an interesting experience. I never could determine whether there was a real plot or whether it had just been gossip which was picked up by someone.

As I suggested earlier, we had a large economic assistance program in Pakistan. Basically, we were underwriting the development budget of Pakistan. My feeling about the aid program was mixed. Some of our people were quite good and helpful. A lot of the projects were just a total “mismatch.” I found an illustration of this “mismatch” out in the countryside in the Province of Sindh—maybe 200 miles north of Karachi. We had come to a small government office, like a county headquarters where I met two women ICA experts. I was there for the day, traveling around and looking into irrigation matters. They were home economics teachers from Ohio and their project was to teach home economics to Pakistani women, by getting home economics into the curriculum of the

rural schools. The project was a total “mismatch.” The AID women were working at one level, with one set of values which had absolutely nothing to do with the values which rural Pakistani women had. The ladies were quite nice, but they were a bit lost. They didn't understand the environment, and that their program couldn't work in that environment. I think unfortunately that this happened with a lot of our aid programs at the time. The money was committed rapidly, and then the staffs began to think of ways to spend it.

One of the ways to spend it was in the field of education, where the Pakistanis certainly needed help. However, the AID view seemed to be that if we teach home economics in the U. S., then we should teach home economics in Pakistan. I don't think that the Pakistanis knew what these people were talking about. These ladies didn't know what the Pakistanis were talking about.On another occasion when I was travelling in Sindh perhaps 200 miles north of Karachi, the Pakistani hosts said to me, “Oh, you are from the American Embassy. You must see our aid project. We have a wonderful science laboratory.” So we visited the laboratory at a local college. There was lots of equipment on hand—refrigerators and various other modern things. I noted that the equipment wasn't plugged in. When I asked why, I was told: “Well, there is a little problem. We don't have any electricity.” AID had given the Pakistanis some money to equip science labs for local colleges. Nobody apparently bothered to find out if they had electricity. I think that there was a lot of that sort of thing going on.

That is not to say that there weren't a lot of good aid programs. There was the Mangla dam, a big project, but that came after my tour. There were other things that we did well. We were involved in helping the Pakistani Railways. They needed re-equipment. We helped PIA, (Pakistan International Airlines). There we had a contract with Pan American Airways, which brought in a team which “lived” with PIA and showed them how to operate the system. That worked quite well. PIA was much better than Indian Airlines, which modernized itself on its own. So some of the aid projects were good. Some of them were not so good.

What was very important in the mid-1950s was the commodity imports program. This amounted to giving the Pakistanis money to import equipment and commodities at a time when they were short of foreign exchange. We also helped the Pakistanis with food imports under PL 480. Then we had other projects, as we did in India, to help set up, for example, an agricultural training facility, with a longer term American commitment—not just dumping equipment on them. Under these programs, Americans would be there for five or 10 years. Usually these projects were conducted under a contract with an American land grant college. I think that they worked pretty well. However, it was a rather helter skelter.

The Economic Counselor was at first involved in the program planning. Part of the problem was that he did so much work on assistance programs that he wasn't really running the Economic Section. We had was a very strong director for the aid program—Jim Killen—who later became AID director in Vietnam. He was an old trade union type. My impression was that he was rough and nasty, and not very sensitive to the feelings of others—including the Pakistanis. I had a good Pakistani friend whom I met when I wrote the textile report. He was Textile Commissioner or Deputy Textile Commissioner. He told me about a meeting with Killen where the AID Director “chewed out” the Pakistanis the way you would “chew out” Americans. After Killen left the meeting, the senior Pakistani turned to his colleagues and apologized for having had to suffer the insults of “this American boor.” However, he said, Pakistan was a poor country, and they had to put up with these “awful people.” That was Killen's style—a bull in the china shop.

There were other much better people there. With the Pakistan Planning Commission, we had a group from Harvard, headed by David Bell and funded by Ford. They worked closely with the Pakistanis, quite amicably, and had a big impact.

We had an enormous Embassy. There were seven people in the Economic Section and half a dozen people in the Political Section. There was a big aid program. We had a big CIA operation, which I was only vaguely aware of. We had a big military assistance

program. The reason we were so very heavily engaged in Pakistan was the alliance relationship we had with them.

I began to develop contacts in the Pakistani ministries. It took me a while. In fact, in the beginning—during my first six months there—I was frequently sick. It was a difficult adjustment. Maintaining good health was a problem for Embassy people. I think that 20-25% of the Americans there contracted hepatitis. This was before gamma globulin [an injection against hepatitis] became available. Almost everybody came down with dysentery or malaria. However, I think that once you got through the initial period—if you got through it—then you were “fine.” At least, that was my experience.

There were psychological problems for the Embassy people which still continue today to some extent in South Asia. Getting through the “health barrier” is in part a psychological phenomenon. A lot of Americans became so concerned or had such bad health problems that they went into a cocoon and never get out into the society. In Pakistan the American establishment was so big that it could be “self-contained.” Many people saw a lot of other Americans and didn't have much to do with the Pakistanis.

It was not my experience, though. I was not married at the time and figured that I had not gone to Pakistan to see a lot of Americans. The educated Pakistanis were very pro-American at the time and very sociable. People invited you to their homes. There was one major sports and social club, the Gymkhana Club, which is still there, left over from the British colonial days. “Khana” means “house,” and it is a house for “gym.” It was right in downtown Karachi, and had tennis and squash courts.

There was much socializing with people from the other embassies and younger Westernized Pakistanis—and some Americans as well. I met many younger Pakistanis particularly in my second year and felt that I understood something about the country. That was quite gratifying. Pakistan was essentially a three class society. There were the elite —the English speakers. Then came the middle class, members of which might or might

not speak English. They were basically shop keepers, middle grade military officers, and the lower level bureaucrats. Then there were the poor, who were the vast majority. In the rural areas there was a semi-feudal society. There were big landlords, who were the “big shots” in those areas. They were like feudal lords controlling the villages and the peasants on their large estates.

Pakistani women were in two categories. The Western-educated, emancipated women spoke English. They usually had gone to Western schools, either overseas or at a convent or private school in Pakistan where they studied in English all the way through. However, the wives of many of the Pakistani civil servants were in “purdah” [secluded; they did not circulate outside of the home]. They were not brought to parties or, if they did come, they had nothing to say. They just sat and giggled with each other. At parties these Pakistani women tended to sit separately, so that they didn't play much of a role.

However, there were women who were well educated. The Pakistanis, as opposed to the Indians, liked to dance and party. I did more dancing in Pakistan than in any other place during my entire time in the Foreign Service. There were a lot of parties, and the Pakistanis were great fun lovers. This was true even though the majority of the Pakistani women did not join the festivities. For example, Ayub Khan's wife did not usually come out into society. She would not attend social occasions even if hosted by the Ambassador. Very often the senior Pakistani officials would not come to Embassy functions with their wives.

As I said earlier, after six months or so, I became acquainted with some officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, although not a lot. Most of my contacts were with the economic Ministries. I was not dealing with bilateral diplomatic issues, but was reporting on aspects of the economy. When I was doing a report, I would go around to see the people in the appropriate ministries. They were really quite open. The United States was much beloved at that time—not by everybody, but in general.

My views of the Pakistani bureaucracy were somewhat mixed. At the top they were very efficient. On the whole, they weren't bad. Some of them had been trained in England. Some of the newer people were less well trained. It was mixed bag. The younger Foreign Ministry people had been trained in the US. I had met some when I was at Fletcher where the Pakistanis used to send their junior Foreign Service people. That practice lasted until about 1960. So I had the advantage of knowing some Pakistanis and their families from my own time in graduate school.

At first, the economic section was separate from the Embassy. I got to the Chancery once a week when there was a big staff meeting with the Ambassador, attended by all of the substantive FSO's, perhaps 20 or 25 people. Later the Economic Section moved to the Chancery, which was in a horrible building over a jeep repair shop in the center of town. The jeep dealer had the ground floor and had a repair shop in the back, with an open courtyard. The Embassy had the top three floors. The Economic Counselor had an air conditioner in his office, but that was about it. During the hot season, when it gets to 110 degrees [Fahrenheit], everybody else just suffered. It was pretty bad.

During the first year or year and a half that I was in Karachi, the Ambassador was a man from New Hampshire named James Langley. He was a crusty, conservative newspaperman. I didn't have much to do with him, except for one embarrassing occasion. The DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] for the first year or year and a half was Ridgway Knight, who was really more French than American. He had grown up in France and had a bit of a French accent.

The Political Counselor was Mallory Brown. I didn't realize at first that he was rather ineffective. He had been a well known newspaperman during World War II for the “Christian Science Monitor.” Then he joined the Foreign Service—I'm not quite sure how or why. The thing that he did best was write. The Economic Counselor, Tom Robinson, was

good. He had worked for the Department of Agriculture and had grown up on a farm. He was a warm and friendly man who later worked for the FAO in Rome.

The Political Section included Chris Van Hollen and Jane Abell (later Jane Coon) who both became ambassadors in South Asia. There was another Political Officer, David Linebaugh, a very fine officer who was later in a terrible automobile accident from which he never really recovered. There was a Political-Military Officer—Jules Bassin, for whom I later worked in Personnel.

I think these officers were at the heart of Embassy. I was impressed with them. They were a good group, a well-qualified and hard working. The DCM used to call on the junior officers to do something or other from time to time—to go out to the airport to meet a VIP, etc. Ridgway Knight's wife was French. She was not very much involved. The Ambassador and Mrs. Langley did not place any demands on the junior officers. I think that the American Embassy community was relatively happy for such a big place, even though there were occasional grumbles. There was a large American School.

About the only source for recreation other than tennis and squash, or horse back riding, was going to the beach at Hawkes Bay, about an hour's drive away on the Arabian Sea coast. People had “beach huts,” which were really little houses which they rented. I was part of a group which rented one of them, Chris Van Hollen and Stan Schiff were also owners. Now that I think back on it, it was a relatively amicable group there. There were some problems, but not many, occasional friction between the State Department and aid people, often about housing accommodations. But on the whole, housing was pretty well organized and very good. In comparison to most Pakistanis, Americans lived well.

I didn't get a chance to visit East Pakistan which was a long way away although I traveled all over West Pakistan during my tour. I didn't know it at the time, but the oral history interview of Arch Blood makes clear that there was friction between the Consul General in Dacca, the capital of East Pakistan, and the Embassy. The Consuls General looked

on themselves as sort of “mini-Ambassadors.” The Consul General in Lahore, Andy Corry, was like that. He was very knowledgeable about Pakistan, but very protective of his territory. He had been the Minerals Attach# during an earlier tour. Transportation was not so easy in Pakistan in those days. PIA [Pakistan International Airways] wasn't all of that good. You had to go by train, a long, slow trip, so the Consuls were pretty largely left alone. They were on their own, for the most part. They were quite concerned about Embassy people traveling in their consular districts and they wanted to know what they were doing. You had to “clear” all visits to their districts with them.

I remember that the first time I visited Lahore, I stayed in a local hotel. Corry, the Consul General, was rather suspicious of me. However, the next time I visited, he invited me to stay at his place. By then he thought that I was “all right.” He was rather “persnickety” but very knowledgeable. The Consul Generals obviously had the great advantage in that the American presence in their consular districts was relatively small. So they had much better contact with the local Pakistani community than the Embassy had.

Talking of policy, many of my Pakistani friends liked the US but not the alliance with us. The Dean at the Fletcher School—Hayden Williams—got a job as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and came through Karachi when I was there. He was interested in meeting some “non-official” Pakistanis. By then I had gotten to know a lot of Pakistani journalists and intellectuals well. Basically, they would have liked Pakistan to follow a foreign policy like that of India. They preferred neutralism and didn't like being aligned with the United States. They really weren't concerned about communism at all. Their concern was India. We, of course, were concerned about the Communists and wanted good relations with India. This led to a basic “mismatch” in our alliance relationship with the Pakistanis. When Hayden Williams visited Karachi, we went out to lunch with a Pakistani woman, a friend of mine, who was a journalist. Williams started asking her about the alliance with the U. S. and why Pakistan wanted military aid from us, saying that this aid was to help Pakistan against communism. She said: “No, we don't care about the communists. We need this aid against India.” When he asked: “Aren't

you worried about communism?" She answered, "No." He was shaken up by this. The Pakistanis were obsessed with by the "Indian threat" and you can understand why. We chose to ignore this reality. The Eisenhower administration had the idea of surrounding the communists with alliances and allies. The Pakistanis were one of our allies, and we were going to help them. We were not unaware of Pakistani views, but preferred to just to filtered this unpleasant fact out.

We also created a problem because our presence in Pakistan was so great and so heavy that it almost looked as if we were replacing the British. The intellectuals felt uncomfortable about this. They didn't like the idea of being a "lackey" of the Americans, which is to some extent what they had become. This was the general feeling among the younger Pakistanis that I knew. Certainly, we were welcomed by the Pakistani military, who lived off us and were well equipped thanks to us. The civil servants and the economic people were annoyed by AID Director Killen, but he was just one individual. They were happy enough to take our aid funds.

The younger Pakistanis that I knew were children of well to do families and were well-educated. They were concerned and jealous about India but greatly influenced by Nehru, who was the dominant figure in South Asia. They thought that Pakistan should not be a consumption driven society. There aim was to follow some sort of moderate socialist pattern. They tended to feel that Pakistan was on the wrong path, blaming us, to some extent, for this. However, this feeling was somewhat muffled because they were so scared of the Indians. We were their security shield against India.

They viewed their own military relatively positively. I was in Pakistan when Ayub Khan took over power in October 1958. The civilian government of Pakistan, which had been in control during my first year there, was really a mess. It wasn't functioning. There was a lot of back biting. Right before its collapse there was a big fight in the East Pakistan Assembly, in which the Deputy Speaker was killed after he was hit by an inkwell.The Pakistanis whom I knew were ashamed of the political turmoil. India, by then, had two

elections and seemed to be moving ahead. The Pakistanis didn't seem to be able to get their act together.

When Ayub first came into power, I think that there was a rather universal feeling of relief that the country was finally on a firmer footing. Ayub was well received by my friends even though they sometimes might have had relatives who were kicked out of jobs. But Ayub put civilians into office, too. I remember that one of the younger civilians that he put into office was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Martial law meant that the Army was running the show. They could enact laws by the issuance of an ordinance. The government did begin to operate more effectively. Right at the beginning of the Ayub Khan period three things happened. One, he cleaned up Karachi. He resettled the refugees into new towns. These were quickly built and the refugees were moved into permanent quarters.

Then, they got people to work on time. For the Pakistanis the work day theoretically started at 9:00 AM. But people would not be there until 11:00 AM. Suddenly, it was a military operation and people were on time. But that didn't last all of that long. Ayub Khan also carried out a purge of the government. A number of people were fired for corruption. These were senior government officials, including one man I used to deal with in Civil Aviation. Examples were made of the worst offenders, who they were fired.

Ayub also carried out a modest land reform program, which was a big domestic issue in West Pakistan. It was a modest effort, and did not break the back of the big landlord and the feudal system. The lower limit of land which an individual could hold was quite high. There were loopholes, too, so that it didn't affect too many landholders. The Army didn't go after the landlords who weren't badly hurt by the reforms.

During the year that I was there when Ayub was in power, things were running much better. In fact, this happened in Burma and in a couple of other countries where there were military takeovers. There was a feeling at the time that maybe we were too facile in

assuming that democracy was the best way for Third World countries. Maybe they needed a period of firmer rule and stability before they could make democracy work.

During the first few years under Ayub, Pakistan went from being an unstable mess to become a country which was seen as promising. The country was uplifted psychologically as well as economically. Pakistanis had a renewed sense of pride. Maybe the economic achievements weren't fully noticed in one year, but people felt more optimistic. They felt better about themselves, than they had before.

In the mid 1950s, we were just developing a corps of South Asian specialists, such as Chris Van Hollen and Dave Schneider. There was a man before him named Morris Dembo and Jane Coon. And then I got into it. Hal Josif was telling me that he was sent for training, I think about 1950. So there were people sent for university or language training who knew a great deal about India or Pakistan, but most of the Embassy were in Pakistan on their first tours—or perhaps their second tours, at most. This was one of the reasons that you had these cultural “gaps,” they often didn't know Pakistani customs.

Being the low man on the Economic Section totem pole, I didn't get involved in many substantive issues. There actually was a lot going on. When I write my book, I will get into some of these things. For example, during this period the Pakistan arms program really ballooned. Nobody could explain how it ballooned. The Pakistanis were very good at getting money from us. We suddenly were very short of money in the military assistance program. President Eisenhower exploded at a meeting of the NSC [National Security Council] on the Pakistan arms program, asking how we had gotten into this damned thing. He asked why we were doing it. However, he said that now that we were into it, we couldn't get out of it.

Q: Then, in 1960, you were assigned to Madras, India, as the Commercial/Consular Officer. How did that assignment come about?

[Tape did not record segment on Madras.]

Q: Now we are in 1962. You have been assigned to Washington as Desk Officer for Nepal and the Assistant Desk Officer for India. Could you tell me what your responsibilities were? You were the sole Desk Officer for Nepal.

KUX: I was the support officer in Washington for our Embassy in Nepal. Basically, I was supposed to know and to be involved in anything that happened in the U. S. Government regarding Nepal—anything that had foreign policy ramifications. It was an “across the board” responsibility, including the “care and feeding” of the Nepalese Embassy in Washington. There was a steady flow of correspondence with the Ambassador and DCM of our Embassy in Nepal. The Ambassador wrote to the Office Director, Turner Cameron, but I drafted the replies for his signature. At the time Nepal was of interest because the Chinese Communists and the Indians were jousting for influence. Let me put it this way. Nepal, which the Indians consider part of their defense zone, was trying to gain a little breathing space by expanding its relations with China. As the Chinese had bad relations with the Indians at the time—this was right before the Sino-Indian War—the Indians were very nervous and we in turn became very nervous.

The organizational structure at the time was as follows: under the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs [NEA] there were four Offices, one of which was the Office of South Asian Affairs. Turner Cameron was the Director of that Office. He had been DCM in Colombo but was really a “Europeanist.” The Deputy Director was Carol Laise, who had been Political Officer in New Delhi. Ambassadors Galbraith and Bunker liked her. In fact, Ambassador Bunker eventually married her. Galbraith had Carol Laise sent back to the Department. I think that the Department “fired” the man who had been Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs. He didn't move fast enough for Galbraith. The Office covered India, Pakistan, Ceylon as well as Afghanistan and Nepal. There were

two subgroups. One was concerned with India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka, and the other one covered Pakistan and Afghanistan.

I was a staff member of the group that dealt with India, Nepal, and Ceylon—now Sri Lanka. The desk officer for India said, “Well, you are probably not going to be busy full time, so you can work on India on an 'as assigned' basis.”

The first assignment I had, which was a bit of a shock for me, was to review and appraise something like six months of political reporting from the Embassy and Consulates in India. The desk officer said, “My God, I couldn't get to it. Why don't you go through this stuff?”

One of the major reasons for the Consulates in India was to serve as “listening posts” or political reporting posts. At the time, we had Consulates in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras —the same ones as now, although they do much less reporting. The people who prepared these reports assumed that Washington was listening, but there was the India desk, the main repository and the main “target” for this reporting and nobody read the reports. So, as the junior officer in the office, I read and appraised the reports.

This exercise made me think a little about the value of the political reporting. I realized later on, though I did not realize it at the time, that there is a broader audience in Washington than just the State desk. Perhaps it was too broad an audience, with the CIA, the Defense Department, and the INR analysts all reading the reports. However, we clearly did not need all of the information in the regional bureau of the State Department.

Eventually, I concluded that there was value in the reporting different from what I originally believed. It served as a training ground for the junior officers who were doing most of the reporting. They learned about the country in a way that they otherwise would not have done. They honed their reporting skills. In 1962 we had political reporting officers in each of the three Consulates and in Bombay we had two. They sent in a of material on local and state level politics, in addition to Embassy reporting airgrams.

At a certain point the India Desk Officer left, and I think that there was something like a year's gap until his replacement came. In effect, I became the India Desk Officer, as well as the Nepal Desk Officer. That was at a very interesting time. J. Kenneth Galbraith was the Ambassador, and he would come sauntering through the Department from time to time. He was always handled by David Schneider, the Officer-in-Charge, and Carol Laise, the Deputy Office Director.

A question arises periodically concerning the desirability of having one Office responsible for both India and Pakistan. In fact, from a policy point of view, it didn't make any difference. The policy was set at a much higher level than the Office Director. In 1962, when India and Pakistan had far higher priorities than they do now, policy was set by the top echelons of the administration. In the Eisenhower administration there was a greater emphasis at first on military assistance and military arrangements, a dislike of neutralism, and a tendency toward Pakistan. This shifted under Kennedy. The Office of South Asian Affairs implemented the policy; it didn't make it.

The policy level began at the Assistant Secretary level and there was friction there, which I didn't realize between Phil Talbot, the Assistant Secretary, and Galbraith. If you read Ambassador Galbraith's book, you can see that he heartily disliked Talbot. Phil knew much more about South Asia than Galbraith. He had spent most of the years between 1939 and 1947 dealing with the subcontinent and had a very balanced view. Talbot felt that the United States should have good relations with both India and Pakistan. He didn't jump fast enough on the India band wagon to suit Ambassador Galbraith.

Talbot wasn't “anti-Indian.” Rather, he considered U. S. interests in the region as a whole and designed U. S. policy accordingly. The goals of the Kennedy administration were affected by the personalities whom I have mentioned. Ambassador Chester Bowles was on one extreme. He wanted to say, “To hell with Pakistan and let's go with India”, when he was Under secretary of State. Ambassador Galbraith also “tilted” toward India, but he was more erratic than Ambassador Bowles. I think that Galbraith took into account, to a greater

extent, the interests of Pakistan. Bob Komer, who was the South Asia man on the National Security Council staff, and Talbot were pretty close on US policy. They wanted greater emphasis on the relationship with India than had been the case during the Eisenhower administration. However, they did not want to give up the relationship with Pakistan. There were two reasons for this.

One reason was that, after the disaster of the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in 1961, which came very early during the Kennedy administration, the administration did not want to dump an ally. The ally, in this case, was Pakistan. The Kennedy administration felt that it could lay itself open to a lot of criticism from conservatives. The second reason was of more direct interest. We had intelligence facilities in Pakistan—electronic listening posts which, according to the intelligence community, gave unique information on Soviet missile and nuclear testing. That was a threat which the Pakistanis held over us, if we leaned too far toward the Indians. That was in the back of people's minds.

There was also the feeling of others—Dean Rusk, for example—that you really couldn't count on the Indians. You would be giving up a known quantity in the sense of an ally—maybe difficult at times but still an ally—for people [in this case, the Indians] who were considered unreliable. Krishna Menon [former Indian Defense Minister] was still around and was always an anti-US menace. Nehru was fading at this point. In any case, the Indians didn't make it easy for Americans who wanted a stronger relationship with them.

Very early on, one thing that happened, which was probably a tactical mistake, was for the Kennedy administration to greatly expand our aid program to India. That came almost immediately after President Kennedy took office. So we gave away, if you think of it in those terms, a bargaining chip. The aid program had already increased under the Eisenhower administration. It increased further under the Kennedy administration. I don't recall the exact figures, but my recollection is that it was $1.0 billion a year, which was big, big money in those days. Basically, this economic aid underwrote the Indian economic development program. Other countries were also involved, but we were the key.

The Office Director was really the “mechanic.” He carried out the policies set by the assistant Secretary and his superiors. He did not initiate the policies. The Office Director did see Talbot and Bowles frequently. There also was a Deputy Assistant Secretary, who was very important, just because of who he was. I refer to Jim Grant who has just died. He was very much involved in the more important issues. He was into the policy process—the first level of tat process really, really an informal, inter-agency process. It involved Talbot and Grant, for the State Department; Bill Gaud the Assistant AID Administrator for Near East and South Asia, Bob Komer from the NSC staff at the White House, and Critchfield from CIA and someone from Defense. In those days it was a very informal White House. Komer had direct access to the President.

It was not a formal structure, but there still was a process. There was also an NSC process, in the sense that on a number of occasions President Kennedy met different agencies on India and Pakistan. Rusk had experience with South Asia because he spent part of World War II out there. There was also McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

There had been trouble all the time along the Sino-India border, going back a couple of years. There were serious clashes. We had intelligence that the Chinese Communists had increased their troop deployments, as had the Indians. However, what we didn't know was that the Chinese would actually strike the Indians. That took people by surprise. Then the next thing that took people by surprise was the poor performance of the Indian Army.

When the word came that the Chinese had struck, as a relatively junior officer I went scurrying around, because I knew how to get the press tickers faster than anybody else. I was constantly running down to the press room or wherever the wire service machines were kept. We got much of our information from the wire services. That was my contribution. I was given the task of writing a daily “Sitrep” [Situation Report] which then

went to the Secretary of State and the “Seventh Floor” of the State Department so that the principals would know what was happening.

No task force was set up. You have to remember that this happened simultaneously with the Cuban Missile Crisis of October, 1962. You had the rather strange situation—and Ambassador Galbraith points this out in his book—that for a 10 day or two week period there was the threat of a major regional war and the threat of an even larger conflict involving the major powers going on at the same time. The Sino-Indian War was obscured from the general vision by the Cuban Missile Crisis. So the Sino-Indian War was handled by the informal task force composed of the South Asia office of the Department of State and the Pentagon. The immediate U. S. response was to add a person to the India desk to handle Political-Military issues.

The policy decision to provide immediate military aid to India was made in a matter of days; we then tried to persuade the Pakistanis not to take any unhelpful actions. This last goal was basically not achieved. The actions that we took were all handled expeditiously, without a lot of paper work. The results were seen in Presidential messages to Ayub Khan and Nehru, and this correspondence moved back and forth very rapidly during the crisis.

There were two phases of the crisis. The first phase occurred on or about October 20, 1962. The Indian Army was kicked in the teeth, and then there was a lull. Three weeks later, in mid to late November, the Indians launched an offensive. The Chinese were waiting for this and beat the hell out of the Indians. At that point the President decided at a White House meeting to send Averell Harriman—then the Assistant Secretary for FE—to India to find out what the Indians really wanted. He went with Paul Nitze and others. This was, I think, the highest powered official American mission that has ever gone to South Asia. Nitze may have been an Assistant Secretary of Defense at the time. Jim Grant also was on that mission as well as Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence & Research, Carl Kaysen, from the White House, and General Paul Adams, a four-star general.

There was a separate British group that went out to South Asia at the same time. The Kennedy administration—more than the Eisenhower administration—was interested in getting the British and the British Commonwealth in on the act. Secretary Rusk felt very strongly about that—having “more flags flying.” He felt that we should not be alone. Since South Asia had been a British territory, they should be present. So the British sent Duncan Sandys, a cabinet minister at the time.

In December 1962, there was a conference in Bermuda between President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan. It was decided to provide another $120 million in short-term military assistance to India. The aid provided was split 50-50 between the Commonwealth and the United States, with India and Pakistan each getting about $60 million.

The crisis did ended when the Chinese pulled their troops back and, in effect, imposed a settlement. Then there was a dispute within the State Department. I remember that quite vividly. On the China desk, Lindsey Grant, who was the equivalent to David Schneider, said that this is simply a border conflict and that the Chinese were just teaching the Indians a lesson. They were not out to conquer India or get the U. S. involved in major hostilities. On the India desk, I think, we saw events more as the Indians saw them. We felt that there was a fundamental challenge to the democracy and the security of India.

The Kennedy administration had seen these events as an opportunity to strengthen our relations with the Indians, which had been its goal, by providing immediate assistance and by going along with the Indian view that this was a fundamental challenge by the Chinese. The Indians basically panicked. Indeed, Nehru sent a message to President Kennedy, which has never been released, during the middle of the second crisis with the Chinese. It may have been this message from Nehru which precipitated the despatch of the Harriman mission. In effect, Nehru asked for American military, he wanted the U. S. Air Force to intervene, to provide tactical air support, and to bomb Chinese supply lines. The Indians

didn't want to use their own Air Force because they were afraid that the Chinese would attack India's cities.

This was what I called Nehru's “Dunkirk” message. The Indian Ambassador to the United States was so embarrassed that he kept his only copy of the Nehru message in his desk at the Indian Embassy. I remember seeing the message when it came in. We were all stunned by it. The crisis receded in a day or so when the Chinese announced their cease-fire, and I don't think that Nehru ever got an answer to his message. The matter spun out into talks and discussions. Gradually, the pressure for action by the Kennedy administration diminished.

The major problem was with Pakistan whom the Kennedy administration did not want to “lose”, because of the military facilities which we had there. There was a Pakistani “club” in Washington in the U. S. intelligence community and among the military. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan took the view that the Chinese were not really a major threat to India and that therefore the United States should not respond to India's requests. Ayub became angrier and angrier as we increased our assistance to India. The Pakistanis in turn developed their relationship with China right at this time.

We tried to use the crisis to get a settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. We did get the Indians to agree to talks, but with much, much difficulty. These talks went on for five rounds, from December, 1962, to May, 1963. They got nowhere. The Office of South Asian Affairs played a considerable role, working with the Office of Policy Planning and the NSC in prodding both India and Pakistan into these talks and doing the backstopping. When these talks faltered in the spring of 1963, there was a U. S.-British plan which was presented and rejected by both sides. Ambassador Galbraith commented wryly that we finally got the Indians and Pakistanis to agree on something! So it was a very busy time in the Office of South Asian Affairs. I was still only a helper.

The working relationships between the India and Pakistan Desks were good. Basically, Carol Laise, the Deputy Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs, was rather pro-Indian. She had a stronger personality than Turner Cameron, and the Pakistan Desk suffered accordingly. I mentioned that some people tended to “tilt” toward Pakistan for a couple of reasons. First, they felt that the Pakistanis had gotten the short end of the stick from the Indians in the Kashmir dispute and had been treated badly. Secondly, they felt that the U. S. had more at stake with Pakistanis, that we had more assets at risk in Pakistan. Thirdly, they liked the Pakistanis better than the Indians. This was the human equation.

Everybody saw Pakistan through the prism of the Cold War. India was seen largely through the prism of the Cold War, but there was a generalized feeling that perhaps transcended the Cold War. That is, there was the view that India was the world's largest democracy and required help, quite apart from Cold War considerations. Certainly, at the top level of the U. S. Government India was seen in terms of the Cold War. The second Eisenhower administration and the Kennedy administration did not differ on that.

I was lucky that I had served in both India and Pakistan and so I personally felt some sympathy toward both of them. I have a feeling that if you served just in one of the two countries, it was very hard not to soak up some of the local prejudices. I had the feeling that India was the right side to support. India is the larger country, so that you could make out a geopolitical case in favor of India if you have to pick one country over the other. Unfortunately, it was a “zero sum” game. In the security area it was very hard to work with both India and Pakistan in any substantial way, because each saw the other as their principal enemy.

This was shown in the reaction of the Pakistanis when we gave emergency help to India. They “went through the overhead,” just as the Indians had “gone through the overhead” when we helped Pakistan seven years before [1954] or during the years after that. To some extent, those views were mitigated by our large economic aid programs, which gave us an important stake in both economies. However, basically, it was a “zero sum” game. It

probably would have been impossible to establish a large security relationship with India and maintain a good security relationship with Pakistan. That situation still exists today.

I personally did not view that the provision of military assistance as a cause for further heightening of tension between the two countries. I did had the feeling that we had gone over our heads in the case of Pakistan. I thought that we were too committed to the Pakistanis. I was not aware at the time, at my level, of the intelligence side of things. At the same time I felt that, although we shouldn't “ditch” the Pakistanis, we should have a stronger relationship with the Indians—as frustrating as the Indians were, and God knows that they were frustrating. That was always the problem. They, themselves, were a major hindrance to improved U. S. - Indian relations. They were constantly doing things that annoyed Americans—taking policy initiatives that annoyed us. These were not personality conflicts. In my own view, I feel rather strongly that nations disagree or nations have trouble with each other because they disagree usually on security interests and not because Minister X and Minister Y can't get along.

Look at Korea. I don't think that the Koreans are easy people to deal with. But they are our allies, and it is my feeling that our national security interests parallel. Similarly, with the Turks. They are not easy—they're harder to get along with than the Indians, in many ways. However, they're our allies.

So the fact that the Indians are difficult, I think, was not the point. The point was that we and the Indians disagreed on basic national security concerns: the world struggle, for example. They didn't see this as a “Manichean” struggle between good and evil. They saw it as two power groups struggling with each other. Nehru, for his own reasons—which weren't necessarily stupid or ill-considered—wanted India to stay out of this struggle and be neutral. I think that the Indians would not have annoyed us to such an extent if, for example, they had done what some of the other countries in Asia did. Those countries stayed out of this struggle—really stayed out and said nothing. The Indians felt that they had to “stick their noses into it,” to act as a great power and to be a “go-between.” When

you go back and look at the various issues, they really leaned toward the Soviet side, more often than not, and more than I thought at the time.

As I look back on it, this tilt was a surprise to me. On disarmament questions they had a lot of clout internationally and continued to have it until 1962. They really were a major world force. One of the major results of the Sino-Indian War of 1962 was to destroy India as a major factor in international affairs—for quite a long period. On issues like Berlin, for example, we had trouble with the Russians on access and so forth. Why did Nehru have to make a pronouncement that sounded pro-Russian? That got everybody angry. On the next day, he retracted the statement, but why did he have to do that? Why did he become involved in it at all?

On the other side of the coin, in their own neighborhood, in Jammu and Kashmir, the Indians took what was pretty much a “realpolitik” position. They had the territory. Although earlier, in 1947-1948, they had suggested that the problem be solved by a plebiscite, a year or so later they decided that maybe they didn't want that after all. Thereafter, from 1949 on, whatever suggestion was made to help to solve the issue, it was always the Indians who said, “No.” This attitude made US officials feel that the Indians were rather hypocritical on the issue. They preached morality on many other issues, when it didn't concern them. But when it came to their own interests, then they acted the way that other nations act.

In 1962, Kashmir was, in effect, part of India. It had acceded to India. It had a legal relationship with India which was somewhat different from that of the rest of the country. It had more autonomy. I should say there were two Kashmirs—Azad or Free Kashmir, a part of Kashmir which Pakistan held, and the part of Kashmir which India had. India had the more important part, the valley, which is people usually think of when they talk about Kashmir. In fact, Kashmir is actually a much larger area than that.

Part of the Sino-Indian border dispute was over a section of Kashmir, called the Aksai Chin. This was an area which the Chinese claimed—very far north, on the other side of the Karakoram Mountains. I think that the Indians had rather carelessly laid a claim to this area. It was a “No Man's Land” where virtually no one lived. It is a high altitude desert, a salt plain. No one, as far as I can tell, really “owned” it. In earlier years it had been no great value to anybody. However, in the mid 1950's the Chinese built a road across it to link up Sinkiang and Tibet. So it became important to them. The Indians didn't even know that the road had been built, even though it was in an area that they claimed.

While I was on the desk, the Kashmir issue was not raised in the UN because of a potential Soviet veto. It came up, I think, in 1961 or early 1962, before I got to the desk. What had happened was that in the 1950's, the issue had been regularly on the agenda of the UN Security Council. After 1954 the Indians had the advantage of a potential Soviet veto in their pocket. That pretty well blocked the UN from doing anything. In 1962-1963, as I said before, we got the Indians to enter into bilateral talks with the Pakistanis. Nothing happened. Then, a year later, in 1964, the Indians released the major political leader in Kashmir, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, who had been in jail or under house arrest most of the time since 1953. He was a personal friend of Nehru's. In 1964, Nehru perhaps wavered to some extent during the last month of his life. Abdullah went to Pakistan and got agreement from Ayub Khan and Nehru that they would talk about Kashmir. Then Nehru died. It is not clear what would have happened had Nehru lived.

We were not a player in that episode. In 1963 we tried to do something about Kashmir but it didn't get very far. By that time, the India desk was once again fully staffed and I had much less to do on India.

Other things happened in 1963. We decided—and this was a policy decision by President Kennedy—to provide a small amount of military equipment to Nepal. The Nepalese had been after us to provide such equipment because they wanted to offset the Indians. They felt a little bit uncomfortable about the idea of the Chinese providing them with military

equipment because that would “drive the Indians up the wall.” Our Embassy in Kathmandu favored providing the military equipment. I was for it. We obtained agreement within the State Department that the U. S. should do this. Carol Laise, the SOA Deputy Director, was not happy about it even though we were talking about non-lethal equipment—small amounts of communications gear. However, it was symbolically important. Carol Laise wanted us to tell the Indians about it first, before we proceeded. The Nepalese did not want us to do that, and I did not want to do that—because the Indians would say, “No.” The whole point was to have a policy vis-a-vis Nepal that was separate and apart from Indian desires. We—the Embassy and the desk—finally won out on that.

We were interested in providing this military equipment because we were worried that the Nepalese felt so isolated. Nepal is a land-locked country. They were —and still are—dependent on the Indians who intervened in Nepalese internal politics. We were concerned that the Nepalese would turn to the Chinese, who were then very active and had a historical claim to Nepal, going back to the 17th or 18th century, as a tributary state. It was in the U. S. interest to prevent the expansion of Communist Chinese influence and to ease the pressure on India which Nepal might apply. During the Sino-Indian War, Nepal had been very loyal to India, although it had been given the opportunity to “kick” India, the way the Pakistanis did.

The policy to provide military assistance to Nepal was a presidential decision. This was an issue which was not of major importance, but it involved India, and there were two sides to the question; so the bureaucracy didn't like to make a decision. The issue was finally joined by a visit to the United States of Nepal's Prime Minister, a man named Tulsi Giri. The King of Nepal at the time, King Mahendra, was very shrewd. He had two “teams” which he moved in and out of power. He had a pro-India team and he had a pro-China team. Nepal at the time was a monarchy, and the King actually ruled. They had a democratic government for a year in 1960, but the King dismissed the democratic government and resumed direct rule.

Prime Minister Giri was regarded as pro-Chinese. Some people within the U. S. Government were leery about him, but he came to the United States and made his case to the President. After Kennedy saw Giri, he decided to go ahead with the small military assistance program. Even before Giri made his visit, we had prepared a memorandum to the President recommending approval of military assistance, but no decision had been made by our superiors on this issue. Phil Talbot, the NEA Assistant Secretary, was at the meeting between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Giri. I wasn't at the meeting. I escorted Prime Minister Giri to the Oval Office and then sat outside in the Cabinet office while Giri saw President Kennedy. I recall that Talbot came out of the meeting and said, “Well, you got your program. The President liked Giri and liked the way you made your case. He said, “Let's go for it.” That was the way the decision was made.

After the decision, there was a lot of work for the desk officer in getting the program going. It was not a big one—about $2.0 million, but you had to work with the Pentagon to get it moving—getting approvals and so forth. There was a lot of work to do on the economic aid program. That was not a large amount, but it was important for Nepal. The Nepal desk officer in AID and I were constantly moving papers forward, getting approval, and fighting to keep whatever it was that we were trying to do. I considered both assistance programs to be political tools to achieve our objectives in Nepal. The desk's role was not to fuss over the details of the programs but to see that the programs were actually implemented.

One aid project involved a “rope way.” At the time the communications between India and Nepal were very poor. The project involved building something like a ski lift to carry goods from the plains over the mountains and into the Kathmandu Valley, the most important part of Nepal where the capital was. This was a fairly expensive project. My recollection is that AID didn't like it. The Embassy in Kathmandu liked it because it was tangible, and there was more political “payoff” in a program like that, rather than education, or malaria control, and other things that AID tended to like. So there was friction about the projects

to be carried out under the economic assistance program. The State Department liked visibility and a “payoff.” AID was less concerned with that.

I did not have the opportunity to visit Nepal. That was very strange, because I would often be asked about it during meetings and the Office Director and the Deputy Office Director would interject, “Yes, we were there.” However, the desk officer had not been there which rather annoyed me as the desk officer.

One other dispute that we had concerning Nepal involved a police program. This was an aid program run by people, some of whom had been with CIA. The traditional AID people didn't like this at all. The Nepal desk was always pushing for the “Public Safety Program.” Most of the people running it had a public safety or police background. As I said, some of them had been with CIA, but it was AID funded.

The other thing that I remember was the introduction of a Peace Corps program in Nepal. Peace Corps representatives breezed into our office in 1962—just after I got there—and they said, “We are going to Nepal.” The Embassy and the Nepal desk, reflecting Embassy views, said, “Oh, we love the Peace Corps, but, really, Nepal is too sensitive a place. There are too many, potential problems there,” and so forth. The Peace Corps people said, “Thank you very much. Get out of our way.”

They proceeded to install themselves in Nepal and did very well, and have been doing very well since then. In six months or a year they had a Peace Corps contingent going into Nepal, and it has been one of the real Peace Corps successes. It has been a major success for the United States in Nepal. We on the desk were wrong. We were being the timid State Department. The Peace Corps was right.

I might just add some recollections of backstopping Chester Bowles when he was in Delhi for the second time starting in 1963. Almost immediately after he arrived in New Delhi, we had a big “dust up” with the Indians, when they welshed on an agreement to build a “Voice of America” transmitter in India. This was something that Ambassador Galbraith

had rammed through at the height of the crisis of the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The VOA was looking for a transmitter site. The Indians agreed to set up a transmitter in Eastern India. We would use it for a couple of hours a day, and they would use it the rest of the time. We wanted to use it to broadcast to China.

As the crisis abated, this became a political issue in India. It clearly was not in accordance with Indian “non alignment” to have a VOA transmitter operating there. Therefore, Nehru changed his mind. He claimed that he had never signed the original papers and that he was never properly briefed on it. Of course, then there was no question of our proceeding with it.

I was assigned to be the “Action Officer” on this matter. Everybody was angry at Nehru. We drafted an instruction to Ambassador Bowles the substance of which was: “You should go and tell Nehru, We are concerned and that he indeed had agreed and we did not like his backing out, etc.” I remember marching that draft instruction around for clearance and taking it into the office of Edward R. Murrow, who was then the head of USIA [United States Information Agency]. He was a major radio and TV news figure, as you recall. There he was seated at his desk, puffing his cigarette. He read through the cable and said in the voice millions knew well, “It looks all right.” He cleared the cable, and off it went to Ambassador Bowles in New Delhi. For two or three days we heard nothing. Then we received a message from Bowles, which said: “I called on Nehru yesterday and gave him the most recent book of Martin Luther King's speeches.” Bowles went on and on about Martin Luther King. Somewhere in there, he mentioned something about the VOA transmitter. He didn't say anything much about it and didn't follow the instruction.

During his second tour in India, when I was on the desk, Bowles was seen as an enormous wind bag. He sent in wordy telegrams which went on and on and on. He was more of a pleader for India than for the United States. He was a disappointment.

Bowles was not nasty and wasn't difficult at the personal level like Galbraith. He was difficult because he would go to the White House, he would go directly to the President. He couldn't stand Phil Talbot, the Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs, and he didn't like the Secretary of State. He was terribly difficult. He had the Deputy Office Director and the India Desk Officer removed. That was why there was a big personnel gap on the India Desk. He staffed the office with people that he wanted, at the top level. He wanted people that moved in tune with him and serviced him. Bowles didn't operate that way. Bowles convinced himself, wrongly in my view, that he had a great mission in India. In fact, he was being “shuffled off to Buffalo.”

Before we finish our discussion on my tour on the Nepal desk, I would like to mention in some further detail the issue of military aid to India. During my last year in the Office of South Asian Affairs that assistance was moving along very slowly. President Kennedy hadn't decided whether to go ahead with a sustained program. The emergency program had been approved, but he hadn't decided on a long term program of military aid to India. The problem involved concern about the Pakistanis, on the one side, and uncertainty about India on the other.

Finally, in November, 1963, there was to be a decision meeting on the subject, with Ambassador Bowles, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of State Rusk, and President Kennedy. I think that the meeting was scheduled for November 24 or 25. Of course, the meeting never took place. Probably, Kennedy would have agreed to the program at that time. I didn't know this at the time, but I learned from research I did for my book from interviews with Bob Komer, Jimmy Grant, and Phil Talbot, that there was general agreement that the “ground work” for a long term military assistance program to India was set. However, Kennedy died and therefore we never did engage in a long term military assistance program with the Indians. I was not directly involved. Carl Coon was handling military aid. However, I knew about the meeting.

I had lunch that day with Carl Coon at “Kitty and Al's” restaurant, a “greasy spoon place” that used to be across from the State Department on Virginia Avenue. People say that they will always remember where they were when they learned of Kennedy's assassination; I certainly do. We went right back to the office. Turner Cameron and Dave Schneider dismissed everybody and said, “Well, obviously, there's not going to be a meeting on aid to India.”

I believe that India-US relations would have been different—and better—if Kennedy had been able to approve the assistance program in 1963. It was important for our South Asia policy. We may have been fooling ourselves. Maybe I am fooling myself. I think that we overrated—not the importance of South Asia, because I think that it is important—but the role that South Asia played in the Cold War. In effect we walked away from South Asia five years later in 1965.

One of the other remembrances that I have, which is very vivid, is not about India but about Nepal and the Cuba Missile Crisis. As Nepal desk officer, I was sitting in on the briefing held in the State Department Auditorium with all of the resident foreign Ambassadors in Washington—just before President Kennedy spoke to the nation. Harriman briefed everyone on what had happened and then we watched Kennedy on a big TV screen. It was a tremendously dramatic moment.

Q: Then you left the South Asian area entirely in 1964. You went to the Office of Personnel. Why, and how?

KUX: At that time, officers of my rank were assigned to a four year tour in Washington divided into two different assignments. I had a choice for the second half of my tour. I had the option of going up to work in SS [Executive Secretariat] on the “line”—as one of the people who filter the paperwork for the senior people in the Department. Or, I could work in Personnel Assignments. Both of these were considered good jobs. At the time before the personnel system had been decentralized to the bureaus, the central personnel office

was a relatively small group—a “closed shop—that made all the lower and middle level assignments by itself. People assigned to Personnel met in a panel. Officers couldn't really “bid” on jobs since they didn't know what jobs were available. The vacancy list was kept confidential. Officers listed their assignment preferences on a form submitted on April 1, each year, which was therefore known as the “April Fool's” form. It was entirely different from the present bidding system.

I thought about the two possibilities. I did not understand what made the system work. Some people are “worldly wise” about this but I was not one of them. I didn't know how assignments in the Foreign Service really worked. So I picked an assignment to Personnel, rather than working in the “line” in the Executive Secretariat. I ended up in Washington assignments which we jokingly called “The Suits and Pants Division” because we had all of the “odd jobs”—Washington jobs, not involving assignments to the regional bureaus. That included the functional bureaus and the Executive Secretariat. I was one of the Assignment Officers for that group. I think that there were three of us.

The chief of that office was Jules Bassin, whom I had met previously in Pakistan. For the first year I found this a fascinating work. I have to confess that it was interesting to read personnel files, as assignments officers were permitted to do. The way the system worked, it was very much like a business office. As the Assignment Officer, I had vacancies to fill. Our bureaus had vacancies, so my job was to understand the requirements of these job and to find an officer who came the closest to fitting the requirements. The name of the game was to fill your vacancies. Many of the jobs were not considered the most desirable from the point of view of a officer's career but they had to be filled. Certain functional bureaus were regarded as less “glamorous,” less related to the Foreign Service, and less likely to get you promoted. INR was one such bureau. The Science Bureau was just developing and was another example. The Economics Bureau was another one. I am not sure that the promotion perception was valid. But it was understandable. There was, in fact, a bias toward the regional bureaus. These were seen as “main line” Foreign Service assignments, while most of the functional bureaus were seen as something of

a “sideline.”The people in the functional bureaus would continuously bang on our door. There were a lot of interests to satisfy. The job was made more difficult by the fact that the personnel panels tended to be prejudiced against functional assignments. Assignments were made by majority votes and usually went against us in a pinch.

The panel was chaired by the division head and the members were the chiefs of the five regional bureau sections and Washington Assignments. Earl Sohm was the overall Chairman. Bob Donhauser, his deputy, often ran the panel. They made the assignments, which were final. The members of the panels were all “substantive” FSO's. There were no professional personnel people among them.

We used to find people by going to the individual personnel files. The raw material—the main instrument which was available— was called the “Panel Book,” which listed all the vacancies. And it included a listing of the officers who would be available within a reasonable time frame. Today all officers have this listing, but at the time only the personnel people had access to it.

You would then go and read the files of the people that were available. If they made sense for the jobs which you had to fill, you would write up a proposal, and Jules Bassin would try to sell it to the panel. Our problem was that when there was competition our proposal usually lost so we had to work twice as hard to staff the vacancies we had as the regional bureaus.

This was true for the INR [Bureau of Intelligence Research] and for the “E” Bureau [Bureau of Economic Affairs]. The “E” Bureau had a real “tigress” as the Executive Director—Frances Wilson. She had her own “Black Book”—people she did not approve of. Getting people through Frances Wilson was not easy. We also had the Executive Secretariat to staff, which was regarded as a plum job. You couldn't predict how long people would stay in the Executive Secretariat because the turnover was very high. So we “over assigned” people to SS. We assigned more people than were actual positions. The panel wouldn't

let us do this overtly, so we had “fake” or “dummy” jobs. We worked this out with the Executive Director of the Executive Secretariat, Pete Skoufis. He knew pretty well what we were doing, but the rest of the panel didn't. We were “over booking” as much as 50% And it worked.

In the Office of Personnel, there was also a Career Development Office. Ed Adams was in charge of that office was supposed to look out for the welfare of the officer being assigned while we were focussed on filling vacancies. Adams had a vote on the personnel panel. Over the years there have been various emphases in the Department's personnel process. This was a time when there was less attention being paid to Career Development than a few years before, when there was a very elaborate system of “career patterns” developed for officers. During my tour it was a simpler system. Those in Career Development counseled people. The Assignments Officers also counseled people. We were constantly counseling people.

The work was interesting up to a point. The first year was fascinating, but in the second a year in Personnel I had “had” it. I never wanted to read another personnel file. I think that at that time people could see their efficiency reports. Before then people couldn't see their reports and these were therefore much franker during the earlier period.

When people came in to see you after a while you developed what we called the “45 second test.” You knew after 45 seconds of conversation whether this person was a “griper,” a “chronic complainer,” somebody who thought he or she had been “done in,” or someone with a genuine problem, etc. On assignments, I thought there was the “Rule of Three.” About one-third of the assignments made excellent sense, another third were defensible, and a third of them made no sense.

It was during this period that the Department was going through considerable ferment on the management/administrative side, led by Bill Crockett. I thought that some of his proposals were good. One of them was for a larger consolidated Foreign Service, with

USIA and AID combined with State and all competing for senior level positions. This was one of his proposals which was rejected. Other ideas of giving better, faster service to people were good. Some of the other ideas—for example, the decentralization of personnel—were not good. That happened while I was in Personnel, so that in my first year I worked under one system and in my the second year, under a different one. What happened was that the central personnel system was broken up. The Assignment Officers were taken out of the Office of Personnel and assigned to the regional and functional bureaus. The Office of Personnel became an advisory or career counseling center. My own office, because it was a little anomalous, representing a number of bureaus, reported directly to Deputy Under Secretary Crockett. This was a good development. From having to go through deputy division chiefs to division chiefs, the Deputy Director of Personnel, the Director of Personnel, the Assistant Secretary for Administration, and then to Crockett —six or seven “layers”—Jules Bassin reported directly to Crockett.

That part of the change was wonderful. We didn't go to Crockett all of that often, but we could get action on things when you did have a problem, instead of going through the tedious and long chain of command. On the other hand, the main purpose of this change—making it a more efficient and effective personnel assignment process—was not achieved.

The new system certainly wasn't more efficient. I calculated that we needed to double our staff because we would have to do more “leg work” in contacting and negotiating with other people. Indeed, instead of having three people in my office we had six. We did acquired additional functions, but these were related to the Civil Service and were pretty static. The whole operation became more diffuse and less efficient. Now officers have a larger voice in their own assignments but there is a lot more negotiating on assignments. The advantage of the earlier system was that, once the assignment was made, that was it. It could be “broken,” but this was pretty rare. In the new system there was much more time spent on assignments and—if you think of time as money—it was therefore much less efficient. Now officers participate much more directly in their own assignments than

they did under the earlier system. As I think about it, up to a certain point in a career, an officer is not really known and assignments are therefore a matter of happenstance. This is true of junior officer assignments, even today. After a certain point you gain a “corridor” reputation, and that is what matters—whether it's an “open” or “closed” system. That is what decides assignments—that and your “connections,” particularly at the more senior level. That aspect of the system hasn't changed. What has changed is that the assignment process is more “transparent.” There were probably ways of introducing more transparency into the old system without losing so much efficiency.

The other aspect of the Crockett's management “revolution” which was “hare-brained” was PPBS [planning, programming, and budgeting system] which, as I recall, was essentially aimed at finding out how people spent their time. An officer broke down how his or her time was spent and then put this all together under major categories of the mission. That theoretically indicated the areas of mission emphasis. An enormous amount of work was spent on collecting that data. At one time, there were about 30 or 40 officers assigned, full-time to this effort.

It always struck me that the fallacy in this approach was that while you can and should apply numbers, for a dollar and cents approach to the delivery of services in the administrative or consular functions, it is hard to apply rationally to foreign policy. Theoretically, you can do this, but I don't think that it makes any sense. The idea behind PPBS was that Secretary of Defense McNamara was using systems analysis and program budgeting there and that his system could be adapted to foreign policy management. This is something which the Department of State has tried periodically and which has always been a failure. I think that it is wrong to attempt to quantify foreign policy and to try to tie policy to budgets. The idea sounds good, but it doesn't really work. Under Crockett's scheme, there was a lot of effort for no particular useful purpose.

It was during this period that the “cone” system was developed—i.e. the designation of each officer as a specialist in one functional category or another. I was in the Economic

“Cone” but I really wanted to be in the Political “Cone”. Eventually—wisely or unwisely—I managed to be transferred to my preferred “cone”. That transition didn't give me many problems.

I remember something in the personnel process from that time—which I think brought an improvement. I don't know whether it was Crockett who brought it in. There was a man named Pete Szluk, who worked in Personnel. He had a little office which dealt with disciplinary and suitability cases. In those days there was no “due process.” You were called in to see Mr. Szluk. He would say: “Good luck in doing whatever you want to do now. Here is the form to resign from the Foreign Service.” Most people, presented with this situation, just resigned. I knew one case where a fellow didn't resign. He got a lawyer to argue his case, and he won. I think that, at that time, this was one aspects of the service which was very wrong. There was no “due process” for this type of case. Today it has gone too far in the other direction.

In general, I would have to say that I was in Personnel as the Foreign Service began a major transition period, from a closed, highly disciplined service to what it is today. The other thing that I participated in had to do with the “selection out” process. What happened with “selection out” in those days was that each Promotion Board had to “low rank” a certain percentage. I think the level was the lowest 10% If you were rated twice or three times in the lowest 10%, you were then considered for “selection out.” Each year, indeed, there were three or four percent—a significant number of people—who were “selected out” in each grade. There was then a review process in Personnel. After a person was considered for “selection out,” his case was reviewed by a special panel. I served on a couple of those panels. A certain number of people were appointed to the panels—all from the Office of Personnel—, and the actual composition varied. The review looked at all factors, including any extenuating circumstances, surrounding the person. They went beyond the file which was all the selection boards had. One particular consideration was whether a “hatchet job” had been done on the officer concerned. The members of the

panel talked to people and were able to find out what the circumstances were. A far share of people were “saved” as a result of the panel review.

It was very sad for the people who were “selected out.” In some cases these people had a pretty good career and felt “dishonored” at being “selected out”. The idea was a good one, but it was a tough process under any circumstances. I was a” hand holder” on a number of these cases.

By the end of my tour in Personal I felt a little jaded and burned out. I had enough of people and their problems. The experience, however, was very valuable because I was able to look at my own situation in a more rational way. I generally thereafter understood what was happening. If even I was getting a message which, at times, was not very pleasant, I felt better for knowing what was going on. Unfortunately, a lot of people in the Foreign Service don't understand have the foggiest notion. They didn't hear you when you talked with them honestly in personnel. And it was also hard to tell them if the news was bad. Often, they weren't being “done in”; they just didn't have a very good record. I found that hard to handle beyond a certain point.

After my tour in Personnel, I came to the conclusion that, on the whole, the personnel system was reasonable, as it tried to strike an appropriate balance between the needs of the Foreign Service and the rights and aspirations of the people concerned. I came away more impressed with the system than I was when I went into Personnel. I think that the changes which have been since that time have frankly rendered it less effective.

Of course, one of the advantages of working in Personnel then was that an officer had an opportunity to choose his next assignment, since he or she was aware of up-coming vacancies. That was one of the main reasons why people accepted a Personnel assignment. I decided that I didn't want to go back to South Asia at the time. I had six years there and wanted to do something else. I was happy to go back to South Asia later on but I felt I should have some variety.

First, I decided that I wanted to go to Latin America. The Personnel officer for ARA—the Bureau of American Republic Affairs—had me tentatively assigned to a vacancy in Costa Rica, at an appropriate job level. However, he couldn't persuade ARA to take me, as I didn't speak Spanish. This was really rather silly as I am very good at languages. In fact, ARA was a “closed circuit.” The bosses in Personnel were rather upset, so they decided to make me the head of a combined Political and Economic Section in Switzerland. This was pretty good for somebody of my grade. I was an FSO-4 at the time.

Henry Kellermann was the charg# d'affaires in Bern and had been there for a long while. He was due to leave Switzerland. The Department didn't bother to tell him that I had been assigned. He had a terrible reputation as a “people killer.” It turned out that he didn't leave Switzerland, after all. He was to stay there for another six or eight months. He then objected violently when he learned of my assignment primarily because he didn't know me. Jules Bassin advised me not to go to Switzerland. He said: “Your career will be ended by this guy.” So we found convenient reasons to break the assignment. Then Personnel came up with another assignment, which turned out to be substantively a better one. This assignment was to go to Bonn in the Political Section. This was in July, 1966 after I studied German for several months at FSI.

BONN

Bonn was an enormous Embassy, with a 13 or 14 man Political Section. There were subsections which dealt with East Germany, the U. S. Military, the Atlantic Alliance, Labor, and Internal Political Affairs. I was in the Internal Political Affairs office, which also handled Germany's relations with the Third World. We had very capable people in all of the sections. The staff of the Political Section, in terms of brain power, was the best that I ever worked with in the Foreign Service.

In Germany the task of a political reporting officer was a combination of between newspaper work and public relations. My particular assignment was to follow a part of

the German political scene—specifically, the Left Wing. So I actually started with a small center party—the Free Democrats [or FDP]. Then, when I became more familiar with the situation, I was given the Socialist Party of Germany [SPD] as well. Later, after students became a problem in 1968, I was asked to report on the student movement. This was my beat. My job was to report on significant developments in my area of the German political spectrum. I followed what the political parties were doing by reading the newspapers, meeting members of the political parties, attending party conventions, and pretty much doing what a newspaperman would do, if he were covering this beat.

I spent time on university campuses trying to understand the student movement. However, dealing with the student "Left" was rather a specialized thing. There I did essentially the same thing. I went to some of the conventions and the offices of the student movement. I met with the leaders; I sought out what their ideas were—very much as a newspaperman would do. Then I would come back to the Embassy and write up a report. I remember attending the Socialist Party convention. I went to the Conservative Party convention later in Berlin, stayed there the whole time, and sent off a cable to the Department on what had happened.

Our office also covered the German Parliament. I would go there when there were important debates. We had a German national there, all the time, filling us in on the debates. If we thought that there were some matters which were of special interest, I would go down and cover these.

Periodically I would draft a "round up" analysis in which I tried to convey where things seemed to be going. In Germany you had a lot of elections. Not only were there the general elections for the Federal Parliament, which are held every four years, but each of the "laender,"—the provinces [or states]—have their own parliamentary or "Landtag" elections. They are on different schedules, staggered throughout the year, depending on the date when the local government was set up during the Allied occupation after World

War II. These state elections have an impact nationally. Consequentially, there was a whole cycle of information that we were sending back to Washington.

We reported back to Washington in two ways—either in what was called an "Airgram" [report sent back by diplomatic pouch] or in a telegram. An airgram was then duplicated in Washington in the State Department and sent around to all of the various offices in the Department and other U. S. Government agencies, including the intelligence community, which were interested in the subject. In those days about 100 copies of each airgram were distributed.

In the case of a telegram, of course, the report went back faster, and it received a somewhat similar distribution. If I remember correctly, about 85 or 90 copies of telegrams were distributed. Sometimes, you had very "hot" [sensitive] subjects. For example, I remember when the Socialist Party decided to break with the U. S. position on Vietnam. It was clear that something like this was coming. I was friendly with the spokesman of the Socialist Party. I called him up and asked if I could come down to see him. He agreed and then gave me a "read out," as I recall, on what happened at the party leadership meeting earlier that day. That night I went back to the Embassy and sent off a cable to Washington explaining the SPD decision. The next morning the weekly Embassy staff meeting was held. The Ambassador, George McGhee, asked me to report on what had happened at the SPD leadership meeting, which I did, essentially giving the same report I had sent into Washington.

I was not really aware of the second part, or public relations aspect, of the assignment when I got to the Embassy in Bonn. That was making contacts and explaining US policies with members of the Bundestag [Federal Parliament] and party officials. I picked the younger members of the Bundestag across the political spectrum as my "target group." It turned out that, at age 35, I was the youngest person in the Political Section. There were some 80 members of the German Parliament who were under 40. Few people in the Embassy knew any of them. I set about meeting them.

We had an assistant in the Political Section which made it easier for us to contact members of Parliament—arranging for office calls, lunches, and so forth. Maybe once or twice a week I would see someone whom I selected almost at random. What it meant was that, at any given time, I had just seen somebody and I was able to keep quite current on developments.

When I first arrived in Bonn, I was not at all familiar with the German political scene. I became more familiar with it and got to know “who was who.” At the beginning, as I suggested, it was really something of a random series of contacts with members of the German Parliament. By the time I left Bonn in 1969, I had a fair number of contacts and had become good friends with some of them. I would invite them to lunch. They were very happy to come, sit, and talk. In Germany at the time it was seen as a “good thing” to be talking with somebody from the American Embassy—even a lowly Second Secretary. That surprised me, although perhaps “surprise” is the wrong word. I hadn't had this experience before. The Germans were intensely serious, very interested in American policy, not only on questions of German politics, but on any issues of global import, such as what was happening in Vietnam and Latin America and what we thought of various NATO issues. An issue which was very important at the time was the “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.” I found that, in effect, I became a spokesman or salesman for American foreign policy with my parliamentary and political contacts. I spent a lot of time keeping up on the various issues. Those I dealt with were very intelligent people, well-educated, and very interested in world affairs. So it was an interesting experience for me.

You had to work at establishing contacts. It did not happen by itself. I was happy to have the assistant do the phone calling. At that time, the German deputies in the Bundestag did not have assistants. So they would answer the phone themselves. They had small, government allotted apartments when they were in Bonn—like efficiency apartments, which also doubled as their offices. So it was often hard to get in touch with people.

Most politicians, but not all of the students were willing to talk to us. When I called on the leader of the most radical group, the SDS, he was not too happy to meet with me. Finally I just went to their office in Frankfurt. I said: “Here I am. I am Dennis Kux of the American Embassy.” It was a little awkward talking to the head of the SDS. On the wall there was a scrawled sign, “Fuck LBJ.” Still, we somehow got through the conversation. The whole student viewpoint seemed strange to me. The SDS were real revolutionaries, but highly theoretical. Germany had done so well after the war consider the disaster the country faced. It was hard for me to understand why they wanted to revolt. But they surely did.

Once I had an appointment with the leader of the West German Communist Party [KPD] who lived in Dusseldorf. I called and made an appointment. He was definitely not happy to see me and it was a rather cold conversation. As I said, I took the “vacuum cleaner” approach. What we were doing was keeping informed on German politics. So we were gathering information on a “rolling” basis. If I couldn't get in touch with Mr. X, I saw Mr. Y.My boss, Hans Imhof, introduced me to the press spokesmen of the major parties. They were not necessarily very influential, but they were very knowledgeable. Indeed, Edward Ackermann, the spokesman for the CDU [Christian Democratic Union]—the conservative party—has just recently retired. He had eventually become part of Chancellor Kohl's inner circle. I knew the spokesmen for the Socialists, the Free Democrats, and the Christian Democrats. They were very well informed on internal party matters. I also had a modest amount of contacts with the Foreign Ministry since our office in the Political Section also covered Germany's relations with the Third World. We went around to the Foreign Ministry from time to time. We didn't spend a lot of time on that.

CIA covered some of the same issues and personalities as we did. There was some duplication in official U. S. coverage of various sources. The U. S. had built up, during the occupation days just after World War II, an extensive intelligence network in Germany. The Germans didn't seem to mind talking on an overt basis to representatives of two different U. S. Government agencies. They knew that I was part of the Department of State and

someone else was from CIA. But of course the CIA had in addition some confidential relationships with people. Some of our senior CIA people were “declared” and were well known to the German Government with whom they work in a liaison relationship.The reporting system was very different for each agency. Although we might have reported on the same issues, State and CIA reported them differently. The Agency reports what Mr. X or Mrs. Y said. It had a check list of specific questions. After writing a summary of any conversation which a CIA man might have had, the Station” [CIA office in an Embassy] would add a comment at the very end, separately. In the State Department, we didn't usually just report what Mr. X or Mrs. Y said. That would have been a “Memorandum of Conversation.” When we sent in a report, we tried to synthesize different conversations and other information. The “comment” was usually woven into the story, more like a newspaper article, although we also sometimes added a comment at the end when we were reporting a conversation with a senior person. The main difference was the “Station” didn't do the analysis in their reporting while Embassy messages did. For CIA, the theory was that the analysis was done in Washington and not in the field intelligence report.

I felt that in general there was over reporting from Germany because the Political Section in Bonn was too big. That was a legacy of the occupation [of Germany], when we covered everything. I didn't think that all of the information we sent in was really needed. But I was tremendously impressed with the staff of the Embassy in Bonn.

I served two Ambassadors, George McGhee and Henry Cabot Lodge. McGhee was a very capable and hard-driving man, a trait was not always helpful to him in Germany. He was too hard a driver, too activist in his approach in Germany during a time of transition in U. S.-German relations. Germany was well beyond the occupation phase and was coming back into its own. Ambassador McGhee was, by nature, a little too “pro-consular.” He also didn't speak German which was an enormous handicap. He got off to a bad start when he had his picture taken, presenting his credentials to the German President, with his hand in

his pocket. That was something that was not done in Germany and gave him the image of a “gauche” Texan.

He was replaced as Ambassador by Henry Cabot Lodge, who, in a way, was the reverse. He was very relaxed and had two advantages which McGhee didn't have. He spoke German. He had a German governess when he was a child. The Germans appreciated that. Furthermore, he was an American aristocrat, and the Germans appreciated that. The Germans tend to be rather snobbish. They liked the idea of having somebody from an old American family who was well- connected. They also liked his relationship with the German Government. Ambassador McGhee was constantly on the phone, trying to arrange to see the Chancellor, asking about this or that. Ambassador Lodge rarely took the initiative. Indeed, it was the other way around. The German Chancellor would be the one trying to see Ambassador Lodge. Ambassador Lodge probably better fitted our policy at the time than McGhee.

McGhee—inadvertently—created frictions with the Germans by being too much of an activist. McGhee was constantly on the road speaking whenever he could, whereas Ambassador Lodge waited for an invitation. Basically, Lodge let the Embassy “do its thing.” He was much more relaxed about running the Embassy. He didn't stay that in Bonn for very long. He was just there for about nine months, but it was a happier, more relaxed Embassy than it had been under George McGhee.

My first DCM was the extraordinarily capable, “Mr. Germany,” Martin Hillenbrand, who suffered a bit under Ambassador McGhee. But I think that anybody would have, because McGhee was so much of an activist and so demanding. He was into everything and worked long hours. Martin Hillenbrand left to become Ambassador to Hungary. He was replaced by Russ Fessenden, who, as I remember, was more “laid back.” He let his staff “do its thing,” but he was also very capable.

I had two Political Counselors, both very capable and very different. Jim Sutterlin was the first one. He was a person who could work very rapidly and very effectively, seemingly without any effort. He was very quiet. He knew Germany extremely well. I think that he went on to be the chief of the German desk and then was the head of Policy Planning.

He was replaced by Jonathan “Jock” Dean, who was very, very different in style. Jock was high profile, worked more or less constantly, and was also extremely knowledgeable about Germany. Jock dominated the Embassy. Just after Jock first came to the Embassy, I remember going into his office one day. He had a rather abrupt manner. I was trying to explain what I did. He said: “Well, what the hell is it that you do?”—or something like that. However, we got along pretty well. He was intensely interested in the substance of things and instituted the practice of having lunch once a week with someone at a senior level of the German Government. He sort of did what we were doing in the internal section, but at a higher level.

During my last year in Bonn, I was “de facto” in charge of the internal Political Section, we had a variety of personnel problems. In effect, nobody was in charge of the Section. Jock tended to work with me, so I would go to the lunches which he hosted. He would invite the heads of the different Parliamentary groups and other important Germans. These were very interesting meetings. I believe Dean was instrumental in developing the Berlin Agreement. I think that Jock was the “behind the scenes” architect of the Berlin Agreement. He was very much involved in things like that.

One thing that I felt was unfortunate there was that the American community was so large that it became self- contained. When I first arrived in Bonn, all official Americans lived in the “Golden Ghetto,” the American housing area along the Rhine in Plittersdorf. That, at first it struck me as awful. In Washington we had lived in the District, on Capitol Hill. When I arrived in Bonn, I thought that I had moved into some suburban development in Virginia, which I didn't like at all. However, I had three little kids—and school was just down the

street. The kids could tumble out into the yard and play with dozens of other kids. That was an offsetting advantage.

In May 1968, I was promoted to FSO-3 or First Secretary and we moved into a bigger apartment. This was the “high rent district” on Turmstrasse with a direct view on the Rhine. Those were really lovely apartments. They were bigger, had more bedrooms, larger living rooms, and so forth. You weren't surrounded by other apartments. In theory I would have liked to have lived outside the American compound. I guess that by the time that became possible—toward the end of my tour—it wasn't worth it to move. I was just too comfortable where we were.

Also, by then, I had a lot of German contacts. We had developed our own style of living. I couldn't have done the job I did if I had just stayed in “Little America.” So we got out of the compound frequently. I must say that living in the American compound was not a bar to having contacts. Quite the contrary. The Germans I knew were quite happy to come there. Also, it wasn't just all Americans living there. A number of apartments were rented out to Germans. Somebody had the idea of making a “swap.” In the cities where we had Consulates, the German Government rented places for our people, and we, in turn, gave the Germans apartments in Bonn. At the time these Plittersdorf flats were regarded as prize apartments by Germans.

In addition, the American Club which, I assume, had been put up during the occupation, was something which Germans liked. The American Club, which was close to our apartment, was not just a place to which only Americans belonged. The Germans were quite happy to come to lunch there and to be members. Still, if my job hadn't required to be in contact with a lot of people, I probably would have had a lot more trouble breaking through the cultural barrier between Germans and Americans.

Among the special memories I have of the assignment was the visit of President Johnson for Konrad Adenauer' funeral. I was control officer for George Meany [President of the

AFL/CIO], who had trouble walking. The Labor Attach# was on home leave and wasn't there at that time, so I took care of George Meany. He literally needed help from me and from a young German from one of the German labor unions. To walk, Meany had to lean on each of us. I got to know him quite well during the course of his stay. Because it was a Presidential visit, the rest of the Embassy virtually ignored Meany. Everybody else was involved with the President and with the other members of his party. Meany liked to talk and was pretty free in his comments, blistering about Bobby Kennedy. At the end of the funeral Mass for Adenauer, Meany had me accompany him to a reception, attended by all of the European leaders and other notables. I remember Meany, with his Bronx accent, walking up to an Italian, “Mario, how are ya? What're you doing these days? I haven't seen you in Washington for a while.” The Italian replied, “Well, I am now the Prime Minister of Italy.”

Another trip I recall the most vividly was a Congressional visit—Congressman Wayne Hayes. Hayes and a Congressional delegation more or less “dropped out” of the sky. They were a parliamentary delegation going to Brussels for a NATO meeting and couldn't land in Brussels. They landed in Frankfurt instead. I was assigned as the control officer because I was the first person that the DCM ran into in the embassy. I was told to go over to the Petershof, a luxury hotel across the Rhine River, and to take care of the delegation which was going to stay there. The Embassy was ready to go all out since Hayes was the chairman of the subcommittee that passed on State's funding. The other Congressmen were not a problem. However, Wayne Hayes was a difficult person to deal with. That weekend was quite an experience.

Congressman Hayes, who was the leader of the delegation, arrived about 15 or 20 minutes after I got to the hotel. He got out of his car—not an Embassy car but a car from the Consulate General in Frankfurt. He was with a young lady—he said she was his “secretary”—and off they went upstairs. Some 15 or 20 minutes after that, a bus arrived with the other five or six Congressmen in it.

They were all talking about the “big scene” at the Frankfurt airport, when Congressman Hayes arrived. Apparently, Hayes had cabled ahead that he wanted this or that kind of bus and that they would all travel by bus. However, when Congressman Hayes arrived, he insisted on a car for himself. As the Commanding General at the air base hadn't provided what Congressman Hayes wanted, Hayes proceed to chew that general up and down. Hayes read the riot act to this general because he hadn't provided a car, and Congressman Hayes was going to have to ride in a bus. The Consul General in Frankfurt said: “Mr. Congressman, take my car.” So Hayes took the Consul General's car. They zoomed off and then ran out of gas! Anyway, by the time that Congressman Hayes arrived in Bonn, he had calmed down. The other Congressmen were all reverberating about what had happened.

It turned out that Congressman Hayes, as the chairman of the group, had virtually dictatorial powers over what they did. That night they all ate at the hotel. I became the “bag man.” The Congressmen had the right to draw money. I had the money, and all they had to do was to sign vouchers with me. There was a system, about which the Administrative Counselor of the Embassy, briefed me. The wife of one of the Congressmen was also there—the wife of Congressman Mendel Rivers [Democrat, South Carolina]. He was then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. Congressman Rivers wasn't there, but his wife was. (Later I learned he had disappeared on a bender in London) She asked me for some money, and I gave her Congressman Rivers' money. There was a number of Congressional staffers along, including the Staff Director for the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He was a very senior man—supposedly a power on the Hill. He came up to me, sweating profusely, and he said: “You gave Mrs. Rivers money. Did the Chairman Hayes approve?” I said: “I don't know. I didn't ask.” He said: “Oh, my God! You can't do that!” Then he said: “I'll be back in a second.” Five minutes later he came back and said: “Whew! It's OK. But never give out money without checking with Congressman Hayes.”

Also visiting Bonn at that time, was the chief or deputy chief of the Foreign Buildings Office [FBO], the office which controls State Department buildings overseas. When he heard that Congressman Hayes was in town, he shot over to the Petershof. He didn't get more than 10 feet away from Hayes for the rest of the trip. He kept mumbling: “Mr. Chairman this and Mr. Chairman that.” It was shameful but sad.

There were very senior Congressmen in the Hayes delegation. Congressman Les Arends was the leading Republican, Congressman Jack Brooks, a Democrat from Texas, and there were a couple others. The weather was bad the next day, so the Hayes delegation stayed in Bonn. The Marine Ball [November 10, anniversary of the foundation of the Marine Corps] was held at this time. Congressman Hayes decided that he was going to go to Cologne or someplace else. He wasn't going to the Marine Ball. He wanted a specific type of car. I turned to the Administrative Counselor and he got the right type of car. I remember that he told me that if Hayes asked a car with for one green tire, one red tire, and one blue tire, we would not argue with him, but it.We arranged for a control officer for each of the Congressmen; each got an Embassy car, and they went off in different directions for the day. That night, everybody but Congressman Hayes went to the Marine Ball, and the congressmen had a good time. Congressman Hayes got hold of me and said that on the next morning the group were going to go to Brussels by bus. Congressman Hayes had told me: “You arrange for the bus.” He specified what kind of bus it was supposed to be. But then he said that he was not going in that bus. Only the others were. He wanted to travel to Brussels in an Embassy car. He said, “I want you to be here with the car. Be here at 8:30 AM sharp with the car, and don't tell anybody. The others won't be up.”

So I got hold of my friendly Administrative Counselor. We got the car. The Administrative Counselor had been wise and had positioned backup cars, out of view. I had to cross the Rhine River on a ferry to get to the Petershof Hotel. The only thing that could wrong—I thought that I had enough time—was that the Rhine would get fogged in and the ferry

wouldn't run. That happened, maybe, once a year. I got down to the ferry, having left home at 8:00 AM. It should have taken about 10 minutes to get over to the Petershof Hotel. I had allowed myself plenty of time. And what happened? The Rhine fogged in. I was stuck down at the damned ferry for 10 or 15 minutes. Fortunately the Embassy had a radio system. At 8:20 AM I heard Congressman Hayes—calling from the hotel—saying: “Where's the Embassy car?”. Just at that moment, miraculously, the fog lifted, the ferry went over, and I arrived at 8:29:30 AM. Congressman Hayes said: “Good morning, Mr. Kux.” He got in the car with his “secretary” and off they went.

About 15 or 20 minutes later down came Congressman Les Arends, the ranking Republican on the delegation. They were all coming down for breakfast, but he happened to be the first one down. He said: “Where's Hayes?” I said, “Well, Mr. Arends, he is gone to Brussels.” Arends said: “He is gone to Brussels? How did he go?” I said: “In a car.” Arends asked: “Who gave him the car? We are all traveling by bus.” I said: “Well, he asked for a car, so we gave him a car.” Arends said, “Oh, you gave him a car?” He said: “Now that I am the ranking member of the delegation here, can you get me a car?” I said: “Yes, Mr. Arends.” He said: “That's fine. I will be leaving in 15 minutes after I have finished my breakfast.” So, 15 minutes later, Mr. and Mrs. Arends sneaked out in a car. So off went Congressman Arends. As he was going off, the other congressmen came down for breakfast and asked: “Where the hell is he Arends going? What's going on here?” Then the bus arrived, but it was a pretty rickety bus. The next ranking congressman said: “Well, I want a car, too.” By now the others were there, and they started joshing him. In the end, everybody rode in the bus, and they used the extra car for excess baggage. And off they went, but it was quite a weekend.

The DCM was breathing easier. Congressman Hayes, apparently, had raised such hell in Frankfurt that he later had the American general commanding the U. S. Air Force installation transferred. I got a profuse letter of thanks—a commendation—from Bill

Macomber, who was in charge of Congressional Relations in the State Department. That was a memorable weekend.

What struck me about Germany in the late 1960s was that the Germans had successfully come through the rebuilding of their country. They were very much a going concern. The country was successful economically and, I thought, politically. Things worked very well. The Federal Parliament was very impressive and serious about things. There was a high level of voting and quite a stable, functioning democracy. However, what struck me was how insecure the Germans were. They felt that all of this might vanish, somehow. They were very fearful of the Soviets. They were psychologically insecure about themselves. Hitler and World War II had been a terrible trauma. They had to start all over, having lost part of their country. They had created something, but the people who were leading the new Germany had lived through a long, dreadful experience. Even twenty years later they hadn't shaken off that experience. They viewed their resurrection through a prism which was hard for an outsider to appreciate. Maybe I had the advantage of not being a German specialist. I was struck by this lack of confidence, whereas a German specialist might have taken it for granted. They were genuinely fearful of the Russians, of the Soviet presence, of the Soviet threat. They leaned on the United States as their “security blanket,” in a psychological sense.

I think that the Germans also appreciated the way that the United States had treated them during the occupation and the early post-war period. They knew that we had treated them much better than they themselves had treated other people. The Germans can be pretty rough. They are a lot rougher than we are. You always think of German foreign policy being run in the way the Germans drive on the autobahn at 90 miles an hour. If you're in the way, watch out! They'll run over you. We Americans didn't act that way, and I have a feeling that the Germans appreciated that. We could have been rougher than we were—as some of the Europeans were—, but we weren't. So we didn't face the resentment that

might be expected naturally among some people. There was a psychological dependence, and the Germans also felt a physical dependence on the United States.

Often, Germans would say: “All through our modern history Germany has suffered from having bad allies. We have always picked the losers. This time, we have not.”

A development that I reported on—the 1968 student rebellion—still puzzles me, to this day. They were rebelling against “having it so good.” They did not have the experience of fighting in the war. They were in their late teens or early 20s in 1968, so many were really born after the war. They didn't have the experience of Hitler. I remember one Socialist Party meeting where one of the Leftists was heckling Willy Brandt. He blew up and said: “What the hell do you know? We rebuilt this country from the ashes.” The young man shouted back at him: “Well, you destroyed it first. It was the Germans who destroyed it, and not somebody else. So what is so great about rebuilding something that you, yourself, destroyed?”

The students had a very peculiar outlook, which didn't seem to be any cause for a revolution, but they really wanted to carry out a revolution. They were university students, children of the upper middle class and upper class. They considered themselves as intellectuals. They had accepted a Marxian view of society that was really to the left of the Maoism. They felt that capitalism was bad, that the Marxism practiced by the Soviet Union was bad, and that what was needed was a “real revolution.” I read their writings, and it just went right by me. I could report on it because I knew what the people were saying, but, for the life of me, I never really understood it. I knew that there was a part of German society was addicted to highly theoretical approaches—which this was. That part had been historically left behind, and this was another example of that. There were a few things that they were complaining about which were legitimate gripes—university traditions, and so forth. However, I didn't fathom the general outlook. Maybe it was a generational thing for me.

Q: In 1969 you were transferred to Islamabad [Pakistan]. Was this at your request? Did you want to get back to your area of specialization?

KUX: The position I held in Bonn was abolished. So I left three or four months before my tour should have been over. In a way the Pakistan assignment worked out in response to my preference. I had put on my “April Fool” form that I would like to go to South Asia. So the Department assigned me to a job in South Asia. I had at an earlier time decided to specialize in South Asia, so that this assignment fit into my career plans very well.

The Political Section of our Embassy in Islamabad was a very different setup than that we had in Bonn. The Embassy in Islamabad had a four or five-man Political Section. I was the second-ranking officer in the Section. We had a Political Counselor, a Political-Military Officer, and I think, perhaps, two others in addition to myself.

Basically, we dealt with three or four major concerns. One was following the internal political situation in Pakistan, which was then in flux. The second issue was India-Pakistan tensions and relations—more tensions than relations. The third was Pakistan's evolving relationships with the Chinese Communists and the Soviets. Finally, there was our own relationship with Pakistan. We had been a major supplier of military equipment to Pakistan in the past. In 1969 we were not providing Pakistan anything much. Each officer in the Political Section did a little bit of everything. The work wasn't strictly compartmentalized.

When I arrived in Islamabad, we had physically the worst Embassy that I had ever served at, in an old house. The Pakistani Government, by then, had moved the capital from Karachi to Islamabad, 1,000 miles to the North. It was a very nice location, at the edge of the foothills of the Himalaya Mountains. It was higher and cooler than Karachi, but the new town hadn't been built. The Embassy was in an older city called Rawalpindi, some 15 miles away. It was a dreadful Embassy building in a ramshackle old private home. The Political Section had awful quarters. My office was a sort of a closed compartment with no windows in it. The electricity would go off frequently. I was often, literally, in the dark!

As the Department hadn't started construction on a new building, we rebuilt the space allocated to the Political Section to improve things. Later we moved to Islamabad and moved in with AID in a much better building. That was a vast improvement.

The first Ambassador when I was there, and he was just there for three or four months, was Benjamin Oehlert. He was a “Coca Cola” executive—I think a vice president. He was a political appointee and suffered from a bad case of “localitis.” That is, he saw his mission in life as improving relations with Pakistan, which, in his view, meant giving them arms. He beat away on this issue unsuccessfully. He was a “Johnny One Note” and did not get along with our Ambassador in New Delhi, Chester Bowles, who was a “Johnny One Note” on a different theme: “Don't give the Pakistanis arms.”

We had suspended arms shipments to Pakistan in 1965, when India and Pakistan went to war. We subsequently eased up on this prohibition a bit. In 1967, we allowed the Pakistanis to purchase “non lethal” military items and spares. I don't think that we gave them any credits and we didn't sell them any new item that they could shoot. So by 1969 we had a very small military assistance program. Ambassador Oehlert wanted this changed. The Pakistanis also wanted our policy changed.

What was very surprising to me, when I arrived there, was how different the attitude of the Pakistanis was toward us from what I remembered to be from my earlier tour in Karachi. Then they liked us, now they thoroughly disliked and distrusted us.The Pakistani attitude in 1969 was like “night and day,” compared to the attitude to 1959. Then we were their great friend. Now we were seen as someone that had betrayed them by not backing them in the 1965 war between Pakistan and India.

My arrival in Islamabad was unusual. I drove overland from Germany, which was quite an experience. It took 21 days. automobile. I drove with a couple of Germans, not with my family. This was something that I had always wanted to do. I ran into a German who had made the trip a couple of times. He said: “Oh, sure, you can do it.” My car, a 1966

Mercedes, was nearly wrecked on the trip when we got stuck in a river crossing in Iran. The trip was a real adventure, but we made it. Arriving in Islamabad was bizarre. We got there at about 5:00 PM, after coming the Khyber Pass from Kabul that day. At 6:30 PM I was at a diplomatic cocktail party. After three weeks on the road, that was a bit of an adjustment. Apart from my trouble in shifting gears, what struck me about the cocktail party was that there was only one Pakistani there to say goodbye to my predecessor and to say hello to me. That was very different from the way things had been in the 1950s. The Pakistani was someone at the appropriate level from the Foreign Ministry—the Americas desk officer.

Oehlert left in June 1969 shortly after I arrived in Islamabad. He was a holdover from the Johnson administration. He was replaced some months later by another political appointee, but a Republican, Joe Farland. He had no experience in the region, but had two previous ambassadorial posts, in Panama and the Dominican Republic. Therefore, he was more sophisticated than his predecessor about the way an Embassy operates.

Ambassador Farland was much less of proponent of getting arms for the Pakistan and was more relaxed about this issue. He had another weakness. He was a publicity hound. He had been very successful in Panama and the Dominican Republic in the public affairs area. He was a big “PR” [Public Relations] type—”Uncle Sam loves you, and so forth.” After he got to Pakistan, he tried to repeat this success in Pakistan. He was present everywhere. He was popping up publicly two or three times a week, ribbon cutting and making speeches. It was as if he were on a U. S. political campaign trip.He launched a press “blitz.” He had a Press Officer, a USIS [United States Information Service] career officer who should have known better but didn't—and who went along with the Ambassador. So should the others in the Embassy but it isn't easy to tell a opinionated political ambassador that he doesn't know what he is doing.

Pretty soon the Pakistani political opposition—led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto—started screaming and attacking Ambassador Farland for “interfering” and being a CIA agent.

Farland had been an FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] agent at one time—so that got translated into a “CIA agent.” The opposition press really came out against Ambassador Farland and launched a nasty campaign against him. He took this rather personally but he did pull in “his horns.” He told the Foreign Ministry that if they didn't turn off these attacks, he would resign as Ambassador. He did this without Washington authorization. I remember going with him to the Foreign Ministry, where he left a note, saying that the attacks on the American Ambassador were unacceptable. If continued, they would severely damage relations between the two countries. He told them orally that he didn't need to stay in Pakistan. He had plenty of money, and there were other things that he would rather do. We did not tell Washington that he was doing this. However, he mailed the Pakistan desk a copy of the note that he had left at the Foreign Ministry. That, I think, was our report of what happened.

Pakistan had a military dictator in power even though there was an opposition and some freedom of the press. They were in a transitional period. Ayub Khan had fallen, and Yahya Khan was the leader. He was the head of the Army but was setting the stage for elections and had eased up on press restrictions. However, they still could turn things off, and did. The attacks on Ambassador Farland stopped. Farland also “pulled his horns in.” In fact, Farland was more of a public figure than a foreign ambassador can be in Pakistan, especially a US ambassador. In Pakistan, there were sensitivities about Americans being seen and heard too much.

I don't think that I ever gave a public speech in Pakistan during my second tour there. When I was there during my previous tour, I gave many. In 1969, I wouldn't have been invited to make a public talk, and the government would have taken exception if I had given speeches. Farland, at first, just didn't understand this. After he had been “burned” personally, he became more laid back and relaxed.

The Embassy staff was more comfortable with Farland's views on the arms issue than with Oehlert's. In fact, the issue of military assistance pretty much faded from our conversations

by the end of my tour in mid-1971. Then there was the crisis over East Pakistan, and we weren't giving them military assistance. The Pakistanis knew that they weren't going to get more military assistance because of the crisis.

The first DCM was Tom Rogers, who left shortly after I got there. Then, Sid Sober was the DCM most of the time I was in Islamabad. He was an area specialist. The Political Counselor was Steve Palmer, whom I had known before. He was not an area specialist, but a very capable officer. He left about six months before I did, and I was the acting Political Counselor.

Pakistani coolness did not last for the whole tour. What changed things was Nixon. Nixon liked Pakistan, and things gradually opened up. Then, about a year and a half through my tour, the Pakistanis held elections in December 1970, and Pakistan became a much freer place until the Bangladesh crisis. While I was still in Islamabad Kissinger came through — in fact, he arrived just as I was leaving in July 1971. I will get to that later.

As I said, the feeling in Pakistan was that the United States had betrayed Pakistan by not backing them in its war with India in 1965 and by cutting off military assistance. Now it was a question of when the military aid was to be resumed. The Pakistanis felt: “We were your ally; why did you stab us in the back and betray us?” We would make the argument that we were their allies against the communists, not against the Indians. We didn't usually point out that, after all, they had started the 1965 war. The top of the Pakistani Government was hopeful for a resumption of military aid, and recognized that the country still needed us. We still had a big economic aid program, in the vicinity of $100 million a year. They knew that was important and they hoped that we would resume military aid.

I mentioned the tensions between our Ambassadors in Islamabad and New Delhi. That situation did improve with Ambassador Farland's arrival. A political Ambassador, Kenneth Keating, was assigned to India after Ambassador Bowles and the tensions between our Ambassadors in Islamabad and New Delhi were not as bad as before. However, there still

were different views. If you sat in New Delhi, you had one view. If you sat in the Embassy in Islamabad, you had a different view. It was hard to rise above these differences.

I personally made the argument for resumption of military assistance to Pakistan because I felt that this was right thing to do in terms of our relations with Pakistan. In fact, when you look at this issue from the standpoint of U. S. relations with India, this was not the thing to do. From that point of view we should not have provided arms or reestablished a substantial security relationship with Pakistan.

The country had developed a great deal economically from when I was in Pakistan 10 years earlier. Then, for example, you could count on being sick—frequently. During the 1969-1971 period we didn't get sick. The standard of living and health had improved considerably. Life was a lot easier. Islamabad was a healthier place to be. The climate was better, but it wasn't just that. The Pakistanis had made a lot of progress in public health and in their economy.

Politically, however, they hadn't made much progress. Just before I arrived in Pakistan in 1969, the Ayub Khan era had come to an end. There were a lot of disturbances among students and other groups, who were discontented with the system, which had started very successfully in the late 1950's and continued into the 1960's. However, Ayub Khan stumbled with the war with India in 1965, which was a big mistake on his part. Ayub tried to grab Kashmir. That led to India's striking back and to war.

Ayub was on the downward slope after that. He fell sick in 1966 or 1967 and never fully recovered. In 1968, Pakistan launched what they called “the decade of development.” Ayub had been in power for 10 years. Many Pakistanis called it “the decade of decadence.” The government had started, as a lot of dictatorships do, in a positive way, but wound up with much corruption. There was a lot of opposition in East Pakistan, which had always felt discriminated against. In the 1965 war, East Pakistan was helpless in the face of India. A big independence movement then started there.

When I arrived in Pakistan in 1969, Ayub Khan had just been kicked out, and Yahya Khan had come in with a new government and announced that it would move gradually toward a democratic system and elections. During the time that I was there, there was a gradual easing of restrictions. There was freedom of the press, and political parties were free to organize. Pakistan held national elections in December, 1970. The results were a big surprise to the Embassy and to the government of Pakistan. In the eastern part of Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh, the provincial party, called the Awami League, won 167 out of 169 seats contested. The seat apportionment system then in effect gave the Awami League an absolute majority in the national Constituent Assembly in Islamabad. It had been assumed that the Awami League would win in East Pakistan, but not by that much of a majority.

In West Pakistan it was assumed that the traditional parties, which were quite conservative and tied to the landlords, would do reasonably well. A new, Left-wing party, the Pakistan Peoples Party, had been organized by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the former Foreign Minister who had quit the government, gone with the opposition, and coined the phrase, “Islamic Socialism.” This party criticized the government and the U. S. It was thought that this new party would do all right but would not dominate the scene. In fact, that party won 85 of 135-140 seats in the west. So Bhutto's party had an absolute majority in the West, while Mujibur Rahman of the Awami League in the East had almost 100% of the seats. The result of what was regarded as a fair election was a political “earthquake.”

I think the economic development program that we funded, over the 10 year period since I last served there, had a significant impact on political activity in Pakistan. But I think that Pakistan is a special case, because it was a new country. It wasn't just a colony becoming independent. It was created out of nothing, really, so that the first 10 years of independence really were a period of nation building.However, the second 10 years of independence were a period of “national consolidation,” which ultimately failed. There certainly was more political activity in the late 1960's than in the late 1950's, because

of the “failed politics” of the country's development. In the 1950's, the political parties didn't know what they were doing, they didn't have their act together, and there was an enormous amount of infighting. Then, after Ayub Khan came to power, there gradually developed an opposition to Ayub. It was “anti-regime” politics, which didn't exist earlier. The level of participation in the elections of December, 1970, was very high. It wasn't that the middle class had a greater stake in the outcome and was therefore politically more active. The fact was that the Pakistanis had never had an election before.

In general, in the pre-election campaigning, politics was a subject that was widely debated. Politics were active and alive. They was taken very seriously. At the time the leadership of the country was military, helped by some “technocrats.” Our impression was that Yahya Khan, who was the leader, was a pretty limited person—a bit of a “boozer” and “womanizer” who was not very bright. He did not have the skill to work out the sort of compromise that would have been necessary to keep Pakistan together. His task was not made any easier by Mujib in East Pakistan, who was a demagogue, nor by Bhutto, who was also a demagogue. Mujib became the undisputed leader in East Pakistan and later the President of Bangladesh.

The Pakistanis were politically aware; they knew what their votes would mean. They were voting for Bhutto in West Pakistan. They were voting for a change from the old regime. The people who were politically educated were pleased that they had a free election. They weren't pleased with the results.

As a political officer, you call on various people. When I called on Mujib in Dacca, he talked to me as if he were talking to 65,000 people in Yankee Stadium. He had a standard speech and he gave it. There certainly were indications that the Bengalis of East Pakistan were unhappy with West Pakistan Government and with the “deal” that they were getting. However, I didn't anticipate that things would work out the way they did. It need not have happened. It was not a certainty. Mujibur Rahman was not very capable and rather

inflexible. He became the “prisoner” of the extremists. There was Yahya Khan, who was very limited, narrow-minded, and was “manipulated,” I think.

Bhutto, I think, still wanted to be “Number One” and was unwilling to serve under Mujib. I think that he worked with members of the Army to ensure what happened. Bhutto was very different from Mujib. He was very clever—perhaps too clever—and he had a very complex personality. While he publicly and violently criticized the United States in his campaign, he would privately tell Sid Sober and Steve Palmer, who were in contact with him: “Don't worry about that. That's just politics. If I get into the government, I will work with you.” Bhutto created a situation which blocked any settlement that would have been acceptable to the East Pakistanis. I think that he did this in league with the Pakistani generals, although it is not entirely clear who did what to whom.

I believe that the Pakistani Army had a “contingency plan” to take over East Pakistan. They started laying the groundwork for that by sending more troops there in early 1971. A series of negotiations were held in the middle of March, 1971, in East Pakistan to try to work out a settlement. During all of this the United States basically took no position. We were in contact with the government, but essentially as observers. We were not involved in Pakistan's internal politics. We hoped that things would work out, but we were not involved. However, a few days before the military crack down we were approached by a man named Daultana—a conservative political figure, a major landlord and former Chief Minister of the Punjab. He said: “Look, you have to intervene. If you don't, the Army is going to botch the job and there will be real trouble ahead.” I remember that we had a big debate in the Embassy on whether we should do something about that request. Our options were to approach the government and say: “Look, you have to make some compromises...”. That would have meant intervening politically. We debated this course of action. The one person who wanted to intervene politically was the CIA Chief of Station. His argument was: “Look, we are a great power, and we should be trying to help.” I was among those who took a more “State Department” attitude, saying: “We can only lose if we do that. The Pakistanis are 'big boys.' They know what they're doing.” The British

High Commission in Islamabad, with which we consulted very closely, was headed by a very effective High Commissioner, Cyril Pickard. He took the same view. So we sat on our hands.

On March 23, 1971, the Pakistani Army “cracked down” in East Pakistan. They arrested Mujib and outlawed the Awami League. That set off the Bangladesh crisis which lasted until the war for independence at the end of 1971. In retrospect, I think that we should have intervened. We should have done something. We should have told the Pakistanis that we were speaking to them as friends. We should have said: “Look, you have to try to save your country. You have got to try to work something out with East Pakistan. The use of force isn't going to work.”

The Pakistani military probably held the view it had no choice in Dacca, except to “crack down.” I think that there, to some extent, they may have been “manipulated,” or Yahya Khan may have been manipulated by Bhutto.

Here I will have to get into the details. There was supposed to be a national meeting, I believe, to write a constitution. This was after the elections of December, 1970. Bhutto refused to participate in the meeting. The Pakistani Army went along with Bhutto, which was not really in keeping with the rules that they had established. The Bengalis had a right to be aggrieved, but what they were demanding amounted to independence. It wouldn't have been “full” independence, but the central government would have been so weakened that it would not amount to much. That wasn't acceptable to the Army.

Of course, the people in East Pakistan were horror-stricken by the military's harsh actions. They paid the penalty and they were bitter and angry. Those Bengalis who were in the government were no longer loyal to it. Many Bengalis who were in West Pakistan no longer felt any allegiance to Pakistan.

What we in the Embassy did not know at the time was that the Pakistani leadership had changed its view of us; it had become much more favorable and we might have had

greater influence that we thought possible. The attitude was different because the US opening to Communist China had begun by then. It was reaching its critical stage. I forget the exact date, but right about this time the Pakistanis got the “green light” from Zhou En-lai—Chinese Communist Prime Minister—for National Security Adviser Kissinger to come to Beijing. That was entirely unknown to us.

The China episode goes back to 1969, when President Nixon visited Pakistan. He didn't come to Islamabad. He went to Lahore, and I wasn't involved in the visit. He raised the “China opening” with Yahya Khan during this visit. Nixon asked: “Could you do anything? We would like to do something with the Chinese Communists.”

So from the summer of 1969 on, the Pakistanis were talking with the Chinese about us. The Embassy was never involved. The channel was from Yahya Khan to the Pakistani Ambassador in China to the Chinese and back the same way, usually not by cable but by diplomatic courier. The channel then ran from Yahya Khan to the Pakistani Ambassador in Washington, who took the messages to Kissinger. On the Pakistani side Yahya Khan did not tell his own Foreign Ministry. Only he and one or two people around him who were aware of what was going on.

Yahya Khan came to the U. S. in 1970 for a dinner in commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the establishment of the UN. President Nixon again raised the China opening question with him. So, all through this period this process was going on. It wasn't very rapid, but it speeded up in the spring of 1971, just as the East Pakistan crisis erupted. So we had a greater influence with the Pakistani government than we were aware. Washington might not have approved intervening with the Pakistanis, but the Embassy probably would have done it without asking for Washington approval in advance. It could have been done in a way that would not have created that much of a problem. Before the “crackdown,” I think that it might have been handled very tactfully which would not have created any “waves.”

The March 23, 1971 came just three and a half months before I left. The Pakistani Army was very brutal when it moved in. It made a large number of arrests and shot many students. The Consul General—Archer Blood—in Dacca sent in a “protest” telegram—Dacca 231. This was an LOU [LIMITED OFFICIAL USE] or OUO [OFFICIAL USE ONLY] message signed by every member of the staff of the Consulate General. Essentially, this message said that the U. S. has no major strategic interest in South Asia. Therefore, our national values should prevail—our concern for human rights and democratic freedoms. It urged U. S. condemnation of the Pakistani military “crack down” and called for support of self-determination in East Pakistan.

When the message came in, I happened to be with Ambassador Farland. The message was sent to the Department of State in Washington, with a copy to the Embassy in Islamabad. Farland shrugged his shoulders and said, “Hmmm.” Sid Sober, however, took a very different view. He was very upset. The next day a cable came back from the Department, reclassifying the Dacca cable from OUO or LOU to NODIS [No Distribution Outside the Department of State], which was the highest restriction. Arch Blood had classified the cable somewhat disingenuously. At the very end of the cable he said that he had not signed the cable, because he did not think that it would be appropriate for a Consul General, but he added that he had the highest respect for the members of the staff, whose views he shared. In fact, the cable was distributed in about 85 or 90 copies and was sent all over Washington, which I assume was Arch's intention.

There followed a period of very, very bitter and bad feelings between our people assigned to East Pakistan, who were evacuated later, and our Embassy people in West Pakistan. There were also tensions within the Embassy. The Dacca staff felt that we were backing the Pakistani Government in Islamabad in its repressive activities in East Pakistan, which wasn't really the case. The Embassy didn't share those views, but understood that the Dacca staff would be much more agitated since some of its Pakistani friends had been arrested and killed. The “crack down” happened very fast. It was made worse by the

fact that when the Consulate General staff in Dacca had to be evacuated, originally the intention was that our people would fly from Dacca to Bangkok, on an American aircraft which the US Government would charter. At the last moment the Pakistani Foreign Ministry said that they didn't want the Consulate General to be evacuated via Bangkok. They wanted them to fly out by way of Karachi on a Pakistani aircraft. We didn't argue with the Foreign Ministry; our concern was to get our people out of Dacca.

We weren't thinking about whether they flew on an American carrier or a Pakistani plane to Karachi. We really didn't consider that. However, our people in Dacca were furious. The Americans in East Pakistan were furious that they had to fly to Karachi, which was quite far [around 1400 miles in the direct line]. They later said that, on the way to Dacca, the Pakistani airliner had ferried Pakistani troops that had come to butcher their friends. It was as if they were Jews leaving Eastern Europe on a train returning from the “gas chambers.”When the people from the Consulate General in Dacca arrived in Karachi, they were greeted by Sid Sober. There was a lot of tension and a bad scene ensued. The Dacca staff was very unhappy with the way they had been evacuated. They felt that the Embassy had let them down, and that we should have fought with the Pakistani Government.

Then there was tension between the Embassy in Islamabad and the Department in Washington about what stance we should take. The Embassy did not want to go as far as the staff of the Consulate General in Dacca had gone but wanted to take some action that would be clearly critical of the Pakistani Government. At that point the State Department in Washington said: “Do nothing.”

A month or so after the “crack down,” in Pakistan, the China arrangement with the U. S. suddenly jelled. The White House didn't want any criticism of the Pakistani Government. We never connected the Department's instructions with Nixon's and Kissinger's “opening” to China. However, AID [Agency for International Development], acting on its own, stopped economic assistance to Pakistan by arguing—in a legalistic way—that they could not move

forward with new programs, given the unsettled conditions. It was amusing, in retrospect, because AID was always pushing for more programs. Now it took the lead in trying to cut back.

Ambassador Farland was eventually made aware of the China developments. He was called back to Washington and briefed. At that time Kissinger worked out a cover story with the Pakistanis. They would say that Kissinger was on a worldwide trip. When he got to Islamabad, he would supposedly get “sick” and would find time to fly into China. The only people in the Embassy who were aware of this were the Ambassador and the CIA Chief of Station.

When Kissinger's trip was announced, Ambassador Farland did something clever. The Director of the AID Mission and the DCM had made previous plans for travel on leave. Ambassador Farland insisted that they keep those plans, even though Kissinger was coming through. So you had the Deputy Director running the aid program. The Political Counselor had already left the post on transfer. That made me the ranking officer in the Embassy. I was the Acting DCM and was appointed Control Officer for Kissinger. I was due to leave Islamabad a day after the Kissinger visit was over. He was in Islamabad the last week I was there.

The Kissinger group was not a large one. It was composed of Kissinger, Hal Saunders, John Holdridge, Winston Lord, Bill Smyser, a staff aide, and maybe one other person. No American or other press representatives. Kissinger first went to India and then came to Pakistan. I knew nothing about the true purpose of the visit to Pakistan. We went through the normal plans for a visit for someone of Kissinger's rank. I think that he was scheduled to be in Pakistan for a day and a half. We set up briefings by the Embassy, calls on Pakistani officials, and followed the usual drill. The whole Embassy was turned upside down. It was difficult for me to manage since I was packing at the same time to leave.

Kissinger arrived. On the way in from the airport I rode with Hal Saunders, who was then with the National Security Council staff. He said: “Everything's OK, but Kissinger has 'Delhi belly' —you know, diarrhea. He's not feeling well.” That was part of their plan. I should have realized it—maybe I am just gullible—but it seemed plausible. But I did notice that Kissinger ate a big lunch at the Ambassador's.

We had meetings at the Embassy. He asked lots of questions about what was going on in East Pakistan, what the odds were of India going to war, and what did we think of the situation. We gave our own briefing, our “dog and pony show.” This involved a lot of work.

That night Yahya Khan gave a dinner for Kissinger. At about midnight, Ambassador Farland and Hal Saunders showed up at my house, which was unusual. I thought: “Oh, God, Kissinger must really be sick.” I was told that Yahya Khan was insisting that Kissinger go up to the mountains. We had to postpone everything for a day. Kissinger was due to leave Pakistan that afternoon. Yahya Khan insisted that Kissinger see sunrise up in the mountains. Ambassador Farland and Hal Saunders went through a big “song and dance” about all of this. Kissinger was staying at Yahya Khan's guest house. So I asked: “What time do I have to be there? You say that Kissinger's leaving at 4:00 AM. I will be there at 3:30 AM.” The Ambassador said: “Oh, no, you don't have to be there.” I said, “I have to be there. It is my job.” The Ambassador said: “No, no.” So finally, I thought: “To hell with it” and didn't show up. Kissinger and most his group left that morning but for China, not the mountains.

Part of the plan was for Ambassador Farland to go up to the mountains with the Pakistani Foreign Secretary. Hal Saunders was the only one in the party who stayed behind in Islamabad. The crew on Kissinger's plane didn't even know what was going on. I remember telling the captain of the plane that the schedule had been changed. Hal even sent a cable to the White House, using CIA communications. It was pretty well done, or else I was very gullible.

The next day the Kissinger party was due back in mid-afternoon. Ambassador Farland and the Pakistani Foreign Secretary arrived back with the Secret Service detachment. They actually had been in the mountains. There were a couple of Secret Service agents with them, one of whom was sick as hell. But no Kissinger. They said: “Oh, God, they took the wrong turn. They stopped to shop for antiques, etc.” It was all a sham. What had happened was that the Kissinger party was late, and the Pak pilots had not told anybody. An hour later in came Kissinger with Winston Lord and everybody else. They were full of smiles and made ready to leave for the airport right away.

Kissinger was very clever. As we were going to the airport, he picked up a point in the Embassy briefing and asked me a question related to it. The party was all smiles, and off they went.

Two weeks later I was in Switzerland. My aunt said: “You know, Kissinger went to China! How did he do that when he was in Pakistan?” I nearly fell off my chair!

However, a funny thing had happened the night they were away in China. There was a farewell party for me. The one American newspaperman resident in Islamabad was an AP [Associated Press] correspondent, Arnold Zeitlin. He said that some people thought that Kissinger's “illness” was a little strange. He asked: “What the hell is going on?” I said: “Do you want to know the real story?” He said, “Yeah.” I said, thinking I was making a joke: “He has gone to China to meet Zhou En-lai.” He said: “You're kidding.” I said: “Yes, I am kidding.”

I remember that the Deputy Director of the AID Mission thought that there was “something strange” going on. I also found things a little strange, except for the fact that we sent the telegrams to the White House and also to Paris, his next stop. These were part of the “cover,” which helped fool me.

Dennis, we're now in 1971, and you have been assigned to the Army War College. Let me ask you, first of all, if this was an assignment that you had sought, or did it come out of the clear, blue sky?

KUX: This was what was called “senior training.” It was something that I had sought. This training involved a year free of normal duties, supposedly to think “big thoughts,” to be away from the daily “grind,” to take a global view of issues, and, if you're involved with the military, to get some idea of how the military operates and how they think. I was anxious to have some advanced training. Also, it was considered a “good thing” in terms of moving up the career ladder. This was also the right moment for me in terms of career progression. However, I didn't seek out the Army War College, in particular, and would have been just as happy elsewhere.

Most of the senior training by Department of State officers is at the National War College. A couple of people go off to each of the service war colleges, while a few go to universities. At the Army War College, there were just two of us from the State Department. There were about half a dozen civilians and, I think, about 185 military. This made it a more interesting experience in a way than being at the National War College. You really did learn a lot more about the military. You mixed and lived with them in military housing.

Ambassador Hermann Eilts was the State Department's faculty member and the Deputy Commandant [of the Army War College. The way the curriculum worked, there was a fixed program each morning, which everybody took. It began with a principal speaker. After the talk and a question period, we broke up into smaller groups or committees, the makeup of which changed every six weeks or so throughout the year. Usually, we had the afternoons free, as I remember, supposedly to “think big thoughts.” Often, people would go out and play golf.

The morning sessions covered a wide range of topics. However, there is a difference between the service war colleges and the National War College. My recollection is that at the National War College it was 60% non-military subjects and 40% military subjects. Our program was the other way around—40% non-military and 60% military, with a heavy focus on the Army, since it was the Army War College.

There were advantages and disadvantages to this. The advantage was that you learned a lot more about the military. The disadvantage was that you had a lot less exposure to civilian topics. In a way, that emphasis was offset by the fact that we took a couple of “electives”—side topics. I took a course on world strategy. I read a lot of material that I interested me. There was another course on “Quantitative International Politics.” That was relevant because I thinking of working with Claus Ruser, who was trying to assign “numbers” to foreign policy. There weren't very many people who understood the business of quantitative analysis—what works, and what doesn't work. There was a view in the academic world at the time that you could “quantify” foreign policy. Although the military used systems analysis to solve military problems involving procurement and other things like that, I don't think that you can really apply that process intelligently to foreign policy. However, it was an interesting class because we were constantly arguing with the professor about terminology. He was a highly theoretical fellow.

I became interested in Ruser's work through a paper I wrote at the War College about the use of computers in the government foreign policy process. I went all around and looked for places where computers were being used in the policy process and how effective they were. In the end, I found the most effective use of computers was a system for tracking documents in the NSC [National Security Council], which Jean Davis set up, with the help of a Navy Warrant Officer. That tracking system was one of the most advanced in the government at the time. ARA [Bureau of American Republic Affairs] in the State Department tried out Claus Ruser's system, but I am not sure how useful it was. Through the survey I became acquainted with Bray Redekker me—another Foreign Service officer

who had done a study on this general subject, too. I think that he helped to set up the Department's program in the Policy Planning Staff. Frankly, I found the “architecture” of the program better than the substance. My conclusion was that the application of quantitative analysis to foreign policy was no panacea. It was a tool that could help sharpen your thinking, because it forced you to prioritize potential courses of action. In that sense it was useful. However, where it was not useful was thinking that you could put numbers on somebody's personality and other variables and predict what was going to happen. The “experts” thought that you could make such predictions by looking at certain phenomena — communications, etc. They had gone back and looked at earlier crises and felt that you could extrapolate conclusions which would be helpful in current and future crises. I don't believe that is possible.

I always felt, as I advanced in my own career in the State Department, that the area where system analysis could be applied, and should be applied, rigorously, is on the administrative side. Surprisingly, the people who fought this approach the most were the administrative officers. In Abidjan, I tried to get the administrative people to put numbers down on what they were going to do next year, much as a business firm would do. They just balked at this. They wanted to do it all on an “ad hoc” basis.

I found my year in the War College to be generally useful. I had been in the Foreign Service for 15 years. It was like a sabbatical and I had a chance to do a lot of reading and to gain some exposure to the military which I found useful given their role in the policy process.

Q: In 1972 you were assigned as Deputy Country Director for India and Nepal. Was this an assignment that you were interested in?

KUX: Yes and no. Actually, I had been interested in doing something on a broader or global scale. One possibility was working with Claus Ruser. That would have been a “mixed bag.” I questioned whether his program was going anywhere. I was asked whether

I would be interested in working on the India desk. One consideration was the impact of a particular assignment on my career. The buzz phrase at the time was “program management.” You had to be a boss supposedly to enter senior ranks. I was then at the top of the mid-level as an O-3. As it turned out, it didn't matter. I was promoted to FSO-2 in June, 1974 without having managed anything. In fact, the conventional wisdom about what gets you ahead is often wrong.

Anyway, I took the job on the India desk. It turned out to be a very interesting and challenging. About three or four days after I got there in mid-1972, I was given a task on a subject about which I knew nothing. This was to coordinate an interagency study for the White House on the Indian nuclear problem. This was before the Indians set off their first nuclear device. The study was commissioned by Kissinger, then the National Security Adviser. One of the ways that he kept the bureaucracy busy was having them do studies. This study was useful—at least to the participants—although I don't know that it led to anything.

So I spent the next couple of months in interagency meetings, learning about what the nuclear program was in India, what this meant to the non proliferation agreement, and what the U. S. could and should do about it, including predictions of whether India would proceed with its test program. I learned a lot about nuclear power and other uses by talking with experts of which there were plenty. I didn't try to become an expert. I would get somebody in to talk me through one aspect or another of the issue. The end product was called NSSM (National Security Study Memorandum) 202; it just sat in the NSC until the Indians tested two years later.

During the first year on the desk I was just a member of the team. The Country Director was Dave Schneider, whom I had worked for before and highly respected. The way he structured the office was that he didn't really have a deputy. Desk officers dealt with him on specific issues, as needed. That was the right approach because it cut out an unnecessary layer of supervision in what was a fairly small office. I think that there were six of us. I was

the senior officer dealing with India. Initially, that meant dealing with the nuclear problem. Then there were various other tasks. There was another fellow working on India who didn't work for me. We both worked for Dave [Schneider], who in 1973 went to India as DCM when Pat Moynihan went out as Ambassador. Bruce Laingen became the Country Director for a very brief period. Then there was a change “upstairs” [in the Bureau of South Asian Affairs], and Bruce became a Deputy Assistant Secretary. I became the Country Director from the summer of 1973 to 1977—four years.

The Country Director's role goes back to changes in the mid 1960s, when Dean Rusk assigned principal responsibility to country directors to lead the U. S. Government team, which dealt with a specific country or area. The intention was that the country director not just be the person who dealt with the country in the State Department. He or she was to be the interagency coordinator. The country directorate was to be the focal point for everything that went on between the United States and a specific country. The Country Director did not make policy, but did frame the issues for the policy makers and then was the person who carried out that policy in the day-to-day work involving that country. He or she was the “back stopper” for the Embassy and was to be very much the hub or focal point of the US government's dealings with the country.

He or she would have an unquestioned right to know what was going with the country of responsibility—except for CIA matters which were handled a level higher. So, except for the Agency, the Country Director was supposed to be involved or aware of everything that was going on within the U. S. Government concerning a given country. This was generally accepted by the other agencies. Sometimes, you had to assert yourself, but the concept wasn't usually challenged.

That was the theory, and for India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, the three countries in the directorate, it was the reality. I was assertive about the responsibilities of the country director. Three things were very important in the case of India. One aspect was working very closely with the people who worked on Pakistan, because so much of U. S.-Indian

relations were involved in the dispute with Pakistan. We really had to have a very close relationship. Our office was right next door to that of the Country Director for Pakistan and we made it a point to get along.

Secondly, there was the effort to define policies for the countries concerned. This really meant India, since relations with the two other countries, Sri Lanka and Nepal, more or less ran themselves, although we had desk officers. The idea was to use the Country Director position to work out policy approaches for India and to bring the whole community interested in India in the U. S. Government into this process. I think that we had a weekly interagency meeting, not just on India but for South Asia as a whole. We did India and Pakistan together deliberately. There had been an Office of South Asian Affairs previously, which was split in half.

Thirdly, I was in very close contact with the our Embassy in New Delhi. We had “political” Ambassadors there—Pat Moynihan for the first couple of years that I was Country Director and Bill Saxbe for the last couple of years. Both were “high fliers,” who dealt directly with National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State Kissinger and the White House. This meant I dealt with the DCM, Dave Schneider for most of the time. We constantly kept in touch. At that time we didn't use “Official-Informal” cables. We wrote letters to each other every week. We figured out the time table which the diplomatic pouch followed and timed our correspondence to make the pouch. That was very helpful in terms of keeping in touch and knowing what was going on. It worked pretty well.

I might at this stage just briefly comment on the informal communication system used by Department of State officials. In the State Department, an outgoing telegram always carries the signature of the Secretary of State. The “authorizing officer” is usually somebody down the line. But in effect, a telegram is an official order. It doesn't necessarily involve a policy directive or an instruction. However, sometimes you can't give the recipient the full background; the cable might never be “cleared.” Often you can't tell the whole story and explain all the ramifications or bureaucratic politics in the background]. So a telegram

doesn't convey the whole picture. To get around this limitation and keep the Embassy in India fully informed, in light of the poor telephone communication, we resorted to letters. We could have sent such a letter by telegram, but “Official-Informal” telegrams were frowned on at that time, because other people could read them. Letters, on the other hand, were strictly private. No one else saw them, and we could say whatever we wanted. If we knew the addressee well, as I did in the case of Schneider, we were totally frank. This was a very good way of keeping the Embassy well informed. In turn, we got from them similar correspondence, indicating what they were interested in. It was a useful system.

Today this exchange takes place on the telephone. What unfortunately happens is that the system can be misused. That was harder for India because communications were so bad. It was not like in Europe, where American diplomats just picked up the telephone. That has security risks because there is often “intercepts” of open conversations by the Soviets, or whoever. Then, classified phones were rare; today it is better. I remember seeing Warren Christopher—then Deputy Secretary of State— pick up a phone at the end of a negotiating session with the Turks when I was in Ankara in 1978-80. He called Peter Tarnoff, who was then the Executive Secretary of the Department of State in Washington. Christopher went over everything that happened during the day on the open line. He asked Tarnoff about what was going on in Washington. It was an appalling breach of security. People forget that their telephonic conversations are heard by many. Today, the situation is better, with “secure” telephones, as long as people remember to use them.

However, the important thing for historians is that with “Official-Informal” correspondence there is a record—a copy is kept in the files where they can be found. I have learned this in my own research, going through Embassy files, which are retained in the National Archives. Most of the official-informal letters are kept either in the Embassy or Country Director files.Ambassadors Moynihan and Saxbe's relations with their counterparts, the U. S. Ambassadors to Pakistan, were in relative harmony, unlike earlier times. Ambassador Moynihan had gone out to New Delhi in 1972. Pakistan had just split into two countries. India was the big player in the region. Our relations with India were terrible because of the

position we had taken during the 1971 war. But there were not any particular difficulties between our Embassies. They were not vying for support from Washington. That made my relationship with the Country Director for Pakistan, Peter Constable, a whole lot easier. Furthermore, we were friends. That also made it easier. We basically saw the situation in the same way. We differed a bit on arms supplies for Pakistan, but it was a comfortable relationship.

Secretary of State Kissinger felt—and he turned out to be correct—that the “sirens of disaster” who said that we had “lost” India by tilting toward Pakistan in 1971 were wrong. He thought that India, in order to maintain its room for maneuver, would want to have a better relationship with the United States, and would not want to be totally tied to the Soviets. But that happened slowly.

Ambassador Moynihan said that in the past we had a relationship with India with sharp ups and downs. What we now wanted, he said, was a steady relationship on a plateau. He termed this a “mature relationship” at the time. Kissinger had time for India, especially when he became Secretary of State in 1973. He considered it a big country worthy of attention. Indeed, much to our surprise, when the Indians appointed as their Ambassador to the U. S. a man who was known for his closeness to the Soviet Union, T.K. or “Tiki” Kaul—to whom we almost did not give agreement because of his pro-Russian leanings—Kissinger received him often. I was new of the desk and I don't remember the details of agreeing to Kaul's appointment. It was the White House that raised some questions, presumably based on intelligence reports. In any case, Ambassador Kaul saw Kissinger at the State Department often, and went to Indian Embassy functions. There were only about half dozen Embassies that he showed this much interest in. He had time for India because, as he would mention at meetings, India was a big and important country.By 1974 India's relationship with Pakistan was less of a problem for us. Pakistan was weak after the 1971 war. The Kashmir problem was quiescent. Pakistan seemed to accept India as

the leading power in the subcontinent. So the situation was relatively calm during this four-year period.

When Kissinger went out to India, some time in 1974, he made a major speech in New Delhi. He used these speeches as an important way of articulating policies. I think that Ambassador Moynihan prepared a draft along with Mark Palmer, who was a Kissinger speech writer. Mark had previously served in India and had a good sense for South Asia.

Basically, what Kissinger said, without expressing any regret for past U. S. policy, was that we accepted India as the major power in South Asia. This is what the Indians wanted to hear. However, as Indians are what they are, they chose not to hear it. Kissinger was in India about three days. And the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, in her inimitable fashion left New Delhi after the first day. The Embassy in New Delhi was caught quite by surprise. She made a point of snubbing Kissinger. I am sure that Henry must have loved that. However, Ambassador Moynihan felt that Kissinger's going out to India and some of these other developments were his and President Nixon's way of trying to improve our relations with India, after our “tilt” toward Pakistan. And relations did improve to some extent. As I now look back on it, 20 years later, and after I have written a book on the U. S. and India, the situation seems quite different than it did at the time. We had achieved a low level of harmony. There wasn't much going on between India and the United States. We did not have an aid program. We had suspended aid, and India retaliated by kicking the AID people out. India cut back the Peace Corps program, and we closed it down entirely. There was very little U. S. investment in India. We had no military assistance program—hadn't had since 1965. So there really wasn't much going on bilaterally.

My comment on the cessation of military assistance in 1965 needs a little amplification. In 1967 we permitted the sale of spare parts for previously acquired U. S. equipment, which really affected Pakistan, but did not resume aid as such. Then Nixon, as a favor to Pakistan, agreed to what was called a “one-time exception” in 1970 for what I recall were some aircraft and some APC's [Armored Personnel Carriers]. In 1975 he lifted the

arms embargo but did not resume aid. He also agreed to finish a program with the Indians of providing radar equipment, which had been suspended back in 1965. We got caught up in this. We tried to have a certain amount of symmetry in our relations with India and Pakistan. However, basically, in the 1972-77 period, there wasn't anything going on.

There was a different situation regarding economic aid. There was the economic aid bureaucracy—the AID bureaucracy— which was eager to get back into India. It had been a big program for them. Ambassador Moynihan did not really want this to happen because he felt that U. S. assistance was too large, its mission too “bloated,” and too arrogant. He called it the “age of the Demi-Raj.” He saw this symbolized by the headquarters of the AID Mission in New Delhi, which was located in a big building on the outskirts of New Delhi. With much ceremony he handed over the keys of this building to the Indian Government. They turned it into a “Five Star” hotel. He wanted to make sure that it wouldn't be reopened again.

It was an interesting exercise. Under the terms of our arrangement with India, we had an enormous amount of foreign currency—in Indian rupees and the Indians built the AID office building. It was put up with local currency [rupees], on the understanding that when we no longer had any use for it, the Government of India would take possession of it. So our returning the building to the Indians wasn't a “gift.” Ambassador Moynihan concluded that we weren't going to have an aid program for the foreseeable future and announced that we were giving the former AID Headquarters building back to the Indians.At that point Senator Fulbright got wind of this. He wrote a letter expressing outrage that we were giving away this building and so forth and asked what was happening. At the time the Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asia Affairs was Joe Sisco. Sisco was more concerned about the Congressional pressure than the Indians. So there was a great stirring around to see “How can we stop this?”. Some people said: “This is a crazy thing that Moynihan is doing.” Well, there wasn't much that we could do. We sent out a telegram—a good, bureaucratic telegram—asking him about his plans and whether he was sure about it. He came back with a wonderful telegram to the State Department. The telegram was called

“The Edifice Complex.” He gave a copy of it to the “New York Times” correspondent in New Delhi and a story appeared in the “New York Times” a few days later. He gave the keys to the building to the Indians with great flourish, and that was the end of it. To me it was an example of how the State Department, on the one hand, caved in to Congressional pressure and tried to stop something that made sense. On the other hand, there was a “political” Ambassador who could ignore the State Department, by going public on an issue.

I had a mixed mind about the resumption of an assistance program. While I thought that we should be helping the Indians, I believed the Indians should ask for aid—and this was more or less a point of theology. What had happened in the past was that the Indians, with the somewhat curious psychology they have, had worked us into a situation where they appeared to be doing us a favor by accepting aid from the U. S. The Indian elite resented receiving U. S. aid because it put them in a relationship of dependency with us. After a long history of being a British colony, they didn't want to renew that kind of relationship. And so, while the aid did good, and I think that it was helpful to India, it engendered bad feeling and became a political liability.

That problem did not exist in other places, for example, not in Pakistan. That country is relatively small, it knows it is dependent, and doesn't have any hang-ups about it. There was also no problem with having aid programs in Nepal and Sri Lanka because the psychology of the recipients was different from the psychology of the Indians. In the case of Nepal there was a situation where foreign aid from the United States and other countries supported the only development that was going on in the country. Whether it did any good—and how much good it did—is somewhat questionable. Economic aid was not useful to us as a political tool in Nepal. Every country looks at its own situation. In the case of Nepal it felt itself squeezed by India. It is almost totally dependent on India. It seeks to broaden its options and relieve this pressure by having as much of a relationship with China as it can get away with—and as many other countries as possible. The United States is a major power. Nepal wanted as broad a relationship with us as possible. So the

Nepalese were delighted at the U. S. presence, wanted us to be involved, and welcomed it as a way to offset the Indians.

Sri Lanka, on the other hand, was a bizarre or paradoxical case. It had a woman Prime Minister at the time, Mrs. Bandaranaike. She, like Mrs. Indira Gandhi, was a Leftist. Sri Lanka's voting record at the UN was about the same as India's. But Sri Lanka, unlike India, got along with the Nixon administration. Nixon and Kissinger both liked Mrs. Bandaranaike. The AID people also liked the Sri Lankans; so the U. S. put aid money into Sri Lanka. We were giving Sri Lanka quite a bit of economic assistance. I remember a dinner at the Sri Lankan Ambassador's house with Deputy Director of the AID Agency—Johnny Murphy. He was quite conservative and was just bubbling over about Sri Lanka. Relatively speaking, Sri Lanka got a larger share of economic aid than one would think. However, the Sri Lankan Government played us right. They were a small country and needed the help. Of all the South Asian countries they had the highest standard of living, literacy, and so forth, and they made the best use of the assistance resources. AID could carry out projects there more effectively than in India and certainly than in Nepal. So Sri Lanka got a lot of aid and used it well. We had a surprisingly good relationship with a country that was not oriented towards us politically.Again, this was related to their situation. They felt isolated, because India was so big, but did not feel as isolated as Nepal did. The Sri Lankans also wanted a relationship with the U. S. We did not use the assistance program as a tool to achieve some political goal there.

With India we went through my whole tour without an aid program. We put some assistance allocation back into the AID budget and announced that we had done this. I think it was something like $75 million. Then the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, would complain from time to time about U. S. interference in India. She would make a speech here or there, alleging that the CIA was interfering in Indian internal affairs. We would complain. The Indian Government would say that she was misquoted, that she had been speaking in Hindi and the translation was wrong. We would threaten not to restart the aid program. Finally, after Ambassador Moynihan had left India and Ambassador Saxbe

was there, we had enough. This was in 1975 or 1976. After Mrs. Gandhi said something that really annoyed us, we announced that we were withdrawing money to support an aid program in India from the budget. And we actually did that. In other words, not giving aid became a message, but this applied only to India. We continued, as we do to this day, to provide aid through voluntary agencies—school lunch programs, and things like that. This amounts to about $100 million a year.

We can talk about the surplus local currency available to us in India in terms of the policy issue. India stopped purchasing food from the U. S. under the P. L. 480 program during the crisis of 1971. India stopped it, we didn't. They told us that they didn't need food anymore. Then, in 1973, I believe, they had a poor harvest. India decided to spend its own money to purchase food, rather than ask us for any more P. L. 480 assistance. It was a policy decision on their part that they would never get into the position which they had been in during the 1960's, when they were heavily dependent on the United States and when, in their view, they had to beg us for food. In any case, it fortunately turned out that the poor Indian harvest of 1973 was a one-year exception, following which food production went up again.

Ambassador Moynihan's major achievement was to resolve the “rupee” problem. This dated back to the first food arrangement we had with India back in 1951. The Indians had worked out an arrangement so that the surplus food was not grant aid. But the Indians couldn't pay it back immediately. They undertook to pay us back in local currency [rupees]. Basically, this use of these funds was restricted to U. S. Embassy local currency expenses. By 1973 because of the large food shipments, especially in the 1960s, the situation was that we owned something like $3.0 billion in Indian rupees, or 20 percent of India's outstanding currency. The money that we owned was in a bank account which drew interest. So we were earning more every year in interest than we were spending for Embassy purposes. I think that we were earning about $100 million (in rupees) in interest and spending only $70 million. This could have gone on forever.

We need to remember that our account was not real money; our rupees were an accounting charge and not real cash. It only became actual cash when we spent it. It was a debt on the Indian books, but the use of it was very limited. It wasn't as if we could really “pull the plug” on the rupee. However, they thought that we could. The Indians were very, very concerned about it, particularly since relations between the two countries were tense. Ambassador Moynihan was very concerned and, to his credit, worked hard to solve this issue. He was concerned that the next time things went wrong between the United States and India, the Indians would simply wipe out the debt in these accounts. After all, it was money held in Indian banks—mostly in the Government Reserve Bank. They could have simply blocked these accounts totally, and this would have made our relations even worse.

Ambassador Moynihan obtained approval for negotiations with the Indian Government on this issue. He was very clever about the way he handled the negotiations. First, it was a negotiation with the U. S. Government, and then with the Indians. Within the U. S. Government it was a question of how much of the balance owed us we would keep and how much we would write off. The negotiating package which the U. S. Government approved was that we would keep $2.0 billion and write off $1.0 billion. Moynihan said nothing about this. He just let the bureaucracy in the Treasury and State Departments work its will. He didn't think that this package would be negotiable with the Indians. He thought that the balance would have to be the other way around.

Ambassador Moynihan played no role in the intra US Government negotiations. He intentionally decided not to do so. Tactically, he was clever. He let the U. S. bureaucracy come up with its “negotiating” package. The NEA Assistant Secretary [of the Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs] said that we would be guided by the position of the Treasury Department. So the argument within the U. S. Government was not very vigorous. However, Ambassador Moynihan returned to Washington, and this is where a political Ambassador can be effective, went out to San Clemente [the Nixon residence in California] and saw President Nixon. He had been head of domestic policy for Nixon and

had access. He said that he talked to President Nixon for about 45 seconds and got him to agree to “turn the package around.” Kissinger wasn't really involved.

The decision therefore was that we would keep $1.0 billion [in rupees] and would “write off” $2.0 billion. It was a “two to one” split the other way. We then negotiated that with the Indians. On the Embassy side was Ambassador Moynihan, the Economic Counselor, and a very good Economic Officer in Washington, Don Born, a good friend of mine. He was basically the “back stopper.” I was involved, but he did the work. It got very, very complicated. There were a lot of details. Ambassador Moynihan had to deal with the political aspect of the negotiations.

The U. S. domestic politics of this issue were difficult because India was not popular, and there were people within the U. S. Government who would have liked to block the deal. And in the Congress. There was a very creative use of a target of opportunity on Ambassador Moynihan's part. A Catholic missionary named Robert Barrett walked into the Embassy in New Delhi one day and asked whether it would be possible to get an endowment for a Catholic Medical Center in Bangalore, India, which he wanted to set up and name for John McCormack, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives. It was not the sort of thing that the Indians wanted to accept. They wanted the $1.0 billion or any other money in this pool strictly limited for use by the Embassy and not for other uses, and particularly not this type of an endowment. However, Ambassador Moynihan, who is not only clever but savvy politically, found out that Barrett not only knew John McCormack but also Senator Ted Kennedy and George Meany of the AFL/CIO, the whole Irish Catholic American network. Moynihan was able to get the active support of these people for this memorial for John McCormack and because of this their support for the rupee deal. Moynihan persuaded the Indians to agree to make an exception, so that $100 million worth of rupees would be used for the John W. McCormack Memorial Medical Center.

One day, in the Country Director's office, the phone rang, and John McCormack was on the phone. He had just retired as Speaker of the House of Representatives. He said: “What can I do to get the rupee deal through? Whom do you want me to speak to?” There was also a phone call from Senator Kennedy's office. There was another call from George Meany's son-in-law, asking: “What do you want the lobbyist of the AFL/CIO to do?” These phone calls turned out to be very helpful, because pretty soon we found ourselves with a big problem in Congress. The problem was that Senator Harry Byrd, from Virginia, tried to kill the whole agreement. He said that this was being handled as an executive agreement, which meant that Congress didn't have to approve it. Senator Byrd slipped through the Senate a motion that this agreement would have to be voted on. It was the “Byrd Amendment” to some piece of legislation, which was accepted by the Senate. Senator Byrd's position was that this was a U. S. “giveaway” even though the funds were really not available for general expenditures. Byrd was also anti-Indian and was unhappy that we would be giving away $2.0 billion to “those people.” This was the kind of argument that we had never really intended to make. We were keeping $1.0 billion. It was something of a fluke that we had this money. The local currency account was always hard to explain. If we didn't complete the agreement, we would always be running the risk of losing it all.

At least twice Senator Byrd got this amendment passed, and we then came back and worked very hard on Congress. We were able to get the situation turned around thanks in part to the Barrett project. We also had President Nixon's help, surprisingly, given the fact that Nixon was not regarded as a “friend” of India. By this time Nixon was on his way out, in the aftermath of “Watergate” . We got active assistance from the White House congressional team. So this arrangement was eventually approved, and Ambassador Moynihan, with a typical flourish, gave the Indians what was then the world's largest check for $2.0 billion worth of rupees. This made the Guinness “World Book of Records.” It was Moynihan's main achievement while he was in India.

In terms of other noteworthy things, there were two main issues. One was the U. S. reaction to the Indian nuclear test. It could be considered poetic justice that I was the Country Director, since I had written a paper on this issue. I was around, two years later, when it actually happened. The Indian nuclear test took place in May, 1974. Ambassador Moynihan was still in India at the time.

Kissinger's reaction was that it had happened, and there wasn't not a hell of a lot that we could do about it. He said: “Let's not make the situation worse.” This was reflected in his toning down the draft press statement which we had prepared regarding the Indian nuclear test. We learned of this about 4:00 AM [Washington time]. We worked up a strong draft statement condemning the test over the telephone with various people. The object was to make a statement in the next couple of hours. Kissinger was then on a “shuttle” trip in the Middle East. All major business in the Department was sent to him for his approval. A couple of hours after the draft statement was sent to him, we received back a “watered down” version of the statement, which was then made public as the U. S. Government's reaction to the Indian nuclear test.

My personal view of India's nuclear policy was that, although Mrs. Gandhi had come out of the 1971 crisis as the “Empress of India” and was at the peak of her power, she screwed up. By 1974 she had become unpopular and was in trouble politically. I felt that she regarded the Indian nuclear test as a way of boosting her power and improving her domestic political position by showing that India could be a world power. The nuclear capability was seen as a major symbol of power. In typical Indian fashion—doing things differently than others— that this was not a nuclear weapon. It was described as a “peaceful explosion.” Indeed, all they did was to set off a peaceful nuclear device. It was an underground explosion. India had signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty and was not authorized under the treaty to conduct an explosion in the atmosphere. It would have broken the treaty if they had done so. They set up a bomb in a hole in Rajasthan and exploded it there.

Just as Moynihan was leaving India, the Indian nuclear explosion took place. Within the U. S. Government this had strong repercussions. Until then, the liberals had been pro-Indian, and the conservatives had been anti-Indian. The liberals were mostly strong anti-nuclear proliferation people. While the conservatives weren't in favor of nuclear proliferation, it wasn't a key issue for them. The liberals who used to be pro-Indian and favored better relations with India turned sour on India after the test. The people that had been anti-Indian weren't exactly for India, but they were not as negative on the Indians as the liberals became.

The Indian nuclear explosion set off alarm bells in the nuclear non-proliferation community. It felt that, if India could proceed with an explosion unchallenged, then other countries could as well. If India were not punished, others will want to do the same thing. The fact was that India hadn't violated any agreements with the US. The Canadians felt that the Indians had violated an agreement with them, since India had used a reactor which Canada had given them for research purposes to produce the uranium used in the nuclear test. The Indians said that they had not violated the agreement with the Canadians, and they were technically correct. The Canadian reactor had been given to India before the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] was negotiated. There were “peaceful use” requirements in the Indian-Canadian agreement, but the Indians said that this explosion was for “peaceful use.” The fact that the NPT said that there was no difference between a peaceful test and a military test was irrelevant, legally speaking. The Indians had a reasonable, legal case, but the Canadians also had a strong case. Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau had warned the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi, that if they proceeded with a nuclear test, using Canadian furnished supplies and equipment, Canada would react. Canada did, cutting off its nuclear help to India. There was pressure from the “non-proliferation people” that the U. S. do the same, because we had been giving India some technical assistance on nuclear matters. There was a close relationship with the AEC's [Atomic Energy Commissions] in the two countries.

A couple of days after the Indian explosion took place Secretary of State Kissinger—incorrectly—said that we were not like Canada and that we had not helped India. When the nuclear experts dug into the details, they discovered that the U. S. government in fact had provided India with some fairly limited help in the form of “heavy water.” The U. S. Government had provided this assistance in the 1950's. We, like Canada, had warned the Indians that they should not use these materials for a nuclear explosion; we would regard such action as a breach of the agreement. This was a unilateral statement, because there wasn't any bilateral agreement. This is an action that we took 12 years after the fact. The Indians took our warning but didn't respond to it.

The State Department was asked by Senator Ribicoff whether there was any U. S. “heavy water” used by the Indians in generating the explosion. Through a screw-up we sent out an erroneous reply to him, which said, “No” because it had evaporated. In fact, the U. S. “heavy water” was used in the Indian preparations for the explosion, because the “heavy water” could not have evaporated by that time. The next thing we heard was a blast in “The New York Times,” with Senator Ribicoff charging the Nixon administration with deceit and lying. With Watergate at high tide, this was a serious allegation.

We were not nuclear experts—and this is typical of the way you operate as a Country Director—but we worked very closely with the scientific people. In effect, the Ribicoff inquiry was joint action responsibility between the regional (NEA) and functional (Science) bureaus because it involved a highly technical question. I said: “What is Ribicoff doing,” and DAS Myron Kratzer, the key man in the science bureau, said, “We have screwed up.'” I asked: “What do you mean?” He said, in effect, that our expert in OES had given an answer that was incorrect and had screwed it up. In layman's language we had in effect said that my Chevrolet”—this is back in 1974—”can get the equivalent of 300 miles to the gallon.” Kratzer said that what we wrote was nonsense—it was wrong. The facts were way off. In fact, he said, anybody in the nuclear field—any nuclear expert—would know that this was nonsense.

What had happened—and I think that people don't realize how often this happens in government—was that in getting the information relayed from the Atomic Energy Commission through OES to our office, which prepared the draft letter answering Ribicoff's query on the Indian nuclear explosion, there was a garble on the numbers. The erroneous information was passed on by one secretary to another secretary. Our assumption in NEA was that we had obtained the correct information. The mistake in transmission involved how rapidly this “heavy water” evaporated. The people in OES who knew the situation hadn't reviewed the final reply and so the wrong information got into this letter. We, frankly, didn't pay enough attention to the details.

All hell broke loose. You have to remember the time. This happened during the “Watergate” affair—the summer of 1974. This incident was then cited as another example of deceit by the Nixon administration. Matters were made worse because Secretary of State Kissinger misspoke and the Department misspoke about US involvement. This was what started the campaign to get the administration to tighten up its nuclear policy. Even more fundamentally, the Indian nuclear test triggered a whole new approach to our nuclear policy.

I think that we were not concerned about reprocessing of nuclear waste at the time. The Indian action led to a change in our overall approach. We insisted that there be safeguards —what are called “full scope safeguards”— on all nuclear transactions. Up until this time the safeguards were limited to one aspect which was considered the “dangerous part.” Indeed, at the time reprocessing of plutonium was not considered a dangerous process. Today, reprocessing is regarded as an enormous sin and strict limitations are applied to it. It was the Indian explosion which triggered a review of our non-proliferation policies; that led to a global policy that took effect during the Carter administration.

Various efforts were made to punish the Indians. We had very little leverage for doing this because we didn't have very much going on. Congress passed a measure that required the U. S. henceforth to vote against all international loans to India. That had no practical

effect because we accounted for only 20 or 25 percent of the votes in the World Bank. The US was essentially left with symbolic actions because we had no assistance programs for India. The people in Washington who didn't like India had an opportunity to vent their spleens.I think the Indians made a monumental strategic blunder. Ambassador Moynihan told Mrs. Gandhi that—this was not part of his instructions—when he went in to give her the U. S. reaction to the Indian nuclear explosion in his personal view India had just made a strategic blunder. In effect he said: “It is certain that up until this point you had total dominance over Pakistan. By 'going nuclear' you will prompt them to 'go nuclear,' and they will be able to offset your advantage. Going nuclear is the only way they can equal you. Now you have given them the excuse to go nuclear themselves. And some day, some mad 'Mogul,' some mad general in Islamabad will pick up the phone and tell you, 'If you don't give me Kashmir, I'm going to obliterate New Delhi.'” Ambassador Moynihan reported, “Mrs. Gandhi sat there, looked out the window, and said nothing.”

Although a bit exaggerated, Moynihan was right. This is, indeed, exactly what has happened. Pakistan has gone nuclear. The Indians, I think, were very ill-advised to proceed with their explosion. They got the worst of all worlds. They let the world know that they were capable of triggering an explosion, but in a military sense, they did not have a weapon or a delivery system. So they didn't really develop a military nuclear capability. They have gradually come around to that, some 20 years later. By insisting that the Indian nuclear explosion was a “peaceful” program they violated the spirit of the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] which asserts that there is no such thing as a “peaceful” program. The Indians got everybody mad at them and they didn't get any of the benefits. They didn't acquire “Great Power” status, which they might have done, had they done what the Chinese Communists have done.

The explosion was not useful even for domestic political purposes. A year later the second major event during this period occurred. Mrs. Gandhi got into great political trouble. She started losing elections and then lost her own seat in Parliament on a technical challenge to her election. This was an allegation that she had used government-owned jeeps to

campaign. It was a trivial charge. She was threatened with being pushed out of office. So, rather than accept this, she invoked a national emergency and imposed a quasi-dictatorship. This was in 1975. Ambassador Moynihan had left, and Ambassador Bill Saxbe had replaced him. Her action then finished the job of losing all of India's liberal supporters in the United States.

India had set off a nuclear device. It was no longer a democratic country. As Ambassador Moynihan said: “The only thing they have to offer now that they are no longer the world's largest democracy are communicable diseases.” This infuriated the Indians, but it was true. So you had the liberals and “The New York Times” beating up on the Indians.

During the Ford administration, Secretary of State Kissinger consistently held the view that India's domestic policies were its own affair, unless they impinged on us. Therefore he took no exception to what happened. I sat in on a meeting after the Emergency was imposed during which he told Ambassador Kaul that: “We did not disapprove of your actions.” The Ford administration was beaten up by the liberals for not condemning Mrs. Gandhi's declaration of a national emergency.

I stayed in the Country Director's job at the start of the Carter administration. I stayed on for the first four or five months—until the summer of 1977. There was a turnaround in policy. When Carter came in, things looked really bad for US-India relations because he wanted to emphasize nuclear non proliferation—and he criticized President Ford on that issue. And President Carter emphasized human rights and democracy.

Then, to people's surprise, Mrs. Gandhi decided to have an election. She proved that she wasn't anti-democratic because she lost the election in February, 1977. I don't think that she would have called the election had she known that she was going to lose it. She was thrown out of office. There was a new government in India. The opposition, which was cobbled together very quickly, was less “pro-Moscow. It was headed by an 81-year-old gentleman—Morarji Desai—who had been considered “pro-American.” He was a moralist

like President Carter. He was a supporter of Mahatma Gandhi. He disliked nuclear testing and said that there would never be another nuclear test while he was in office. He made that very clear, and it looked as if we were in for a period of better relations.

We wrote a paper for the transition team, but I don't think that India was much on their mind. It was assumed that relations between India and the United States would get better. President Carter's mother had served in India in the Peace Corps. Of course, it didn't happen immediately, but Mrs. Gandhi announced that there would be elections before Carter was inaugurated. That changed the atmosphere.

The one single event that happened during the first few months of the Carter administration, and I was involved in that, was that the President of India died. The President of India is a figurehead—a ceremonial chief of state. The question came up of sending a delegation to attend the funeral. President Carter decided to send his mother, Mrs. Lillian Carter. I went along for the trip. That was clearly a sign of interest by President Carter in India. This was the first and only such trips that I ever went on. We travelled on “Air Force One” [the aircraft assigned to the President by the Air Force]. We left Washington at 10:00 AM. My boss was on the plane—the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Adolph (”Spike”) Dubs, a very fine man who was unfortunately killed later in Kabul [Afghanistan]. Along was also Tom Thornton, the South Asia expert on the NSC [National Security Council] staff. On board were a Congressman from Nebraska, Senator Percy [Republican, Illinois], and the Assistant Press Spokesman for the White House. There were just four “official” members of the delegation: Mrs. Carter, Senator Percy, the Congressman, and “Spike” Dubs. We had a briefing for Ms. Lillian, who turned out to be pretty shrewd. I was much impressed with her. Senator Percy wanted to get into a big, substantive discussion with Mrs. Gandhi, still the Prime Minister of India. We argued with him and said that the best thing to do with Mrs. Gandhi was just to attend the funeral and not to engage in any substantive talks, which is what “Miss Lillian” did. We were in New Delhi for a day and then went down to Bombay. “Miss Lillian” went off—I didn't go with her

—to visit the place where she had worked in the Peace Corps as a nurse. The whole trip went so fast. It was like a blur.

The appointment of Bob Goheen as Ambassador was also a sign of interest in India. Goheen was the former President of Princeton. More than that, he had been born in India, was the son of missionary parents, and felt very much attached to India. This was seen as a sign of interest in India on the part of the new administration. I sat in on his meeting with Secretary of State Vance whom he knew very well. I didn't sit in at his meeting with President Carter. According to Goheen, Carter said that all he wanted from India was a signal that India was not going to explode another nuclear device. When Ambassador Goheen called on Prime Minister Morarji Desai, the Prime Minister said: “You have my word that there will be no further nuclear tests.” That set the relationship on what was seen to be a much better basis.

We also held a private meeting in London with the Indians in 1977 on the nuclear question between Joe Nye, the new top nuclear man at State, and Jagat Mehta, the Indian Foreign Secretary. I went along and attended. The main hope was to persuade the Indians to agree to put all of their nuclear facilities under international inspection, under a system of foolproof safeguards set up by the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Administration]. This involved some presidential letters. The meeting in London was not successful, but we did express our concerns about nuclear explosions. Nevertheless, there was a feeling that we were on a better course in terms of our relations with India. The Indians said that they wanted, in their terms, a “more balanced bilateralism,” —i.e. a more balanced kind of non alignment, which was less pro-Soviet.

Let me now just briefly discuss Nepal and Sri Lanka. During most of the time that I was on the desk, Carol Laise our Ambassador to Nepal. She was very much the “Queen Bee.” She had been the Country Director and had been Ambassador about four years by the time I was assigned to South Asian Affairs. She had all the issues at her fingertips, although there weren't many. They were basically assistance issues and personnel

matters. They were matters which could be handled at the Country Director level, unlike India, which went to the Secretary of State. There really wasn't much at issue in Nepal. That is pretty much what I meant when I said that Nepal “ran itself.”

To illustrate the kinds of problems we had with Nepal, there was an issue about climbing Mt. Everest. Traditionally, the Nepalese do not decide which Americans would be approved to climb the mountain. They left that to the American Alpine or Mountaineering Club, which is a very “establishment” kind of organization.

Some fellow from Alaska, who turned out to be a kook, wanted to climb Mt. Everest. He didn't get the approval from the American Alpine Club; so he protested and got his Senator to approach the State Department to complain. The Nepalese Desk Officer in the State Department was “bamboozled” by this guy. I really didn't pay any attention to him. He passed the issue to the Nepalese Embassy in Washington and said, in effect: “We are taking no position on what the American Alpine Club says.” The Nepalese Embassy took that to mean that we were endorsing this guy, this kook, who then went out to Nepal and started putting up crosses half way up Mt. Everest. These were 50 foot crosses, and they created a problem. I remember that our Nepalese Desk Officer and the Embassy in Kathmandu were all upset. As I said, until then I had not really gotten into how this matter had been handled.

Then the people in the American Alpine Club started writing letters and making phone calls to Secretary of State Vance to find out what was going on. They knew Vance. They said: “Why did you 'disenfranchise' the American Alpine Club?” So we said: “We made a mistake.” This was the point. On matters like this the Country Director could decide things. We had made the mistake, so we could unmake the mistake. So we wrote a diplomatic note to the Nepalese Embassy in Washington, saying that we were canceling this proposed climb of Mt. Everest and that we were “re-recognizing” the American Alpine Club. We suggested that the Embassy follow their recommendations. The Nepalese Government promptly took the approval away from this kook, kicked him out of the

country, and that was the end of the story. As Country Director, I could deal with matters like that.

In the case of Sri Lanka, Chris Van Hollen was the Ambassador. He had been the Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia Affairs prior to that. There was more going on in Sri Lanka. Ambassador Van Hollen was very active. In this case he pretty much worked with the Desk Officer for Sri Lanka. I didn't have much direct contact with him, although I signed letters to him which were drafted by the Desk Officer. They worked very effectively as a team and there were few problems. I spent, I would say, 85-90% of my time as Country Director on India, and very little time, directly, on Sri Lanka and Nepal. It didn't mean that they weren't part of the office for which I was responsible, but the relationship with Sri Lanka and Nepal took very little of my time unless there was a visit. As far as visits were concerned, I met Mrs. Bandaranaike [Prime Minister of Sri Lanka], up in New York. She was there in connection with the annual UN meetings. I sat in on a 30-minute “non conversation” between her and Kissinger. She hardly said anything other than “Yes” or “No.”

The Deputy Assistant Secretary probably spent no time at all on Sri Lanka and Nepal, nor did the Assistant Secretary, except for an occasional situation. Still, they liked the Sri Lankan and Nepalese Ambassadors. But on a day-to-day, the fact is that our relations with Sri Lanka and Nepal were handled at the Desk officer level. We had very competent Desk Officers. I found that the more competent a subordinate, the less I had to do with these countries. In one or two cases the subordinate turned out to be weak, and I suddenly found myself spending a lot more time on the smaller countries, simply because I wasn't satisfied with the work that was being done.

We had a change in Assistant Secretaries while I was in NEA—from Sisco to Roy Atherton. Sisco was someone who had been very much involved with the Indians during the crisis over the 1971 war. Sisco was also involved in everything that might involve the “Seventh Floor” [the Secretary of State and other, senior officers of the Department] and

anything of major significance. He was directly involved in Indian issues. For example, he read such things as my nuclear paper.

Atherton was less involved, although he had served in India. He was much more involved in the Middle East and left issues more to the Deputy Assistant Secretaries and the Country Directors. Sisco kept his fingers on everything. Roy Atherton was absorbed with the Middle East and the Middle East peace process. He was involved in “shuttle” trips to the area and spent a lot of time on the road. But I didn't think that it was a problem. If you needed to get to someone, you could always see Joe Sisco, who was then the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Kissinger was also available for Indian issues. So I never felt that we missed any opportunities because of a lack of access to senior officers of the Department. The process actually worked more informally than an organization chart would suggest. We didn't always have to go to a more senior level. If the desk officer for a small country is competent, he or she didn't need the Country Director. It's not as if there was a “void.” If you needed higher authority, you got the help. If you didn't, you did your own work. Roy Atherton was available when he was around. If he wasn't, we usually went to someone on the “Seventh Floor”.

My first Deputy Assistant Secretary was Sid Sober, who had come back to Washington from Pakistan. He was briefly a Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia and then moved up to be senior Deputy Assistant Secretary. Bruce Laingen then moved up to be the Deputy Assistant Secretary dealing with South Asia. He was there about a year. He never was confirmed in the job because Secretary Kissinger decided on a program called “GLOP,”—Global Perspectives. Kissinger felt that the people in the Department were too insular and that the regional bureaus were too inbred. He always wanted to have at least one of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries come from another area. So Larry Burger Eagle [Under Secretary of State for Management] refused to confirm Bruce Laingen in the job as Deputy Assistant Secretary, since he basically had only served in South Asia. Eventually, Eagleburger insisted on Bruce Laingen going to Europe. They assigned “Spike” Dubs, who

had been DCM and charg# d'affaires in Moscow, as Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs.

That made a big difference to me as Country Director for India. I forget when “Spike” Dubs came in—maybe in 1975 or 1976—during the latter half of my time working on India. Until then I had been working for superiors who were very knowledgeable about South Asia. So my latitude for action was reduced.

There was a period when Armin Meyer was acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs. He had just come back from Japan, where he had been Ambassador. No one was in the job, so he handled it for a while. He had served in the region earlier. When “Spike” Dubs came in as Deputy Assistant Secretary in 1975, it made a big difference to me, because “Spike” didn't know much about South Asia. He was a good boss, who treated his subordinates well and gave us a lot of leeway. Not that he wasn't in charge. You talked things over with him, but you had an opportunity to express your views.

While commenting on the process during my tour in NEA, I should refer back to our Ambassadors in India. We had two Ambassadors who were very high powered [Galbraith and Moynihan]. It was very different with Ambassador Saxbe. I used to call him “a canny cornball.” He had been a Senator from Ohio and Attorney General. He was put in at the end of the Watergate Affair because nobody could accuse him of being in President Nixon's “pocket.” He knew India, having visited the country of several occasions. He liked India. He didn't know a lot about the normal processes of diplomacy. He believed in operating as an Ambassador the way he would as a Senator—namely, by calling in the “New York Times” or “Washington Post” correspondent and making a point, rather than going to the Foreign Minister. He also didn't believe in “calling” on other ambassadors or Indian Government officials. His attitude was: “Well, if they need me, they know where I am.” He was unique.

President Nixon, in fact, had told Ambassador Moynihan not to be “public.” So Moynihan gave one press conference during his two years in India, and that was the day before he left. Moynihan had no press exposure in India, which is very unlike him. Ambassador Moynihan kept a low profile. He found it very frustrating, but he did it.

Ambassador Saxbe came in when Ford was President. Saxbe was politically more powerful than Moynihan. At that time Moynihan had not been elected Senator. He was an academic who had worked his way up to the White House and become a public personality. However, Ambassador Saxbe had been a Senator and an Attorney General. He didn't really owe anybody anything. President Ford asked him what he wanted to do. He said, “Go to India.” He was delighted to go to India. He went and said publicly: “We are ready for whatever relationship the Indians are ready for.”

After a while in Delhi, he became upset. He said that he had been reading the Indian papers and saw all of the official criticism of the United States. Yet the same officials would come to the Embassy and ask for help so their children can study in the United States. He called in the correspondent of the “New York Times.” He said: “I don't understand this country. On Monday the President of India criticizes the United States in a speech. On Tuesday he is over at my house for dinner, telling me what a wonderful country we have, and can I help him get his son into Harvard. What is it, what do they want?” Naturally, this made good copy and soon appeared as a NY Times story, stirring up a diplomatic fuss.

We finally had to tell Saxbe: “We appreciate your views and we agree with them. But don't give them to the 'New York Times.'” Actually, I think that Ambassador Saxbe was quite effective, because he made the policy point that the Indians were not all that important for us. For a variety of reasons the Indians had an exaggerated view of their importance to the US. Ambassador Saxbe helped to get bring them down to earth.

Saxbe was in India during a difficult time— the “emergency”. Since there wasn't much going on bilaterally, he traveled and played golf a lot—and complained when the Indians

criticized us. I remember one telegram that he sent in. He was pushing to get us to withdraw the offer of economic aid. It is an unusual ambassador who will take such a stand.

The Embassy staff rather liked him. He basically had the same staff that Ambassador Moynihan had. Moynihan had a very good team in New Delhi. The staff found it quite different, working for Ambassador Saxbe. He let the Embassy run itself. He had the same DCM [David Schneider]. He brought out a couple of staff aides. Normally, a “political” ambassador is allowed one aide. In fact, Ambassador Saxbe had two. One of them had been his personal assistant for years and the other was a fellow who had been the head of management at the Department of Justice. There was great concern that this person, who was considered a “high powered”, was going to try to run the Embassy.

In fact, the staff did have some trouble with the former Justice man, at first, but then it worked out all right. John Reager was the Administrative Officer, and he was a fairly tough cookie.

Saxbe was Ambassador to India for a couple of years. He “did his own thing.” When he wanted to listen to us, he did. When he didn't, he didn't. With both Moynihan and Saxbe as ambassadors, I got to see Secretary of State Kissinger quite a bit. Both would come back to Washington for consultations, more often than most career ambassadors. I remember that on one occasion Ambassador Saxbe was supposed to see Secretary Kissinger at 9:00 AM on a Saturday morning. So I came into the Department. At 8:50 AM I had a phone call from Kissinger's office, saying that he wasn't ready to receive Ambassador Saxbe. Kissinger's aide said: “As a matter of fact, he is “on hold.” Saxbe said: “What does that mean?” So we waited about 10 minutes, and he said: “Look, I have an appointment at 10:00 AM. Call back and say that I will stay around until 9:30 AM and then I am leaving.” So I called Kissinger's office. I was told: “Saxbe can't leave at 9:30. The Secretary has put him 'on hold,'” Saxbe was sitting there. I told him: “They say you can't leave.” He said: “The hell I can't. Tell him that I'm leaving at 9:30,” which was only a few minutes from then. I put

the phone down. Five minutes later, I got another phone call: “Tell Saxbe that he should be up here in five minutes. The schedule has been rearranged.” So, five minutes later, we were in Kissinger's office. Kissinger's first question was: “You were going to play golf, weren't you?” Saxbe said: “Yes, I have an appointment with Senator Fulbright at 10:00 AM.”

I remember one thing about briefing both Moynihan and Saxbe. Papers were of no particular use. What mattered was your oral presentation during the minute and a half or two minutes on the way from the office to the office of whomever you were seeing. Both would ask: “What is the main point? What should I say about this or that?” This was particularly true of Saxbe.

The main issue that Saxbe took up with Kissinger was the arms sale to Pakistan. Kissinger was pushing for such assistance. It was the big issue at the time. Saxbe would walk right in and say to Kissinger: “What's all this about arms to Pakistan?” This put Kissinger on the defensive. When he started into his usual presentation on this matter, Saxbe said: “That's the most stupid thing I have ever heard of.” Kissinger wasn't expecting this. Saxbe was unique!

Both Moynihan and Saxbe were pretty independent of Washington—Saxbe, in particular. Moynihan was in the White House loop. I remember that we got him all excited about arms to Pakistan when he was departing from India, but he didn't raise the issue with President Ford. He probably wouldn't have raised it, anyway, because this was something that Secretary Kissinger wanted to do. Saxbe, on other hand, trod “where angels feared to walk.” He couldn't have cared less. He used to say: “I can always go home.”

One of the Kissinger innovations was the institution of “Joint Commissions” with different countries. He was became interested in having a joint India-US commission. We first heard about it from the Indians who had wanted a joint commission. We had always said that it was not the American way of doing things. The Indians had a joint commission with

the Soviets. That is the way the Soviets operated. The Indians wanted one with us.They said: “Your Secretary has agreed to it.” We said: “This is nonsense. We don't want this.” Then we checked and found that Kissinger had indeed agreed to it.

We didn't want a joint commission because we didn't want to have all aspects of our relations with India controlled by the Indian Government. Our point was that there should be “people to people” contacts, and private businesses should be free to deal with Indian counterparts, instead of dealing with the government all the time. But Kissinger had already agreed so we had to work out an agreement. The reason he agreed, I assume, was that a commission cost us little and was a way to make the Indians a bit happier. So Eric Gonsalves—the DCM at the Indian Embassy—and I then set about negotiating an agreement on the joint commission. We developed a draft and talked our way through it. He said: “This is an advantage for you because, in fact, if an American does business in India today, at any level, the Indian Government is going to become involved. So this way, if you get things done through the Joint Commission, you then have the government's blessing. If you don't do this, there's no system now for giving you the government's blessing. Today it is very hard for Americans to get anything done in India.”

I accepted that but said: “Let us try to set up a rational structure that at least will do no harm or make things worse.” He said: “That sounds reasonable.” We decided to set up a system without a formal structure. The Joint Commission, as such, was the Secretary of State and the Indian Foreign Minister. We figured that since the Indian Foreign Minister always came to the UN every year, they would meet once every year. And once every two years the Secretary of State, we thought, was about right for the Secretary to go to New Delhi. The real work of the Joint Commission, such as it was, would be done by Subcommissions. There would be no staff and no formal organization. Nothing. There would be three Subcommissions: one on science and technology, because we had a large “rupee financed” program of science projects in India, amounting to about $20 million

a year. It was handled by the Science Attach# in New Delhi. The Subcommission on Science and Technology would go over programs, assign priorities, and so forth.

The second Subcommission was to work in the field of education and culture. This was an area that in which we had some interest—doing more on educational exchanges, getting Indian scholars to come to the US, etc. Each side could set up its part the way it wanted to. We didn't try to make it parallel. We then arranged to include various U. S. agencies on our side. We had one representative from USIA [United States Information Agency], one from the arts and museums, one from the publishing sector—some private, some public.

Then there was a Subcommission on Economics and Trade, which was strictly governmental. The Indians wanted a mixed private-public Subcommission, but we did not agree with this, because a governmental subcommission could only talk about policy issues and some general current problems. As a result, we set up a parallel, private sector Subcommission, called the Joint Business Council. I think that the U. S. side consisted of representatives from the Indian Subsection of the International Chamber of Commerce. Orville Freeman was the first head of that. The Indian Chamber of Commerce then set up a similar group.

So this Joint Commission got under way. Bob Goheen was the first head of the U. S. team of the Subcommission on Education and Culture. I think that the Assistant Secretary for OES [Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs] was the head of the U. S. element of the Subcommission on Science and Technology. The Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs was the head of the U. S. element of the Subcommission on Economics and Trade.

Before the first meeting of the Joint Commission, which was held during the visit to Washington of Chavan in 1976, the Indian Foreign Minister, Kissinger had the three chairmen of the U. S. elements of the three Subcommissions up to his office. He said: “I wish you well and good luck. But let me tell you one thing: don't come asking for any

money. I am not going to give you any. You figure out how you are going to finance anything that you agree to." In fact, the Subcommissions are now 20 years old. They are still functioning. I think that they have achieved their goal. They have done no harm. They have done some good. The Indians feel that it has been a reasonable institution. I think that we did a reasonably good job of negotiating it in such a way that it has created no permanent bureaucracy.

These Subcommissions did things that might not have happened without them, particularly in the education and cultural fields. In the mid 1980s they decided on an "India Here" program in the United States, with big exhibits. It provided a venue which had not previously existed. They would consider from time to time, "What can we do" and "What should we do"? I think that was a good thing. In practical terms, as Gonsalves said, it provided a vehicle to get approval for some science projects. It provided a vehicle to get approval for anything that was decided on in the cultural area. The Subcommission on Economics and Trade faded out. The U S. private business sector never did very much with this. The structure still exists, but the wonderful thing about it is that there is nothing to the structure. It is a mechanism which can be used or not used. Once or twice it was interesting.

Q: We are now up to 1977, when you were chosen to go to the Senior Seminar on Foreign Policy at the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State. First of all, was this an assignment that you sought?

KUX:Yes and no. "Yes," for personal reasons. My wife was working and wanted to work overseas. This was difficult to work out so the Senior Seminar was sort of a stalling operation to put off an overseas assignment. Five years on the India desk [1972-1977] had been enough.

So they talked to me about the Senior Seminar. Everybody that I knew who had gone there said that it was a good experience. So I said, "Why not?" My assignment was

unusual in that I had already had “senior training.”—the Army War College [1971-1972]. It is unusual for a Foreign Service Officer to have two “senior training” assignments during a career, but in my case, the Department proposed it. I think that what happened is that they had filled up the roster for senior training and then, for one reason or another, people dropped out. So they needed more people. The officer in Personnel that I was dealing with said that this was a reasonable assignment. My boss, “Spike” Dubs had taken this course. He said, “Take it.” People had generally had good experiences with it. They were very positive about it. So I became a member of the 1977-1978 class. It was the 20th class. The Chairman of the course was Chris Van Hollen, whom of course I knew.

It was quite different from the Army War College. I think that there were 28 people in the class. 14 were from the State Department, and 14 from the rest of the government—AID, CIA, USIA, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and the Marines, Agriculture, Treasury, Commerce. I think that there were a couple of people from CIA, including one from the DO [Directorate of Operations], and two from AID. There were two from USIA.

The Senior seminar program really doesn't change that much from year to year. About two-thirds of the year was spent on the U. S. and its problems. We went to New York to visit the UN and “The New York Times.” We went to the slums of the south Bronx. Hume Horan, who speaks Spanish, was with the group. We were listening to a case worker who didn't speak Spanish, so he started interpreting for her. When we were in New England, we visited New Bedford, Fall River, and the fishing industry. Then we were in Atlanta, where we spent a day at Delta Airlines. We met with former Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Atlanta.

We went to Puerto Rico where I had never been before. We went to Iowa for our farm visit. Each of us spent a day with a farm family. Then the group split up into smaller groups to look at energy problems. The subgroup that I was with went to California to look at the electric power industry. The father of one of our members worked for a power company in

California. Another member had a brother who was big in the movie industry. So the seven of us were wined and dined in Hollywood.

Then we also went to Chicago. We talked with the Mayor's office to the University of Chicago. We visited the Grain Exchange. We spent an evening riding around in police cars, during which I saw somebody murdered. I drew one of the worst precincts in Chicago. The cops took me along to one of the public housing projects. It was like in the movies. They had their guns drawn, kicking in doors. They said: “Look, you can stay in the car if you want to, but you will be safer coming with us.” Then there was a call—it wasn't at the public housing project, but it was about a guy who was dead in the street. The disintegration of our cities were clearly evident to all of us.

We talked to any people in the state governments. We talked with the Governor of Iowa, of Georgia and with the Governor of Puerto Rico. We visited SAC [Strategic Air Command] in Omaha, the Air Force Academy in Colorado, a strategic missile base in North Dakota, a nuclear submarine, and an aircraft carrier. I think that we had a plane assigned to us for a week. They flew us around the country, including a visit to Nellis Air Force Base outside of Las Vegas, Nevada.

Our usual pattern was to meet with an expert on a given subject. He would talk for an hour, and then we would have a couple of hours of questions. The system was a good one, different from that at the war colleges, because the class numbers were so much smaller. During the year, we gained an excellent impression of what was going on in the United States. The conclusion: the country as a whole, say about 85 percent, was in good shape. But 15 percent of the people, living in the big, urban areas, face many problems, discrimination, poor education, etc. and the incipient problems with crime and drugs, which weren't being dealt with. I must say that our group was very unimpressed with the U. S. administration—the federal government, both in terms of foreign and domestic affairs. We didn't see President Carter, but we saw Secretary of State Vance and National Security Adviser Brzezinski. We saw a couple of other cabinet members and spokesmen or senior

people across the United States in the areas we were concerned about. This was the first year of the Carter administration. There was a feeling that they really hadn't gotten their act together.

We also lucky to have an overseas trip which the Seminar didn't usually take. Since this was the 20th year of the Senior Seminar, Chris Van Hollen wanted to do something different. George Springsteen was the head of the FSI [Foreign Service Institute] and liked the idea of our going overseas, provided that he could go on the trip.

We started with a visit to NATO in Brussels. We were greeted by General Al Haig, who was then NATO commander [SACEUR—Supreme Allied Commander, Europe]. We had spent the night on the airplane and were exhausted when we arrived. In Moscow, we were received at the Soviet Foreign Ministry by the Deputy Foreign Minister. I don't know how they put the program together, but we did see some interesting things in Moscow. The American Embassy escorted us around, with different Embassy people accompanying us. It was a good experience.

Then we went down to Kiev, where we visited a collective farm, to contrast our visit to farms in Iowa. About 40 miles outside of Kiev, we got to the collective farm and wanted to see the animals. They wouldn't let us, saying that it was against the rules. All they did was to show us a movie on how the farm ran. They clearly didn't know how to deal with a bunch of foreigners. So we watched movies for a couple of hours and listen to lectures about the pigs and what collective farming can do.

Then we went to Leningrad and had a couple of days there. It is a wonderful city and we had some interesting talks. You tended to get the “party line” from people, but, even so, it was interesting. It was a good week; we were well-received and had no problems despite the Cold War. We were warned to “mind our P's and Q's.” I think that one of our group went off and talked to a “refusenik,” which got Chris Van Hollen all upset.

Then we went from Leningrad to Warsaw. That was a revealing experience, because there was an enormous contrast with the Soviet Union. It was quite clear that all was not well between Poland and the Soviet Union. We met primarily with government officials but talked with some nonofficials.

It was a fun year. It was a good learning experience for me, but whether it was of benefit to the Foreign Service is another matter.

Q: In 1978, you were assigned as Political Counselor to our Embassy in Ankara, Turkey. What were your considerations for accepting this assignment?

KUX: At first I thought that I wouldn't end up assigned there for personal reasons, because my wife couldn't get a job. In the end she decided to stay at home and continue working in the U. S. I remember drawing a circle of places which wouldn't be too far to get back home from time to time. Turkey was about as far as you could go and get back in a day.

One other consideration was that the Ambassador was very good—Ron Spiers. He was somebody I had not known before. But he had an excellent reputation. I wanted to work for somebody who was a real “star.” I hadn't really thought that much about Turkey. But when the job was offered, I said to myself, “Why not?” Everybody thought very highly of Ron Spiers.

Knowing that I was going to Turkey, I decided to study the thorny problem of Turkey, Cyprus and the Greeks. It was an opportunity to look at it in some depth, and my senior training assignment was an occasion to see how this policy had been put together. I focussed in particular on the Greek lobby. I interviewed the leaders of the Greek community and traced how they operated in the American political world. In the Congress, I met two Greek-American Senators—Sarbanes and Tsongas—and a couple of Congressmen as well. I went to New York, Boston, and Chicago to see Greek community leaders. I concluded that it was very simple to put together a “Lobby.” The

Greek-Americans had a basic structure, the Greek Orthodox Church, which could readily mobilize people. They didn't have faxes then, but they had telexes. The Greek-American “lobby' had a small office in Washington, which kept track of what was going on. It fed information into a larger organization, called the “AHEPA.(American Hellenic Education Progressive Association)”. AHEPA was an overall Greek ethnic organization, which went back to the 1920s.

I enjoyed working for Ron Spiers. He was very good—an unusual manager, I think. He was intellectually very active, but he wasn't hyperactive in the embassy. He didn't go in for unnecessary work. He always left the Embassy on time and didn't come in on Saturdays —unless something had to be done. He let his staff carry out their functions without interference. He was most unusual in that he really delegated responsibility. When he wanted to get into something, then he did get into it. Otherwise, he was rather laid back as was Bob Dillon, the DCM. The Counselors functioned as they saw fit. In Bob's case, he was surprisingly restrained because he was an experienced Political Officer and knew more about Turkey than anybody else in the Foreign Service. But he let me do my job and wasn't looking over your shoulder. It was a pleasure to work for both Ron and Bob.

The Political Section had seven officers and focussed on three main issues. One related to presence of U. S. troops and the base negotiations. This had been handled separately, outside the Political Section, but Ron Spiers put responsibility for it back in the Political Section. We had a Counselor for Political-Military Affairs, Don Gelber, who, in effect, was the deputy chief of the Political Section. He more or less reported to me. He was a friend of Ron's. I think that Ron really hadn't gotten the boundaries quite straight between the Political and Political-Military Affairs sections, reflecting I suspect his previous assignment as Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the Department. But it worked out all right. Gelber and I shared a house and got along personally.

The major bilateral issue was trying to work out a satisfactory base relationship between us and the Turks. This issue was very difficult because the Turks were super-sensitive

about sovereignty issues and were very tough negotiators. The U. S. forces are prone to setting up “Little Americas” overseas and didn't like the idea of local jurisdiction. Negotiations on this subject went on the whole time I was there. An agreement was finally agreed upon the night that Ron Spiers left Turkey in 1980. When I went to Turkey, there was no “Status of Forces” agreement as such; there were ad hoc arrangements which had been carried forward over the years. The Turks were unhappy about this because we had cut off military aid after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Aid had been restored just prior to my arrival thanks to a major push by the administration.

Handling military aid was another major task for Don Gelber. The other aspect of his work was dealing with American military units in Turkey. We had a couple of “listening posts,” and the Air Force had a base at Adana. We had shrinking numbers of troops, but we had about three or four generals there. There was a NATO headquarters in Izmir. So there was a considerable U. S. military presence in Turkey, which was primarily Don Gelber's bailiwick. He did it very well.

The second major issue was Cyprus. Despite much effort, the US hadn't been able to make much progress on that. While I was in Turkey, things had pretty well reached a stand off. The Turks had their part of Cyprus, and the Greeks had their's. During the two years that I was in Turkey there wasn't any real movement on this issue. There were occasional “up's” and “down's,” but I don't think that much happened. There was some interest from Washington in doing something about the Cyprus problem, but no pressure because there wasn't much that we could do. The UN in those days was very active on this issue, but it also could not work out an agreement to do anything. We weren't satisfied with the status quo because we always saw this issue as a potential flash point. Here were two of our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, more or less at each other's throats. We were always concerned that something would go wrong. We had good relations and periodic visits from and to our colleagues in Athens. We had different vantage points, but that never degenerated into bitterness or feuding.

There was a lot of physical insecurity in Turkey during those two years [1978-1980]. It was called the “anarchie”, “the period of anarchy.” First, Turkey had a weak Center-Left government and then a weak Center-Right government. There were Left wing anarchists periodically shooting up the towns and on the Right, there were some quasi-fascists, led by a Mr. Turkesh, making trouble, shooting leftists. A number of prominent people were killed, including the editor of the major newspaper, who was assassinated in Istanbul. Some Americans were targeted. There were nine Americans killed while I was in Turkey, all military people. So security was a real problem. One evening, around 6 or 7 p.m. somebody threw a bomb at my house while I was taking a nap and blew out all the windows in the living room. Our houses were not especially guarded. There may have been some soldiers around, but there was no special security. There was a terrorist attack just down the street at the Egyptian Embassy. A couple of people were killed. So there was a fair amount of insecurity in Turkey at the time.

A threat was made against Ambassador Spiers one time when he was visiting Istanbul. There was one other situation concerning a Political Officer, Bob Peck, later Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs. I had known him earlier when he worked on South Asian Affairs. He spoke good Turkish, traveled a lot and may have asked the Turks too many questions about what was going on locally. His name began to appear in the Turkish press. He was described as a “CIA agent.” He wasn't. There was concern in the Embassy that he might become a target because he had become sufficiently prominent. He was also a victim of pro-Communist disinformation. The Turkish Foreign Minister at the time, in a Left wing government—he was a “Left winger” himself—tended to take these allegations of CIA involvement seriously. He wouldn't accept our assurances, and suggested that the allegations were true. Then when we asked what he wanted us to do about these charges, he said: “Why don't you withdraw Peck?” In the end we didn't withdraw him, but Peck decided to leave early. So he left Turkey about a year early. Ambassador Spiers left this decision entirely up to Bob Peck. This was a technique which Ron used.

We felt the insecurity the most in 1979 after the trouble in Mecca [Saudi Arabia]. Muslim extremists had seized the Islamic Holy Places in Mecca and held them for a short time before being expelled. A rumor circulated in the Muslim world that the U. S. was somehow responsible for this incident.

Because of the burning of our Embassy in Islamabad, the Department started evacuating people throughout the Muslim world. I was Charg# d'Affaires that week as the Ambassador and DCM Bob Dillon were both away. Dave Newsom, then Under secretary for Political Affairs in the Department, called up on the telephone and asked: “Do you want to evacuate our people in Turkey?” He came right to the point. I said, “No.” I think that this was the right decision.

We did have some trouble in Izmir. A mob surrounded the Consulate General but no one was hurt. One thing as a result of the incident—and the experience in Tehran when the militants found all sorts of classified documents in the Embassy—was to cut way down on the classified documents. The Department's instructions were to destroy everything, leaving only a small amount of material which could be burned quickly in case the Embassy was attacked. In the case of Ankara that meant going down from 132 file cabinets to four. I don't think that we ever missed the material that was destroyed.

We did not consider the internal problems of Turkey to be our affair, but we did have one issue outstanding with the Turks. This came up in the early part of my tour in Ankara, and it was happily resolved. After some Americans arrested in Turkey on drug charges, the Turks were pretty tough on them. This led to an outcry in the U. S. We tried to get these people out of Turkish jails. The Turks wouldn't let them out. They insisted on having an the extradition treaty, and an agreement on judicial cooperation. I was the negotiator and the work took up a fair amount of my time during the first six months that I was in Turkey. As I've said before, the Turks were tough negotiators. In the end, the agreement was settled

only when Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher came out and raised this matter with the Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit.

We did have a somewhat different relationship with the “Right” than we had with the “Left”. A number of the people in the “Left” government tended to favor a more neutral approach in Turkish foreign policy. But that did not interfere with our personal relationships. We had pretty good contacts with the “Left”. I knew some Turkish, though I wasn't very good at it, but enough to deal with people who did not speak English. On the political side, I could always call on appropriate people to find out what was going on. The doors were always open for get-togethers regardless of party in power.

Turkish foreign policy and Turkish attitudes toward the United States altered with the change in governments. The Ecevit government was more suspicious of the United States. One of the reasons was a CIA “scandal” shortly before I arrived in Turkey. The CIA Chief of Station was caught meeting clandestinely with the deputy head of Turkish Intelligence, who had been working for us. It did not exactly improve our standing with Mr. Ecevit. However, this affair was buried; it never became a public matter, but it certainly did not inspire a lot of confidence on Ecevit's part. When he came in as Prime Minister, there were great hopes that Ecevit would be a Turkish “Kennedy.” He turned out to be indecisive and incapable of delegating authority very well. He tried to do everything himself.

After the overthrow of the Shah in Iran, we wanted to make greater use of Turkey. The issue was verification procedures of the SALT II agreement with the Soviets. We wanted the right to base “spy” planes in Turkey and overfly Turkish soil. The Turks refused. They didn't want to run the risk of upsetting the Soviet Union. The issue finally died. Ecevit was also not very helpful regarding Iran both before and after the Shah's fall. When the Turkish government changed, Demirel, the incoming Prime Minister, was much more pro-American.

The Shah's fall raised questions in Ankara. One of the things that happened was that CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] disintegrated. I got involved as the U. S. representative on what was called “The Liquidation Committee.” Part of my job as Political Counselor was to deal with CENTO as the U. S. representative. We were technically “observers” but de facto members. By then CENTO had become pretty much moribund. The “Liquidation Committee” was necessary to dispose of CENTO assets, the building, furniture, and things like that.

Another matter that I was involved in during my tour in Ankara was the effort to tie Turkey more closely to Europe and NATO. If the Turks felt excluded, there was a risk of driving them away from Europe and NATO. The Turks were always uneasy and worried that Europe would reject because they were Muslims. They wanted to be part of Europe. There were numerous Turkish workers in Germany and elsewhere. However, people in the Turkish government tended to be from the “elite.” They were very nationalistic, very proud of being Turks, but still wanted to be seen as part of Europe. We were always pushing for the Turks to be more closely identified with Europe. We felt that Turkey was important, and there was a risk, as I said, of alienating her if she were not brought more closely into Europe. Therefore, we felt that it would be better to have close ties to Europe.

Ecevit and Demirel did not get along personally. Turks are not compromisers by nature. Actually, it is most surprising that the Turks have stayed with democracy. There was nothing democratic in their history. The rivalry between the two men had an impact on Turkish politics. The two major parties, the “People's Party” and Demirel's party—the “True Path” party—couldn't get together on anything. There was a lot of personal ill will, quite apart from ideological differences, which were not major.

Future historians may trace political instability in Turkey to the population explosion. The growth in population since World War II outstripped the economic development; the cities were just bursting at the seams. It was a very poor country to start with. Turkey had a lot

of economic development, and what they had done was impressive. However, population growth outstripped it.

Our aid program amounted to $200 million a year, and delivery of it was by means of a check. We no longer had any programs, just money. The assistance checks that we wrote were what was called “Supporting Assistance.” In fact, it was budgetary support.

Actually, I was interested in doing something in the field of environmental affairs. My wife worked in this area for AID. There was one AID officer who instead of being in the Economic Section was attached to the Political Section, which is a little unusual. In the end, we got an environmental program going. In the whole Middle East, Turkey was the only country where there was non-governmental activity going on in the environmental field. This was led by a Turkish lawyer who did legal work occasionally for the Embassy. In fact he was the Turkish environmental movement. He operated out of his home, working for environmental legislation and so forth. We were able to arrange for some AID assistance for him—to fund his operation for four or five years and to set up a little program for him. When I was in Washington, I met with Joe Wheeler, the Deputy Director of the Agency for International Development, whom I came to know when he was the Director of the AID Mission in Pakistan and sold him on the idea of helping the one-man Turkish environmental lobby. Ten or 15 years later AID was still working with this person!

While I was in Turkey, we heard rumblings of dissatisfaction as the violence got worse. Finally just after I left, the Turkish military took over. This was not a surprise. The Turkish military had done this before. But, as before, they only stayed in power a short while and then went back to the barracks—not like in Pakistan.

I thought that Turkey was a fascinating country—half way between Europe and Asia, both literally and figuratively. I traveled widely around the country. I never worried about personal security although people in our Embassy were worried about “the Turks,” the Kurds, and the military. I remember once that I got on an airplane and went way out to

Eastern Turkey to Van [on Lake Van]. Then I went to Diyarbakir in the heart of the Kurdish area by bus. The security situation was not worse there than in Ankara. You had the same problem—insecurity existed everywhere. Reporting on Turkey really wasn't a problem. We had a pretty good feel for what was going on in the country that was of interest to Uncle Sam. I was not a country expert, although I learned a lot while I was there. Unlike South Asia, I didn't feel that we were missing any important information.

We worked pretty hard, as did Ambassador Spiers, on trying to organize the reporting. This was a challenge. The issue was not a report, but rather the lack of a reporting system. Ambassador Spiers wrote to Washington] and got a nasty reply. He then had an argument with Frank Carlucci [Deputy Director of CIA] about it. Ambassador Spiers and I felt that the Department of State's reporting system was badly organized. There was no guidance and you never got any feedback from Washington. I worked out a reporting plan for the Embassy and pressed Washington for some reaction. We eventually got something back, but only after a lot of hammering.

Ambassador Spiers left Turkey toward the end of my tour to become the Director of INR [Bureau of Intelligence Research]. That was amusing. I happened to be in his office when he got the message calling him back for a Washington assignment as head of INR. He was not thrilled, but asked that if he didn't go back to take the assignment, even though he didn't think he would care for it, how could the Department expect some junior officer to go off to Ouagadougou?. Ambassador Spiers was replaced by Ambassador Jim Spain. I had known Jim Spain from the time when I was in South Asia. He was very, very different from Ron Spiers. He was capable but had a bigger ego and was much more insistent on ambassadorial prerogatives than Spiers.

Q: Then, at the end of 1980, you joined Ron Spiers again. You became Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Coordination [in INR—the Bureau of Intelligence Research—in the Department]. What did the job involve?

I was part of the interface, on the operational side, with the intelligence community. That meant that I dealt with NSA [National Security Agency], the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], a little bit with DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency], but most of all with the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]. Anything that these agencies did was supposed to fit in with and support our foreign policy. My job, in theory, was to see that it did. A tall order in some instances.

There were two major areas. The first dealt with “Covert Action.” In effect, we were the Secretary of State's staff to deal with covert action. The second involved the more regular intelligence coordination problems between the CIA overseas operations and the Department of State. These problems were taken up, in most cases, with the regional Assistant Secretaries of State. In most of the bureaus in the Department there were regular meetings between the regional division chiefs of CIA, the CIA DDO [Deputy Director for Operations] and the appropriate assistant secretary in the Department of State. We were there as the Secretary's staff, to participate in the meeting. Those meetings covered “covert operations”, as well as general intelligence collection issues. We also staffed our regular meetings that the Secretary had with the Director of CIA. When I was in INR, there were meetings once every two weeks which the Director of INR used to attend. We provided the staff work for those meetings—set up the agenda, provided the briefing papers, and so forth.

There were several elements in our staff. We had the CIA “interface” group—maybe five officers and three secretaries. We had a group that dealt with the NSA and another that dealt with “overhead photography.” Our office was where photographic intelligence came into the Department of State. There were also people who worked with the FBI. Then we had the whole map collection operation, which was part of the staff. There also was an administrative staff known as the “Cover Staff” of perhaps a dozen people. They handled the cover arrangements for CIA assignments overseas. That was something that I worked

on with the CIA, trying to figure out what made sense and what didn't make sense. This was always a problem.

My staff consisted of 42 people, mostly civil servants who had been in their jobs for a number of years. They knew the subject matter. Well, some of them were very good and were a pleasure to work with. Some of them were not so good. So I worked “around” them. Most were pretty responsive to what I wanted to do. I thought that the mix between Civil Service and Foreign Service was about right. I had Foreign Service people dealing with CIA problems.

Of course, the activity that drew greatest interest was covert actions conducted by the CIA. The top levels of the State Department show considerable interest in the subject. We had discussions about some of the operations, even though we only had a couple of people who were privileged to the information. These “covert actions” often did not come out of somebody's fertile mind. An Agency officer would be discussing a question with the Assistant Secretary which would most often lay the groundwork. In one instance U. S. involvement in a foreign election had come up. Everybody involved in this discussion was worried about it because we were concerned that the matter would leak, and that would have been very embarrassing. In the end, Director Casey actually refused to go along.

The Agency usually was not out ahead in discussions of “covert actions”. Most of these were not “rogue” operations. There were cases where, quite obviously, neither the Department or the Embassy knew what was happening.

The Agency basically does two things: it collects intelligence. For that purpose you recruit people to be your spies. They answer your questions. Then, to help undertake your “covert operations,” you also need people who can influence others. Let us take one of our global, “covert operations.” Say, we were trying to oppose the threat of communism —something very broad. To do that, the Agency may try to hire people to influence the local government. These people are called “agents of influence.” The source of intelligence

and the “agent of influence” may be the same person, but not always necessarily. If you happen to recruit, the Secretary General of Party X or some official to provide you with information on what is going on—in other words, a “spy”—he also can serve as an “agent of influence.” Where we get into trouble is when something happens. We say that they are using Mr. X, and they say: “No, we are just collecting intelligence.” It sometimes becomes difficult to distinguish one category of agent from another.

Much depends on the relationship between the Chief of Station and the Ambassador. If the COS and the Ambassador have a good relationship and trust each other, things work out well. If they don't, if the COS plays things “close to his vest” with the Ambassador or if the Ambassador tries to get into everything, then there will be problems. The role of a DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] is also a difficult one. He doesn't have full access to what is going on—only when he is charg# d'Affaires. What I tried to tell the ambassadors whom I briefed regularly before they went to post that they should look at the Chief of Station the way they look at the Agricultural Attach#. You want to know what he is doing, what his objectives are, and what his programs are. However, you should let him handle his own programs. You don't need to know every single detail. It seemed to me that something like that would work out. A sensitivity on the part of both the ambassador and the COS was key to a smooth local working relationship.

By the time the Reagan administration came into office, every time a new covert action was undertaken, it had to go through the Congressional intelligence committees. Initially, that was handled by CIA alone, but the committees objected, saying that covert action, by definition, was supposed to support foreign policy objectives. They wanted the State Department to be involved in the briefing process. So the State Department, that is, the Assistant Secretary and the Deputy Assistant Secretary from our office and the regional bureaus, started appearing before Congress in this connection. These were all closed and classified sessions of the intelligence committees.

In the early 1980s, covert action finding, which the President had to approve, was a statement of objectives—what our aim was and what we were going to do. This was an official document which the President had to approve and which went to Congress—to the Intelligence Oversight Committees. We staffed that document for the State Department, reviewing it with the assistant secretary concerned and with the 7th floor if necessary. I don't think that we ever went below the level of a deputy assistant secretary.

Regarding Central America, I remember, Secretary of State Shultz at one of the meetings of the Senate Intelligence Committee, saying that he enjoyed the session, because everything was behind closed doors, and there was no “showbiz.” There were no television cameras, and the members of the Committees were very frank and very straightforward. It is, however, very difficult to work out what the ground rules should be for an intelligence covert action in a democracy. The question of what should be the role of Congress was ever present. It was interesting to be involved in trying to work out some arrangement. I don't know what it is now, but the arrangement we had seemed to work out reasonably well. The trouble came not so much with the initial operation but if its character changed and evolved into something else. Since there were no very clear guidelines, sometimes trouble arose, as over the programs regarding the Contras.

There were differences on the Agency [CIA] side. William B. Casey [Director of CIA] frankly didn't give a damn about Congress. He would grunt with near disdain after a hearing. Most, but not all, of the career people at CIA did. They were concerned about finding the proper balance so that they could carry on with their work without running afoul of Congress. The system that they developed at the time was, in effect, to do that. They would brief the Intelligence Oversight Committee on what was being proposed. The agreement was that if the course of covert action continued in much the same way, it could continue. If it was radically changed, they would come back to the same committee. One of the problems, of course, was that there really wasn't a good system to follow what was happened after approval. You could have a specific, covert action, let us say, to help to

defeat communism in El Salvador. The memorandum would spell out how it was planned to do that. But then there were what were called “global findings.”—that is, how to deal with communism as a whole. They were almost all intended to deal with communism and terrorism around the world, through a whole variety of means. Since these “global findings” were not country specific, they could be used anywhere. It was sort of a tent under which the Agency [CIA] could get its “nose” into all sorts of things.

In the mid 1970s there was a big blowup about “Watergate” and CIA's involvement. The law was changed. Previously, there was an informal arrangement which limited information on “covert actions” to only Congressional Committee Chairmen— nobody else was. After the mid 1970s the Intelligence Oversight Committees were established. This was an evolving development while I was in INR. By the time I became involved in this matter in 1980-1981 there was a semi-formal procedure of “findings” and briefings.

Within the Executive Branch of the government there was also a parallel evolution. However, it was not that different from an informal system called “the 5204 Committee” and perhaps other high level interagency groups which approved “covert actions” in earlier years. This was done without the President's involvement, so that you could have what was called “plausible denial.” This changed after Watergate to an arrangement where, by law, the President has to approve all “covert actions.” As I recall, there was a sub-cabinet group composed of representatives of the Secretary of State, the Agency, the Department of Justice, and the President which reviewed all “covert action” proposals.

Of course, I don't believe that any of these safeguards put a brake on Director Casey. He did whatever he wanted to do. That was obvious to me when I was working in INR. The two major areas of concern at the time were Central America and Afghanistan. On Afghanistan there was no major debate within the government. The Agency pretty well handled that situation by itself. We were generally aware of the CIA activities in support of the mujahideen. There was a “finding” in support of “covert action” and there would be periodic briefings. We knew what was going on in general but we didn't know the details.

CIA Director Casey's attitude toward Congress came across clearly on several occasions when I sat in for State at committee briefings. He would go to Congress and mumble about what was going on with the “Contras,” etc. I remember on one occasion that he came out of the hearings and said: “I hope that will hold the bastards!” In effect, he said: “I told them as little as I could get away with.”

The Iran-Contra operation was started after I left INR. I knew Ollie North, but it was in the context of Central America. We in INR were kept out of Central America affairs after Assistant Secretary Tom Enders came in. We had a lot of friction about that. The way that we dealt with bureaus varied depending on the personality of the Assistant Secretary. In the case of the East Asia, Africa, Europe, and NEA bureaus we had no problems. There were regular meetings between the assistant secretary and the Agency division chief. We attended those meetings and followed up on any problems. In Latin America, we started in the same way. When Enders came in, he began to have his own meetings and kept us out. We would become involved only when they went up to the Hill since our office handled all congressional dealings on intelligence. The Bureau of Congressional Relations was not involved, nor was anybody else in the Department involved in Congressional testimony on intelligence operations.

After Enders left, Tony Motley became the ARA [Bureau of American Republic Affairs] Assistant Secretary. He changed the ground rules and invited us to attend his weekly “RIG” [Restricted Interagency Group] meeting. This was his important, weekly staff meeting during which everything was discussed. Agency people were there, and Ollie North was there representing the NSC. At this weekly meeting many issues were discussed—not just CIA matters but economic aid and anything else that was important. Motley's chief of staff, Tony Gillespie, had said that some of the meetings would not be of interest to us which turned out to be the case. But we were able to follow the covert action programs.

I think Casey really had little regard for the “ground rules” and made them up as he went along. He appointed an outsider—Max Hugel—to run the “spy service,” as the DDO [Deputy Director for Operations]. Hugel had been in private business in New Hampshire. He was a real “hustler” and local Republican “big wig.” I don't know how “big” he was, but he did wear a wig! The Agency was horrified. I rather laughed to myself since we in the State Department have always had to put up with political “turkeys.” The Agency had no experience with political appointees. They couldn't stand the idea; they couldn't stand Hugel, who gave the impression of not knowing what he was doing in one of our government's most sensitive positions. I testified with him on one occasion. For the Agency people, it was like “pumping up” a “political” Ambassador. You could see them writhing. Hugel didn't last long at CIA, because he got caught in some financial shenanigans which had happened before his appointment and he had to resign. I don't know what Casey was thinking about when he appointed Hugel to head the DO.

One other function assigned to us which was important was to brief all ambassadors before they went to their posts on the Agency operation in their countries. If there were “covert action” programs, to tell them what they were. We also explained what the relationship should be with their station chief and the CIA staffs. This was especially important for new ambassadors. We went over with them the ground rules spelled out in the Presidential Letter. Every administration since President Kennedy has set down ground rules for Chiefs of Mission in dealing with other agencies, but especially with CIA.

These ground rules were worked out with great, great difficulty during the Carter administration. It took a year or so to negotiate them. Ben Read, then Under Secretary of State for Management, was the person handling this matter and was regarded as anti-Agency. Under the Reagan administration, the political tide had clearly changed from being “anti-CIA” to being “pro-CIA.” The question then arose as to sort of a letter we would have. I suggested to Ron Spiers that the best thing for the State Department would simply be to reconfirm the “Carter letter,” and not to negotiate a new one. I figured,

and Ron agreed, that we would only lose ground in a new negotiation. The DDO [Deputy Director of Operations for CIA] at the time was John McMahon, who later moved up to be Deputy Director of CIA. McMahon and John Stein, one of CIA's senior officials, were fairly pragmatic. Their feeling was that negotiating letters of this kind created a lot of ill will. We had gotten along all right under the “Carter letter”. After three years' experience using it, people had come to understand what the ground rules were. McMahon and Stein agreed that everybody would be better off if we could somehow just keep the arrangement as it was, without any changes.

So we proposed this. Walter Stoessel, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Ron Spiers, and I were involved in this discussion on behalf of the State Department. On behalf of the CIA was Bobby Inman, then Deputy Director of CIA, and, I think, John Stein. We had discussed this proposal beforehand. I guess that Inman had talked about it with CIA Director Casey, who had simply shrugged his shoulders. So the CIA agreed to this idea and we left things as they were, without a lot of hassle. As a result, the substance of the letter which was used during the Reagan administration was the same as the letter used during the Carter administration. A new letter was issued with a few, minor, editorial changes, but they didn't affect any of the major issues. I felt that was a pretty good achievement.

With the Carter administration I did get into the question of foreign service reporting. When I first arrived in INR in the summer of 1980, I was the State Department staff person on an interagency effort about reporting. This was triggered by the fall of the Shah in Iran—what went wrong, why did we miss it, were we focusing reporting on the right things, and so forth. I prepared a draft study—a global study, actually—setting forth the major issues in each country, staffing this throughout the Department. We met with Don Gregg, then at the NSC and later with the Vice President—a former member of CIA. And there was somebody else from the CIA. The effort was intended to lead to interagency reporting plans for each country. I remember that the drafts of the report were big, fat, and bulky.

Ron Spiers met with John McMahon, who was then the DDO [Deputy Director of CIA for Operations]. They agreed on the package but I don't know whether this effort ever got interagency blessing or not. The Carter administration was coming to an end. Then, when the Reagan administration came into office, I pursued this business of developing country reporting plans, because I felt very strongly that this was something that we should do. There wasn't any sort of reporting system at the time.

Ron Spiers was still there, even after change in administrations. We got agreement to try to set up a reporting assessment system for the State Department. We hired Marty Packman, who had retired from INR, to do a study of what the State Department had done before and what the reporting evaluation and tasking systems were used by the CIA and the Pentagon—so that we would at least know what other people had tried. He spent several months on the project and prepared an excellent report.

Out of Packman's study and our informal checking around, we concluded that the best evaluation system was the one that the DO [Directorate of Operations] in CIA used. They had a whole unit that would go around interviewing consumers of CIA reports and develop their evaluation on the basis of what the consumers thought. That also gave them a good sense for the issues people were really interested in.

Out of all of that we evolved a State system. We didn't have enough money to support it on a global basis. However, we said that we would pick 10 countries a year for detailed reporting evaluations. We decided to hire retired ambassadors to do it. Their task was to find out what reporting officers thought that they were reporting about—was there a plan and what was it? Then they would go to the consumers in Washington, not starting at the bottom but rather going to the Deputy Assistant Secretary or Assistant Secretary level. They would ask them what they thought about the reporting, was it on target in covering the important subjects, and how could it be improved. These retired ambassadors then would write up a country reporting evaluation. My recollection is that we deliberately

made only two copies of this evaluation. One copy went to the Ambassador in the country concerned and the other went to the assistant secretary of the bureau involved.

We did this all through the office of Larry Eagleburger, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Our feeling was that if the system didn't have some sort of top-level backing, no one would take it seriously. We got enough money, perhaps $50,000-$100,000 a year, to hire people to do the evaluations. We figured that we would get people who had been ambassadors, who had retired, and who could be frank without worrying about mincing their words.

This was one part of the effort—the special evaluations. On the whole, I thought that it was pretty good. I don't know how things stand now. This was 10 years ago.

Then we said that for the rest of the world we would have the Country Director work out with the Embassy concerned a reporting plan and evaluate reporting in cooperation with other users. I think that we asked every Embassy to prepare a reporting plan. We gave them an outline of what they should cover. We prepared a prioritized “laundry list” and worked it out through the country directors. The embassies would then get Washington's approval of the draft plan. The country directors would then take that plan around and talk to people. They would ask: “Is this plan right?, will it give you what you need?” and so forth. On the basis of this, they would then write an evaluation. We figured that these evaluations would not be particularly frank, but they would be better than nothing. So we got the system going. The whole idea was that the embassies were not just reporting for their own sakes but for the sake of their consumers back in Washington. We tried to make the system sensitive to what they wanted.

The effort to counter Soviet “disinformation” was another activity in our INR office. This was new and started in the Reagan administration. In the past, to the extent that the U. S. countered “disinformation,” it was handled by the CIA and lacked “credibility.” CIA handled this exclusively and alone. The normal attitude in the State Department was: “We

don't want to dignify that kind of stuff with a comment. We won't comment on a forgery." The Reagan administration came in, obviously with a more aggressive stance about doing things. Two FSO's got a bright idea. One was Mark Palmer, who was then Deputy Assistant Secretary for Eastern Europe. The other one was Bob Peck, who had been in Turkey and was a DAS for South Asia.

They said, and, I think, persuaded Secretary of State Haig to agree, that the State Department should lead an effort to do something about countering "disinformation." They came to me because, they said: "We can't do this unless we have really good information. Your office is the closest place in State to CIA. Can you come up with something on this? Can you work with us on this?" So I said that we would try.

Gradually, we worked out an interagency system. At first, when we got into it, we were a little leery, because there was a tendency among some people in the Reagan administration to "see a Red under every bed." And, in this area, the tendency was to mix up standard Communist propaganda with "disinformation." Unlike propaganda, "Disinformation" is a lie. It is dissembling, making A into B—not just propaganda. It is done with the intent of misleading people through forgeries and planted false news stories. With propaganda, you try to persuade people. So there is an important difference.

INR agreed to make the effort. So we first tried to find out what the Soviets were doing, working with the Agency. It was following and had been following Soviet "disinformation." They had people who were knowledgeable about it. We got our Foreign Service posts involved, as well as USIS [United States Information Agency] offices. Then, as we got a better impression of what was going on, we formed an interagency group to deal with the problem, involving State, CIA and USIA. We developed an approach which was different from the one which had been used earlier. We used the acronym of "RAP" The first letter stood for "Report." That was in the field—with USIA—not CIA. We instructed the USIA missions to report all phony stories and forgeries that might surface. The second letter stood for "Analyze." We had a couple of the people on our staff sifting through the

information and working with CIA, but we also did our own work. As we worked at it, we began to see patterns developing, which would appear in various parts of the world. We gradually developed a much better picture of what was going on. We also developed a new strategy to combat “disinformation”. We decided to publicize it. That was the letter “P.” In the past, State had tended to disregard “disinformation”.

Our feeling was that most people did not like to be "taken in.” They don't like to be deceived. Journalists and media people were the main vehicle used by the Soviets to spread “disinformation.” We were going to try to sensitize people to the fact that this was going on by publicizing it. Also, we believed that the more noise we made the less likely that the Soviets would succeed. The more publicity that we could generate, the more successful we would be.

So we gradually gathered information for about a year and put it altogether in an annual “disinformation” report. This report was published by the State Department as an information publication. We explained what this report was all about. Often, the “disinformation” stories were forgeries—fake telegrams or what have you. For example, stories in publications that suggested that the U. S. was giving aid in Africa to sterilize people; i.e. our aid people were not just giving out vitamins but substances that would sterilize people. This kind of story would run in the press in half a dozen countries. They were all patently false. But it was like a pin ball game. A fake story ran in country A and then was picked up as a legitimate story in country B and C.

We put out this “disinformation” analysis for two or three years and held a press briefing to draw attention to it. We also did some special reports on forgeries and similar activities. Then we went around the world with a little “truth squad” composed of somebody from the Soviet desk, somebody from USIA, somebody from CIA and myself. We visited several dozen countries over a couple of years, briefing intelligence people, foreign ministries, and journalists on Soviet “disinformation” efforts. We developed a little “show and tell” program.

We went to NATO Headquarters every year for an annual meeting on this subject. We went to about 30 countries at different times.

It turned out that the presentation was a fairly simple one. We would say that this kind of “disinformation” activity was going on. Then we gave some illustrations. The illustrations were the key. We had lots of stories about the forgeries. God knows how many we had —there were an awful lot of them. We would give four or five examples and would have some illustrations of how a telegram would be faked and how you could tell that it was a fake. When we would say that you can't tell for sure that it was done by the Soviets, unless you can get the fellow who prepared it, we would be asked: “Why do you think that it came from the Soviets?” Then, through a process of analysis we would show how we came to this conclusion. We had some help from Soviet defectors who had worked in this area and were able to put together a fairly credible picture of what was going on.

I like to think that the fact that we made a credible presentation—not an “ideological” show — which lent a certain amount of professionalism to the whole effort. By 1984, the Soviets started getting annoyed, because they found that we were creating problems for them. In fact, I think that we did create problems for them. One of the most egregious cases was where they tried to tie us to the attempted assassination of the Pope. They had faked an Embassy Rome telegram. We didn't realize this at first, but had to explain our whole the process to show what was “wrong” with that telegram. In effect, we had to take the fake telegram apart by pointing out the technical mistakes. Then we had to explain why we had concluded that it was the Soviets who had done this. There were certain other indications. In one case the transliteration of the word “Brasilia” was done in a way that suggested that it had been translated from Russian. In most cases, though, you could find a “party line” that was a giveaway.Not all the “disinformation” came from the Soviet Union. There were some Eastern European sponsored cases of “disinformation, some from Libya and even a couple of cases of Israeli “disinformation.” That was handled a little differently by the Department. Actually, we got into “The New York Times” on one occasion with that.

When an instance of “disinformation” came to our attention, we got together and went over what happened. Was there a telegram? Were there other indicators? What was wrong with it? What was the “message”? Usually, it was the message which indicated who had an interest in the story and which indicated the source. In one instance, I think, we thought that it was the Libyans. Then came the question of the professional quality of the document. The Soviets were pretty good at this. Some other sources, such as the Libyans, were terrible at it.

The Israelis were very good at it. The Israelis were sore at Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger. There was a fake memcon [memorandum of conversation], suggesting that we would be selling something or encouraging the Saudis to buy something. It was very, very well done. If you didn't know the substance of the matter, you would have thought that it was valid. We had to find somebody who knew the substance who could say: “This isn't right. This is wrong. From that point of view it has been twisted.”

Ed Koch, the Mayor of New York, surfaced this instance of “disinformation”. He wrote to the Pentagon. At the Pentagon they didn't know what to do with it. They turned to us. The FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] was involved in this issue, too. We looked at the document and concluded that it came from the Israelis. At one time Koch, when he was in Congress, had rented a house of mine. I called his aide about it and asked: “How did you get this document?” She answered: “The Israeli Consul General in New York gave it to me.” I didn't suggest this, but, on their own, the FBI interviewed Koch. Koch was furious at the FBI for interviewing him. He may have been furious at the Israelis, too, but he didn't show it. They had “used” him. He then wrote a letter of protest to Webster, the Attorney General in Washington about this violation of his First Amendment rights and the “police state” methods allegedly used by the FBI. He gave a copy of his letter to “The New York Times.” That made the front page. Everybody basically told us to “go away and shut up.” Nobody wanted to touch this case after that. But, it was clearly a case of “disinformation”. Koch said: “Well, what did I know about it? I just passed it on.” When the

reporters pressed for a comment, they got a “no comment” out of the State Department. Nobody said anything.

Q: In 1984 you were pulled out of your job in INR and given a special assignment. I don't want to pursue that in any detail, but whom did you work for?

KUX:Ron Spiers, the Under secretary of State for Management and Will De Pree, the Director of Management Operations. I was Deputy Director of Management Operations. But I had a special task which took my whole time. So I spent from 1984 to 1986 working on that special task dealing with what might be called “crisis management.” It was a project. My task was to assemble a team and carry out the project, which was a novel experience for me. There were some general lessons I learned about management, which I think I could comment on.

It is very unusual for a Foreign Service officer to be a project manager, when you are given a fairly clear concrete task, the funds to carry it out, and, if you will, the responsibility and authority to do the job. This was that type of situation. Ron was very good about it. He said: “Here's the ball. You take it.” The uniqueness was that I had to operate within was an interagency framework. I was told to go to work and come back with results. I used to check with Ron fairly frequently at the beginning. I would say: “This is what I think that I am supposed to do.” He would say “yes or no.” That was the supervision.

The project was fairly complex, involving what for me was substantial funding. That was a very unusual situation.

I learned to hire and fire people. That also made it unusual.

I was engaged on this project for about two years, although the project had already started when I joined the effort and continued for a number of years. My task was to take part in an interagency effort interfacing with the State Department component. When I joined it, the project was not moving. So I picked it up. It had a substantial amount of

“oomph” behind it—an interagency group. It was interesting. There was one thing that I learned from this experience, and this goes back to Ron's philosophy. You figure out what somebody is supposed to do and you let him do it. As he told me later: “If you had failed, I would have fired you.” There was an interagency person outside the State Department who was running the interagency program.

It was also an unusual experience in dealing with contractors and the whole world of administration, but in a different way. What impressed me was that it was possible to get things done. We were dealing with major companies. What also impressed me was that the State Department did a better job in our own area of work with a kind of “pickup crew” than the DOD [Department of Defense], which had a cast of thousands permanent employees to do their part of this job. We did our job better and cheaper; that was very satisfying.

The other interesting aspect of it involved communications and other facets of administration. It got me involved, as a Political Officer who had never really been involved with administration before, in the sub-cultures of administration, particularly communications and the tensions between administrative officers and communications people. I had been wholly unfamiliar with this before I was exposed to it. I learned a good deal about it.

Certainly, one thing that I found out, which I thought was crazy and still think was crazy, was the duplication in overseas communications between the State Department and the CIA. There is a real waste of money and a real example of something which will, hopefully, now be taken care of.

The other thing I learned concerned certain aspects of what we were doing. We were experimenting, for example, with trying to develop a “paper less” office. We found out, as have people who deal with computers have learned, that it costs a lot of money. This is not as easy as it seems. The marriage between the “engineer” or the communications

person is very difficult and takes up a lot of time. One of the things that we worked very hard on was to put substantive and technical people together, so that the technical person would understand what the consumer wanted. The user had to understand a little bit about the technical side—not necessarily a lot—but enough to understand what could and couldn't be produced. I certainly am not that computer literate. If technical limitations are not understood, then you get some systems like the Department has, which are real “lemons”. I refer to automated systems that “work” in a technical sense but don't really “work” in a substantive sense because people won't use them. When I went overseas, I learned the system which the State Department has on keeping track of “representation allowances.” It is not that complicated. However, the Department devised a system which is terribly complicated and which nobody uses.

I learned that to bridge the “cultural gap” between the technicians and the consumers you had to have two people work together. The gap can't be completely bridged, but can be narrowed by setting up “teams.” That is the way you evolve, particularly as you move into waters which people haven't sailed on before. I think that is the only way you can do it. I assume that this is what computer companies do, at least the successful ones, when they develop various programs, like “Quicken.” They must have lots of people who are working on this very, very diligently to come up with systems that are simple and yet are technically feasible and which achieve their purpose. It is a fascinating challenge.

We were very lucky, because our chief technician, who later became the head of State Department communications, was good. Another thing that I learned from this experience, which had always puzzled me previously, was the factor that I talked about earlier: planning—project management, quantifying goals. This was my most extended experience in saying: “This is what your technical objective is.” I really think that, in the State Department administrative world, one could do this in terms of the budget. We could do a lot better than we do. As I said before, I seriously doubt that you can use quantitative analysis on substantive matters, but you can set goals and milestones, even while recognizing that there are variables involved and events are likely to shift, with the

result that these goals may be outdated very quickly. I have to say that when you are dealing with money or specific projects, when you have a concrete objective which you are supposed to achieve, and when you have a certain amount of money to spend and you can monitor the contracts, you can do apply project planning and management. Things go wrong, even there. One of the problems was—I had never dealt with a contractor in any substantial way— was to come up with a technique on which we could work together—particularly if I was responsible. I would not wake up one morning and find out that we had an enormous cost overrun, or we were not doing what we were supposed to do. We had some expertise in contract management. We had a Navy Captain. However, you can only do it right by using these program planning and chart techniques. Periodically, we would get everybody together and ask: “Where are we now”. This is the way the military does this, too. The project really gets done, but you have to know where the “flimflamming” is. The difference with the military, and this is apparently what was different in our operations, is that they hire a contractor and then supervise the contractor. The contractor actually does the job. We hired a contractor, who then melded his people with State Department people, so that there was a single operation. That made our operation a little different.

Q: In 1986, you were appointed as US Ambassador to the Ivory Coast. How did come about?

KUX:Ron Spiers asked me what I would like to do. I had been offered the job of chief of Foreign Building Operations [FBO] in the light of my experience as a project manager. Although it would have been a really interesting challenge, I decided against it. I told Ron about this offer, and he said: “What do you want to do?” I said: “I would like to be an Ambassador.” He said: “All right, I will support you.” Then it was a question of what was available.

As so often is the case in the State Department, it is a question of what is available and when an officer is available. What was available first, going through a list of posts, were Haiti and then Ivory Coast. The Ambassadorial Selection Committee at that time was

composed of Ron Spiers, the Director General of the Foreign Service, the Executive Secretary of the Department and one or two other high ranking officials. I believe that the policy at the time was to nominate a State Department officer for every ambassadorial appointment. Then the nomination was sent in writing to the White House—or Ron Spiers would go to the White House and present it orally.

So I was picked to go to Haiti. That was fine with me. This was before the troubles began there. I spent about a month or so, preparing for this assignment. What apparently happened was that my name came up, and Nick Platt, who was then the Executive Secretary of the Department, also had a candidate in mind for Haiti. His candidate lost out and Ron Spiers prevailed. So I became the State Department choice for Ambassador to Haiti.

As I mentioned, the next available post on the list was Ivory Coast. Platt's candidate, Brunson McKinley, having lost out for Haiti, was then picked to go to the Ivory Coast.

I went away for about a month of leave, reading up about Haiti. One afternoon in January, 1986, I was walking down the hall at the State Department and saw Hank Cohen, who was then Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs. Hank said: “What would you think about going to the Ivory Coast as Ambassador?” I told him that I would. I was a grade higher than McKinley, a Minister-Counselor and he was a Counselor. Ivory Coast was listed as a “Class II” post and Haiti a Class III, so they just switched us at the next meeting of the Ambassadorial Committee. Normally, in terms of my career interests, I would have preferred one of the smaller posts in South Asia, but there was nothing available at that time. But I had no strong preference between Haiti and the Ivory Coast.

I was nominated by the President in the summer of 1986 and approved a few weeks later. The hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was at the end of August had no problems and I was routinely confirmed.

I started learning about the Ivory Coast in the Spring. I was told that I would probably be there when the “old man,” Houphouet-Boigny, died. Although It seemed that he had been President almost forever and was in his 80s, he in fact didn't pass on until my successor's successor was there in 1993.

There weren't a lot of bilateral issues between us and the Ivory Coast. My predecessor, Bob Miller, had made a considerable effort to get an aid program started there, but had not been successful. The feeling was that the Ivory Coast was too well off. At the time—and this is still the case—it was one of the success stories of Africa in economic and also political terms. It was sufficiently stable and prosperous that the U. S. government felt that economic aid wasn't really necessary.

I wrote my own instructions, working with the desk officer, who was very good junior officer. I am sorry that he subsequently left the Foreign Service. He was an impressive young fellow and we worked together very well. We concluded that the U. S. should have a higher profile and that the thrust of our efforts should be in promoting American business interests. There was already a nucleus of an American business community in Abidjan. There was an American Chamber of Commerce and 65 American companies located there. Abidjan, the capital, was a commercial hub, in the context of West Africa. I thought that the promotion of American business was a natural thing for us to be doing. So I recommended this, and Chet Crocker said, “Fine.” That became our the main emphasis.

There wasn't an enormous amount of interest in Washington for the Ivory Coast. The only other issue concerned cocoa, and there the U. S. Government wasn't much involved. The Ivory Coast was the “Saudi Arabia” of the cocoa trade. We had differences on commodity policy with the Ivorians. However, the State Department was not much involved in that. We didn't approve of the International Cocoa Agreement, but we were not a participant. An organization had been set up in London under the International Cocoa Agreement, which was in effect a cartel. It wasn't a price setting arrangement. It was a buffer stock and production quota arrangement. The market was free, but the buffer stock played a role. If

there was overproduction, in theory, the producing countries would hold down production for a while. The price could be stabilized in that way. Eventually, this arrangement failed, creating a problem for the cocoa producers, especially for the Ivory Coast.

My Washington briefings were good and therefore, except cocoa I was not surprised by anything that I found in the Ivory Coast. The major event when I got there was the anticipated visit of Secretary Shultz to Africa. Assistant Secretary of State Crocker prevailed on him to travel there, and Ivory Coast was one of the places where he was going to visit. So there was a hurry to get me out to Ivory Coast. Then, at the last minute, Secretary Shultz postponed his trip. Eventually—three months later—he came. The main surprise in the visit was Houphouet's making a plea for economic help because the crumbling cocoa market was eroding the viability of the Ivoirean economy. All of us were caught by surprise by his plea. This later led to Chet Crocker helping us get a top notch economic officer which ensured that the Embassy was much better plugged into this key issue. But we certainly weren't when Shultz came.

Administratively, the American Embassy in Abidjan is a very unusual place, in that, in effect, it is a regional embassy. It houses a lot of “regional” people who live there and serve a much larger area—communications and other activities in the administrative area. Consequently, we had a fairly large Embassy staff with about 150 Americans assigned there. However, the State Department component and the bilateral U. S. and Ivory Coast element was really quite small—about 30 people. Of the total number of 150 Americans, roughly 100 were assigned to “regional” responsibilities, but some of the people who were “regional” also dealt with the Ivory Coast. The “regional” people did not report to me. However, if there was a serious problem, then I became involved in it.

Abidjan had 25,000 French living there. So a couple of hundred Americans were not a problem. Nevertheless, I felt that we had too many people and tried to reduce the size of the staffs—the regional aid program, for example. I eliminated a position by using the system established under NSC 38 [National Security Council Memorandum No. 38]. I

made myself unpopular. There were two positions that I tried to cut. One was under DOD [Department of Defense], and the other one was under AID. In the case of DOD, I think that it involved the assignment of an Assistant Attach#. The Attach# covered about a half dozen countries. They complained to me, and I finally gave up. In the case of the AID position, they screamed and yelled, but I didn't give up. This question actually went to the Secretary of State, who backed me up and cut the position. I thought that it was an extraordinarily wasteful and time-consuming exercise. The Ambassador should have had the authority to make the decision in that case. We shouldn't have had to go through all of the bureaucratic “rigmarole.”

It turned out that we were able to get a assistance program in the Ivory Coast, after all, which was a bit of a surprise. AID had two regional programs in West Africa—the regular aid program and another program called “Housing Guarantees.” The “Housing Guarantee” program was separate from the regular aid program. There were two, separate offices and didn't get along with each other. The regular AID people didn't like the “loan guarantee” people, because their work didn't involve “traditional” aid. It was bizarre. What the “Housing Guarantee” people were basically doing was guaranteeing loans to municipalities throughout West Africa. Their biggest program was in the Ivory Coast. They were extending something like $10-$20 million worth of loan guarantees per year. The “loan guarantees” enabled municipalities to borrow money and this program was a major source of funds for local government construction activity, such as markets, local roads, etc.I found the program one of the most effective that we had in the Ivory Coast. The people assigned to this office were excellent. They knew the local customs and personalities. They had been in the Ivory Coast for a number of years. They lived in Abidjan but worked primarily outside of Abidjan—all around the country. So I discovered that one of the easiest ways to publicize the United States was to cut ribbons when these projects started or were completed. There were quite a lot of them—four, five, or six a year. They were wonderful projects in terms of helping to develop a democratic culture. The cities and towns in Ivory Coast had never had any experience in urban planning—

where to put a street, or a park or a recreational facility, etc. The “Housing Guarantee” program helped them; the program went beyond simple guarantees. The AID people had discovered, over the years, that you have to provide help in the form of training, if a housing construction program is to have any chance of success. They had funds for this, from a self funded “ pool”. The Ivorians had to deposit guaranteed money in American banks, where it earned interest and over a number of years the “pool” had grown, so the U. S. taxpayer wasn't paying for this technical assistance. AID paid the salaries of the American advisors, and the U. S. government role was to provide the “loan guarantee.” The risk was that the loan would be lost by default which would have required the outlay of US funds. It was a wonderful program which was essentially funded outside the normal government appropriations process.What I found bizarre was that the “traditional” aid people didn't like it. Organizationally, they buried the “housing guarantee” office off in the private enterprise sector. It didn't show up on the radar scope. The two elements of the AID mission in Abidjan were constantly fighting with each other. For someone who was just coming into the country and whose goal was to raise the US profile, this was a wonderful way of doing it—and also doing good at the same time. In fact, we got so much publicity that the French became concerned. They thought that we were trying to “steal their thunder.”

Franco-American relations in Abidjan were alright, but cool—”correct,” but cool. The French are always wary of the Americans in an area that they considered their “chasse gardee,”—their private hunting ground. They were nervous because of the growing American business presence in Ivory Coast, plus the fact that an American oil company, Phillips Petroleum, was a major player there. Phillips Petroleum was fairly substantial; it wasn't a French company that was developing the oil in the Ivory Coast. In 1979 oil was found just offshore from Abidjan. People thought that it was going to be a major field—a major discovery. It turned out that it was a minor discovery. It was enough to meet Ivorian domestic requirements, but that was about it.

Phillips continued to develop the oil field. Dealing with the Phillips Petroleum contract became a problem. In fact, Phillips Petroleum closed down its operations in the Ivory Coast while I was there. There was a problem between Phillips and the Ivory Coast. We did not become involved, although the Embassy followed the dispute. Phillips didn't want the Embassy to be involved. Neither they nor the Ivorians handled the dispute very well, the Ivoireans made a costly mistake. They had a lawyer in the United States who handled petroleum negotiations, who I think did not give them good advice. By the time that I arrived in Abidjan, there was already trouble between Phillips and the Ivorian Government. It was a question of renegotiating the contract. The Ivorians didn't offer enough and Phillips decided to pull out. The oil field was closed down and the Ivoireans had to import their petroleum for a number of years. This was costly and not necessary.

During the whole time that I was there, from 1986 to 1989, the Ivory Coast was economically on a downward glide. They went from solvency to insolvency. A lot of the things that President Houphouet-Boigny, who was a great builder, did went sour during that period. He was really a rather unusual person. He had developed a good enough infrastructure and made enough investments over a 25-year period that the Ivory Coast could absorb the downward trend. It hit rather suddenly.

In the fall of 1986 we were rather unaware of the troubles. They surfaced when Secretary of State Shultz visited the country. Abidjan when I got there in 1986 was a combination of a bustling, modern city with a skyline that was rather astounding, including 20 or 30 story buildings. These stood right next to Africa. One could travel just a few miles outside the center city and you were in traditional African mud hut and thatched roof villages. It was a combination of the traditional and the modern.

I travelled around the country a lot and found that very interesting. The villages were traditional, African villages.Not much progress seems to have been made. President Houphouet-Boigny had built an excellent road system and electricity was available around the country. The roads weren't great everywhere, but they were very good in 75 percent of

the country. They still didn't have a road along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, to the West. However, you could go north, east, and northwest easily. There was a lateral road in the north. There was even a super highway for over 100 miles north of Abidjan. For Africa, the transportation network was excellent.

We also had the Air Attach# plane. What I would often do would be to fly one way somewhere and be picked up there by car. It was a bit of a luxury, but it was nice to fly one-way. The country was about the size of New Mexico. It was about 400-500 miles from north to south and maybe 300 miles from east to west. You could drive off for the weekend. It was not a problem. The French had built a network of hotels in the major towns, but that was beginning to fade. You could find things to buy all around.

It was always an occasion when the US Ambassador visited a village. The “chef du village” puts on a traditional welcome. In fact, there was a photograph in the “Department of State Newsletter” of me, dancing in some village. I ended up with a trunk full of African robes. The people were enormously hospitable. They would make a major occasion of my visit. The American Ambassador was a personality. The public relation aspects were a very important part of the job of ambassador there, in fact, along with promoting US business interests, the most important.

You could see signs of development activity. There were schools with thatch roofs, which was not bad. In terms of the hot sticky climate, it was better than concrete, which could get very hot. Generally, the villages had electricity, but usually no sewage systems. Unfortunately, with the economic downturn, development activity stopped, and things were beginning to slip. The economic deterioration became quite visible. The one thing that we tried to get—and finally did get—was a little U. S. help. I made the point to Washington, and this was a political argument, that Ivory Coast had always been with the West and had always been a friend of the United States. President Houphouet-Boigny needed help, and we should try to do something for him. He was very much for private enterprise and was

doing all of the things that were “right” by U. S. standards. Now he had problems. I felt that we should be there; fortunately, Crocker felt the same way.

Eventually, Washington responded positively. It took a fair amount of pushing. There was a fight between AID-Washington and the Africa Bureau of the State Department. The State Africa Bureau wanted to be helpful. The AID-Washington bureaucrats seemed to have an almost visceral dislike for the Ivory Coast. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chet Crocker once said that this was because Ivory Coast had been successful, and AID only likes “losers.”

I am not exactly sure what the problem was, but we had a tough time getting U. S. aid for Ivory Coast. It seemed to me that, with limited resources, we didn't need to do a lot, but we needed to be visible. Finally, we were able to cobble together what amounted to, I think, a $20-25 million aid program. Here the team in the field was very effective. The regional AID Director at the time, Art Feld, was very inventive and knew how to work the Washington scene. Had he not been very helpful, we would not have been able to do get a program approved. The Department of Agriculture people were also helpful.

We had a full panoply of attach#s in Abidjan—Agriculture, Commerce, Defense. We had help from the U. S. rice industry in getting a Public Law 480 program for the Ivory Coast. Crudely put, the US rice exporters, who were politically well connected, were trying to get into the Ivory Coast market. Through mismanagement the Ivory Coast had become a rice importer. The way the system worked, arrangements were made that rice came from Thailand, despite the fact that American rice was cheaper. There were “kick backs” in Ivory Coast. Eventually our exporters broke into the rice market. I spent a lot of time trying to get the Ivorians to agree to imports of U. S. rice. I think that, in the end, we were able to work out a satisfactory arrangement. It involved my going to the Secretary General of the Ivoirean Government, bargaining with him, laying out the problem, and then bargaining some more. An agreement was finally reached. It is interesting how these things are done. Back in Washington a number of people did not want to set up a PL 480 program for Ivory

Coast. However, we were able to get a program approved.In effect, there was an unwritten understanding that if the Ivorians purchased a certain amount of American rice, the US would also sponsor a PL 480 program. The US rice people were very blunt, saying that if the Ivorians didn't buy some American rice, this would be the end of any consideration of an PL 480 program. This whole thing was done politically. I think that there were staffer in a couple of Senators' office involved. We were told one day that OMB [the Office of Management and Budget] had said, “No,” and the next day that the OMB agreed once the Senators got involved. The rice lobby has its own power levers. However, it seemed to me that it was a legitimate way to use the aid program as a way of showing Africans, in a policy sense, while the Cold War was still on, that the US was a country which would try to help its friends when they were in trouble. This transaction also helped American exporters and American farmers.About the time that I left, in 1989, the Ivorians had gotten into more trouble. The first World Bank assistance “Consortium” meeting was held in late 1989 and we were able to put together a presentable “package.” The “Consortium” was composed of the World Bank, the French, who were the major players, the U. S., and the Japanese. We were prepared to contribute $20-25 million, a lot of which was made up of “smoke and mirrors” and some creative counting. People were so eager to get the United States involved that even the French, in this case, were quite happy to have us do this. They wanted to get the Japanese involved and to get the Germans more deeply committed. Our being in the “Consortium” was an important catalyst in getting others involved. I felt very pleased by events because I thought that it would have been a shame to “walk away” from the Ivoireans.

Furthermore, these programs did good. They mainly consisted of the housing program, the PL 480 program, and a few others. [We had] some medical and health programs. None of them was a bad program. I was satisfied that they were being well managed.After the economy turned sour, the Ivorians agreed that they would put together a new program of economic reforms with the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and in turn the World Bank agreed that it would organize a “Consortium”, which it did in late 1989. But some of the

economic problems were due to mismanagement and corruption, which foreign assistance can not correct. It is true that the Ivory Coast was hurt badly by falling commodity prices on the world market, but there was also much mismanagement on their part.

Houphouet-Boigny was a wonderful man, but he stayed on in office too long. He should have retired in about 1980. His view of the world commodity market was a little bit like that of William Jennings Bryan—He loved to complain about “the speculators on Wall Street.” Bryan used to say that they were manipulating the Middle Western farmer and ensuring that all of the profits went to Wall Street, while the farmer didn't get anything. Houphouet-Boigny would regularly lecture you that the price of cocoa and chocolate bars had gone up, but that he producer never shared in that increase. Who got the difference? He blamed the speculator. He really had a “Third World” outlook on that subject. His view was a little surprising since he was a believer in the free market but also was, in effect, a cocoa speculator himself. He lost the Ivory Coast over a half billion dollars by trying to “corner” the cocoa market in association with one of the major French commodity brokers.

Furthermore, Houphouet-Boigny continued to do business as usual in the 1980s, when the Ivory Coast was short of money; he didn't seem to understand or care about that. His lack of appreciation of the Ivory Coast's economic plight was best illustrated by the construction of the Catholic basilica at Yamoussoukro. It was the last of many impressive public buildings that he had built. He had an “edifice” complex. However, most of the time—until the last few years—he had sufficient cash to afford the new construction. He felt that Africans could build large projects, too—things that people could be proud of. There was a positive side to this “complex.” Things that he arranged to have built included Yamoussoukro, a new capital city. This was an act of extravagance. However, Houphouet-Boigny arranged to have three universities or technical schools built there. One of them was for agriculture, one for teacher training, and one for engineering. “Lavish” is the word [to describe them]; they were built as if they were in the United States or in France. But at the time the Ivory Coast had the money for it. It was relatively wealthy until the late 1980s.

Then, in Yamoussoukro, the village where Houphouet-Boigny was born, he built a palace that was very lavish. It was a multi-millionaire's place of marble and gold just at the edge of “bad taste.” Houphouet-Boigny himself was a relatively modest man. He was not like Mobutu of Zaire. And until the last few years he had the money to do these things.

Then he first built a mosque, the largest mosque in the country. Ivory Coast was 40% Christian and 40% Muslim. The people in the northern part of the country were Muslim. He, himself, was a Catholic. He then built the world's largest church—the basilica. It was called “Notre Dame de la Paix”. It was enormous, looming up over the palm trees and scrub growth around it. In fact, the basilica is a copy of St. Peter's in Rome. I got to know the architect quite well, a Lebanese named Fakhouri, who lived in Abidjan. There were a lot of Lebanese who lived there. The builder was a Frenchman named Cesario who was from North Africa but worked in the Ivory Coast for many years and was in charge of construction projects. The last year or so I was in Ivory Coast he became the economic “czar.” He made no bones about the fact that Houphouet valued him because he was totally honest and a tough bargainer.

I think that Cesario “sold” Houphouet-Boigny on the idea that the basilica was something unique. It is simply enormous—bigger than St. Peter's. The courtyard in front of it has room for 300,000 people. Inside, it can seat 16,000 people. When you look at it up close, it unfortunately seems like a Cecil B. De Mille movie set and a bad copy of St. Peters. I had left by the time it was consecrated, but watched it being constructed. It went up very fast: in three years. It didn't cost all that much. My recollection is that Cesario said that it cost $170 million. All things considered, particularly given its size, it was not enormously expensive. There were some interesting architectural things about it. They used an enormous amount of different types of concrete and a certain type of stone which is not discolored by rain. The air conditioning was necessary, though they didn't air condition the whole dome. They pumped up the cooled air from below—it rises up to about 12 feet. They put in many stained glass windows. In effect, they put a couple of French villages

back to work turning out stained glass exactly in the way it was done in the Middle Ages. As in the Middle Ages, the windows includes faces of contemporary people. Houphouet-Boigny is in one of the glass windows. Cesario is in another.

What struck me as sad about the Basilica was that it wasn't African. It was nothing like the Kenyatta Center in Nairobi [Kenya]—nothing original about the design. However, it is striking, and the whole town of Yamoussoukro, in a way, is striking. This is the capital that Houphouet-Boigny arranged to have built. It is a little unfair to say that it's a “ghost town”, as some have done. In fact, it is a town with a population of about 100,000 people. Houphouet-Boigny built an enormous seat of government, which could house the UN. It's been tastefully but expensively furnished. There is a political party headquarters, a fancy hotel, a fancy golf course, the three technical universities, the basilica, the mosque, and Houphouet-Boigny's home, but not the US or anyone else's embassy.The French colonial system was a source of strength and weakness at the same time for the Ivory Coast. At the time of independence the Ivory Coast was quite poor, one of the poorer countries among the French colonies. However, it produced cocoa, coffee and had lots of forests. Houphouet-Boigny was a political realist. He was an African nationalist who led the political movement for independence in West Africa as the head of the “Rassemblement Democratique Africaine” [African Democratic Rally]. Under the French system the French colonies could send deputies to the French Parliament and in 1946 he was elected to the French Parliament, where he served for about a dozen years. In fact, he was a cabinet minister in five French governments. He only came back to Africa when the French allowed “home rule” in the Ivory Coast in 1958.

While he was a nationalist, he wasn't just an agitator, although he had been that as a young man. He organized the African cocoa planters, who had been discriminated against and did not have equal status with the French planters. His plan for economic development was to import technicians and stress agriculture and education. He used to say: “We don't have the brains or the trained people.” So he brought in a lot of French after independence. They developed a system of what they called “technical counselors.”

The minister would be an African, but he would have a French adviser. Houphouet-Boigny used to say: “We hire the whites.” He also brought in a lot of people from Burkina-Faso [former Upper Volta] as laborers. He said: “The white tribe gives us the brains, and the black tribe gives us the manpower, and we have the money,” through the production of cocoa.

During the early years after independence in 1960 he spent a lot of money on education and training, so that the Africans would then have the brains and be able to replace the French. Unfortunately, by the 1980s, when they had a lot of trained people, they had come to rely on the whites to make the decisions. It was a lot easier and safer to have a Frenchman take the responsibility, instead of assuming the responsibility themselves. Houphouet-Boigny never really got out of that practice. He never really bridged that gap where he felt comfortable relying exclusively on his own countrymen. There was some resentment among the well-trained Ivorians.

At the time I was there—1986-89— it was a period of transition. The government was staffed totally by Ivory Coast people who were quite competent. There were French advisers here and there—not everywhere. There were fewer than before. The Ivorian government ran pretty well. There was some corruption, but Houphouet-Boigny reminded me a little bit of Mayor Richard J. Daley of Chicago. He “passed the goodies around.” One of Houphouet's techniques, which was very important in forging a nation, was to mix together the various ethnic groups. Although he was from the major ethnic group, the Baoule, they were only about 20% of the population. There were a lot of other, ethnic groups—Bete, Senoufo, Malinke, Agni—tribal groups. He tried to make sure that everybody got part of the “pie.”

There was a traditional cultural view in Africa that the tribal chief, and Houphouet was like the tribal chief, gives out “goodies.” That is expected of the chief and not considered a bad thing. It was the normal way. This is one of the reasons why there is so much of what we call “corruption” in Africa. In Houphouet's case, as opposed to some others, he took care

of his own tribe but he also took care of everybody else. He also wasn't mean or cruel. He made the point, and I believe that this is true, that nobody was ever killed or murdered by his government—as opposed to a lot of other places in Africa.

The Ivory Coast was a one-party state. Houphouet was a benevolent dictator. His argument—and he was very frank about it—was that if they had a multi party democracy, there would be 60 parties, one for each of the 60 ethnic groups in the country. He said that wouldn't work in Ivory Coast. They needed a period of one-party rule and then, hopefully, it would evolve into a more democratic system later. The only problem was that he forgot to allow it to evolve.

If anybody stuck his head up, it would be cut it off—figuratively speaking. He moved him out of power. Houphouet's version of the African “democracy” was to have consultations or “dialogue,” which was the word he used. You don't just take a vote, with the parties split 51-49, and the party with 51% wins and can do whatever it wants. You try to reach a consensus. He really worked on the idea of reaching a consensus. Doing that within a one-party structure wasn't necessarily bad. In fact, it worked, although Houphouet had the final say. The country was small enough that he could have the final say.

During the early period of his power he had very good helpers, a very good staff. They were usually “metisse”—half African and half European so they had weak tribal links. He had a team of four or five people who worked with him during the whole 30 years that he was in power. The Secretary General of the Government and one of his advisers were two former French civil servants. They were part French and part African in ancestry. They were not part of any Ivorian tribal system. Houphouet didn't mind that. There were no racial feelings involved. The French colonial system, as opposed to the British one, didn't have racial tensions.

As an American I found that it was very strange for me to be in a black country and not to think of the color of the skin of people you met. The whole question of racial

consciousness was never a factor in the Ivory Coast There were a lot of intermarriages. So Houphouet's key staff members were with him for 30 years. They functioned relatively efficiently. There was corruption, but the system worked reasonably well. There were different types of corruption. Bribes by bidders for government contracts were one type of corruption. Another type of corruption involved the electricity company, where people didn't pay their bills and just stole the money out of the till. There were payoffs. A lot of the French were involved in that. Government officials would get percentages from government contracts.

By the late 1980s, it worked out that the French Ambassador—Michel DuPuch—had been in Ivory Coast by the time I got there for 10 years. He was very close to Houphouet, who often asked his views on various subjects. There were so many French citizens there that the French knew everything that was going on. Ambassador DuPuch did not see himself as a “viceroy.” People misunderstood that. Houphouet was always the boss. He was always his own man. He “used” the French as much as the French used him. The French had a battalion of troops stationed at the airport in the Ivory Coast, as they had in several countries in Africa. It was stationed there so that it could control the airport. The way Houphouet put it, the French battalion was like an umbrella. If it rains, it is nice to be able to go to the closet and pull out an umbrella. However, the umbrella was his. I think that this was true.

During the last year I was in Ivory Coast Houphouet basically named Cesario as de facto Prime Minister. It was very clear that the “old man” was the boss. You had to be very careful in dealing with him. DuPuch was quite frank in saying how stubborn Houphouet was on certain economic issues. The French were trying to get him to limit his expenditure of money and to be more reasonable about that.

When I arrived, I called on the other ambassadors. They all returned the calls, but not the French Ambassador. This was his way of telling me: “You need me more than I need you.” I thought about this and decided that he was right. So about once a month I would call

on DuPuch and discuss what was going on. I think that we established a good personal relationship. It was useful in terms of U. S. interests in the Ivory Coast.

It is true by the late 1980s, people were getting tired of Houphouet. Still he was such a “father figure.” He was the George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, and Thomas Jefferson of Ivory Coast. Also, in the African sense, if you are the chief, you are accepted. People had been used to having him in office for so long that they just accepted having the “old man” around, despite the follies which he committed.

He could be stubborn. I sometimes got into arguments with him on commodity questions. We also tried to get his support on a couple of policy issues such as the situation in Liberia. He was a gentle person in one sense but also a very strong personality. He almost bit my hand off when we asked for his help with Sgt. Doe in Liberia. That man has blood on his hands (In taking power Doe had murdered Houphouet's son-in-law among others) and will die for it. I won't help, he said angrily when I pressed our request that he become Doe's Dutch uncle.

I should say that I found Secretary Shultz' visit very useful. It was a good way of showing American interest in the Ivory Coast. It was appreciated by the Ivorians. Immediately after the Shultz visit there was a visit by half a dozen Congressmen. Then, immediately after that, there was a visit by Tom Bradley, the Mayor of Los Angeles, and a delegation from that city. So we had more American visitors to the Ivory Coast in a period of three weeks than we had in 20 years. It had the effect of being “USA Month.”

There was something about the Shultz visit that was somewhat unusual. Substantively, the Shultz visit involved just an exchange of views. However, one thing that I learned from this visit was that Houphouet didn't follow the American system of taking up one subject after another. Instead, he said his whole piece. I told Secretary Shultz about Houphouet's practice when he went in—that he would speak first and go through his whole brief. The Secretary said: “Ambassador, are you sure that is right?” I said: “I believe so, sir.” Shultz

followed my advice just to listen, which was just as well. When Houphouet started talking, he went on for an hour and a half.

When Secretary Shultz and party met with him, he announced the Ivoirean economy was in terrible shape because of a likely fall in commodity prices and asked our help. He caught me by surprise; he caught Chet Crocker by surprise; he caught Peter McPherson—the AID Director—by surprise. Houphouet said: “We have a terrible problem with commodity prices.” The financial situation in the Ivory Coast had deteriorated very rapidly in the space of a month. Actually, since I had only recently arrived, I was not all that familiar with the situation. Nobody on the American side at this meeting knew the facts.

Later, Crocker then suggested that we get a really good economist assigned to our Embassy staff. So, as a result, we got ourselves somebody who was really terrific. She was a big help to me over the next two years in understanding what was going on. We did have an Agricultural Attach#, but he was mainly involved in pushing sales of American agricultural commodities and not an economist.

Another interesting part of the Shultz visit was arranging a meeting with Jonas Savimbi. The Ivory Coast was a place where Jonas Savimbi—the rebel leader in Angola—who was a prot#g# of Houphouet's and of course supported by us through the CIA, would come to visit frequently and hold private talks. Arranging that meeting was interesting, since it had to be done quietly. I worked it out with Houphouet's chief of protocol, another one of his veterans. Secretary Shultz was in Abidjan for one day and two nights. The schedule included a meeting with President Houphouet in the morning, followed by a lunch and observing local dances after the lunch. As Abidjan was also the headquarters of the African Development Bank—the major regional international organization there, he went there in the afternoon and then held a press conference. There were about 15 newspapermen with him. We arranged for the meeting with Savimbi after the press conference.

When time ran short because the morning session and lunch ran late, Shultz wanted to scrub the African Development Bank meeting, but agreed to my suggestion that he just put in an appearance. What happened was that the President of the African Development Bank made a short introduction and Secretary Shultz began to talk. The schedule called for an hour long discussion. However, after five minutes Shultz said: “It has been a wonderful opportunity to meet with you,” and got up and walked out, shaking hands with everybody as he exited. The US rep and the ABD President, whom I couldn't warn about the timing problem, were pretty unhappy, but they would have been even unhappier had Shultz had skipped the Bank entirely.

Then Shultz had the press conference, which went well for about 40 minutes or so at the Hotel Ivoire, a big modern showcase hotel Houphouet had built in the 1960s. Following that, the Secretary went out to his car and drove to Houphouet's home a mile or so away. Houphouet used to meet people there more often than in his downtown office. Crocker and I were asked to come along for the meeting with Savimbi. Houphouet was not expected to attend, but he just continued to sit there. When Savimbi came in, Houphouet just remained. He obviously was curious about what was going to happen. In fact, not much happened. My recollection was that Secretary Shultz said that we supported Savimbi and that was about it except for an exchange of pleasantries.

Afterwards, perhaps on half a dozen occasions, I was involved in a number of private meetings with Savimbi, Crocker, and then with Assistant Secretary Hank Cohen, after he replaced Crocker. On about four occasions I dealt directly and alone with Savimbi. Savimbi had a representative in Abidjan, who was part of Houphouet's inner entourage. I didn't realize it at first but gradually I got to know the cast of characters in the court around Houphouet. Substantively, it was interesting. Some difficult issues came up. We wanted Savimbi to do certain things, which he wouldn't do. Houphouet also created some difficulties from time to time.

Apart from [Assistant Secretary] Crocker, there was not much interest in the State Department in what was going on in Africa during this 1986-1989 period. There was also a community of people in AID [Agency for International Development] and elsewhere who were interested in development in Africa. But in general, Crocker ran his own fiefdom—pretty much as he wished, although there were clearly differences between him and AID. Assistant Secretary Hank Cohen continued the same pattern.

Before ending this discussion of my tour as Ambassador to the Ivory Coast, I would like to return to the job of promoting American business, which was really a major task there. We had the first American trade fair in West Africa in 1987, which was a big success. We had a second fair in 1989. About 100 American companies participated. Unfortunately, as the economic situation in the Ivory Coast deteriorated, American companies in Abidjan started shutting down. Phillips Petroleum pulled out of the country, as I mentioned, as well as others.

We had a messy situation with an oil company that I got in the middle of. I felt that this was a situation where only the Ambassador could open doors. Actually, it was kind of a “racket,” a good example of corruption. In the Ivory Coast you could import fuel products “ex Customs” with no duty paid, provided that they were used for the Ivorian fishing fleet. The “racket” was that practically all of the companies were bringing in lots of petroleum products, supposedly for the fishing fleet, but in fact for use throughout the country. The Ivory Coast was losing the duties payable on these products which were sold on the black market. In some cases senior officials of the oil companies were involved. In other cases the Customs officials and low level employees were involved.

An American oil company was accused in connection with this “racket”. The senior officials of the company who were clean realized that something was wrong when they saw so much petroleum product going to the fishing fleet. After they investigated, internally within their company, they discovered what was happening. Then they discovered that it affected a large part of the industry. The Ivorians officials, whom the company then refused to pay

off, retaliated and levied an enormous fine. Presumably the senior officials in the Ministry of Finance or whatever government office were involved in the racket and went after the American company because they had refused to pay off and threatened to blow the whistle. The Ivorians said they were going to prosecute the American company, and levy an enormous fine. The company said while some of its employees were involved, and they were fired, it was innocent and refused to pay any fine. I raised this unsuccessfully with the Finance Minister who had refused to deal with the company. I struck out with him and decided the only thing that I could do was to go and see the “old man” [I. e., Houphouet-Boigny]. So the company flew in a vice president and he and I went to the “old man” and laid it all out before him. We said that if he thought that the American company was really guilty, it would pay. We asked him to decide. Houphouet was rather shaken by this matter and said he would look into it.

I don't think he knew what was going on. He was getting old and losing some of his control on his officials. You could never be sure what reached his ears. There were people who were trustworthy and who would talk with Houphouet, but not very many people had access to him—mostly those who had been with him for 30 years, even though some of them were crooks. When I wanted to make sure that a message was delivered, I would see him personally.

Anyway, he looked into the matter. A week or two later his representative came to us and said: “The American company is innocent.” And that is the last we heard of it. Other companies paid the fine, but the US company refused to do so. They said that they would pull out of Ivory Coast, rather than pay an improper fine. If I hadn't been willing to intervene, this outcome probably would have been different. The key was having the US Ambassador stand by the company and help it get to see the old man. Without the ambassador, the oil company would probably not have been able to see Houphouet.

During the last six months that I was in Ivory Coast, we worked very hard—and this continued after I left—to break the French telecommunications monopoly and to get

“COMSAT” a contract to put in a better telephone system. The French were very hard nosed. They tried everything to torpedo us. The French Ambassador was candid about this. DuPuch said: “We cooperate politically,” but about the telecommunications matter, he said: “Well, that is a commercial problem, that is business, that is different, that is war”.

When the COMSAT president came to Ivory Coast, he wanted to give Houphouet a little gift. It was a attractive piece of Steuben glass with a map of the Ivory Coast. As he presented it to Houphouet, the glass shattered! The President had a sense of humor, and he said: “In Africa, that means good luck!” It was a real tussle to settle this telecommunications deal but it was my job to be as helpful as possible. I made this a top priority.

There were also a couple of administrative matters worth mentioning. When I first arrived in Abidjan, I ran into a long standing fight” with the person who owned the American Chancery building, a dreadful building. The dispute went back about 10 years. It had been leased from the owner in the 1960s, under a “lease-purchase” option. When real estate prices went way up, we exercised the option to purchase it. Then the owner didn't want to sell. We then went to the courts to try to get a judgment in our favor. I think that it was not a wise decision since I don't think that the US Government should normally go to court in a foreign country.

The case was finally settled while I was there, and it said something about how business was done in the Ivory Coast. The owner of the property was a Lebanese who was close to the court around Houphouet. As this issue dragged on in the court, we felt that we had the law on our side, and we stopped paying rent for five or six years. The rental money was held in escrow. Finally, right after I got there, we lost the court case. We had thought that we were going to win it. I am sure that what happened was that the issue was presented to Houphouet on the basis that: “Those nasty Americans are squeezing poor Mr. Charbine, who is going bankrupt because they won't pay him any rent.” Houphouet probably felt that kind of behavior was not acceptable. So the court ruled against us.

We paid the outstanding rent immediately. But then Charbine the owner overreached himself and sued us for damages. He not only sued us for damages, which we rejected, but he also served us with legal notice to vacate the premises. He tried to throw us out. We ignored the order, but I got into the matter because it was only the Ambassador who could deal with the problem by this time. The Foreign Minister pressed us to pay what Charbine wanted. We refused. The owner was asking for a lot of money from the US for damages—it would have amounted to a couple of million dollars. We were paying the rent again. We had no lease, as the original lease had expired. I said: “We want a lease.” The Foreign Minister said: “All right, but you have to settle this suit for damages to get the lease.” I wouldn't agree with that.

Meanwhile, I had some advice from Cesario that the landlord was a “crook.” He had been paying off the court. He had bought everybody off. Cesario said that the only way we could settle the matter would be to take it to Houphouet. If he felt the US was the injured party and that the landlord was being unfair, he would come down in our favor. To back this up, I thought that we should make a bilateral issue by raising the problem in Washington.

The State Department called in the Ivorian Ambassador in Washington to complain. I raised the issue with Houphouet. He was very surprised. He didn't know that we had been sued for damages. Nobody had told him that. He said: “But I thought that this problem was settled.” I said: “No, it isn't settled.” I made the case that we had been very reasonable and had paid the outstanding rent immediately, but the landlord was still suing us— for several million dollars. Houphouet said: “Ah.” I was careful not to threaten anything. I just laid out the facts for the old man.

We had continued with the court case because we wanted to be sure that we were on solid legal ground and were making as strong a case as we could. I am sure, however, that what happened next was that the word came down from Houphouet: “Enough is enough, Mr. Charbine.” The court then decided in our favor and rejected Charbine's claims. So the matter was finally resolved. I think that the lesson is that the United States

should not routinely get involved in a local court. We're on somebody else's territory, playing someone else's game in their own backyard and you have to play by their rules.

The other issue involved getting land for the American School. One of the big problems in Abidjan was that it was a large post, in a big city, but with a miserable English language school. There were not only Americans kids in the school, but also English-speaking students from the African Development Bank, who, I think, were more numerous than the Americans. We had a rented school building, which was quite inadequate.

So, during the second year that I was in Ivory Coast, the authorities decided to acquire some land and build a school. The school board, which was elected, scouted around, found a site and developed an architectural plan. Then school asked if I could try to get some land free of charge from the Ivorian Government. The school board had found a good site, but they didn't have the money to buy the land, which was worth a couple of million dollars.

I took the plans for the school to Cesario who was in charge of all Ivorian Government property and contracts. I knew him well enough so that I could ask him what his honest reaction was. He looked at the plans and said: “This is a country club, not a school!” The plans, in fact, were fancy, providing for a swimming pool, air conditioning, and other amenities not usually available in Ivoirean schools. He said, “You'll never get anywhere with this.” Meanwhile, we had gotten a new Administrative Counselor. She agreed with me we needed to get the overseas school people in the State Department involved and to do a better planning job. So the school board hired some planners and Department's school experts came to Abidjan. They did a proper, professional survey and designed a school which would cost a minimum amount of money. We went back to Cesario with the revised plan, which cost about $1 million and was barebones. He agreed that the plan was acceptable. Then my task was to get Houphouet to give us the land for free. I mistakenly thought that Cesario was going to take care of this. He said: “Oh, no. That is your job.”

An additional complication was that the State Department said that it would give us $250,000 of the $1.0 million needed to build the school—local banks would cover the rest—only if the Embassy got control the school board. This was understandable, but to do that, we had to change the school's constitution to have three of nine members appointed by the Embassy. We figured that if the Embassy appointed three members that should ensure effective control.

When I presented the plan to Houphouet, he said: “Ah, the rich are begging from the poor!” He had a sense of humor. Finally, he agreed. So I came back and told Cesario: “Well, it is all set.” He said: “I have to confirm it with him.” It took him months and months and nothing happened. Finally, he said: “If I tell you 'Yes,' and you go ahead without my getting permission from Houphouet, he will chop my head off!” Cesario wanted to make sure that Houphouet didn't change his mind and wasn't just being diplomatic with me. However, Cesario never seemed to find the occasion to raise the problem with the old man.

I was beginning to sweat, because the clock was running out. The Administrative Counselor said: “We really need to deliver on the free land, which amounted to five acres and would make project viable and enable us to “win” on voting the new constitution for the school board. Otherwise the project would founder. Without the free land, there was no new school. We wouldn't have enough money and the school would not vote to change to constitution; official Americans were in a minority in the school.

Just about a week before the final School meeting for the year, Assistant Secretary Crocker came through Abidjan on a trip. As a gimmick, I got Crocker to thank Houphouet for his “generous gesture” of giving free land for the American School. Crocker did that and Houphouet bit: “That was nothing! I wasn't just helping you. I was helping Abidjan, because it needs a good English school. This will be good for everybody. I am delighted to do it.” So I went back to Cesario and told him what had happened. He finally caved: “All

right, you win." He just didn't want to take the issue with Houphouet and was stringing me along. He was a bit of a bastard about things like this. He had his own problems.

He said: "Tomorrow morning at 10:00 AM you go see Monsieur X," for the title to the land. X was a Frenchman who controlled all Ivorian Government property." The question came up as to whom the Ivorian Government would be deeding the property of five acres. The Administrative Counselor said: "It should be given to the American School." As I thought about it, I said, "That's crazy. Why not take it for the Embassy? If we are worried about controlling the school, why not take title to the property?" But the Administrative Counselor said: "You can't do that. You would need to have FBO [Office of Foreign Building Operations in the State Department] permission. You can't accept property abroad without the agreement of FBO."

Well, anyway, we went to the office of Monsieur X. He had all of the forms ready. It was all computerized. When he asked: "To whom is this property to be deeded?" I answered, "To the American Embassy." So I got the piece of paper giving the Embassy title to the land. It was "a gift" from the head of state. A few days later the school voted to change its constitution and a year later the new school was built and up and running. As it has made a big difference for Abidjan, I felt very good that we were able to achieve this. FBO groused about the title but we still kept it.

What was also interesting was that Houphouet put a non-Ivorian official in control of government property. This was part of the way he maintained control over corruption. Monsieur X had a dinky little office, but the land records were all computerized. It took just 15 minutes, and we had a land title.Another administrative issue was less pleasant. It was a combination of incompetence and a race problem. I mentioned earlier that Abidjan was a "regional" Embassy. Because it was a transportation hub, Abidjan provided administrative support for other Embassies, particularly in the General Services area. There had been a history of trouble—mismanagement and alleged corruption—in our General Services Unit. One of the two preceding GSO's had been allowed to retire, and another was fired. The

problems had supposedly been cleaned up or were in the process of being cleaned up when I got to the Ivory Coast. But the Department then assigned an incompetent General Services officer, who happened to be black, and the problems resurfaced. These problems rumbled along during the first year I was at post until “efficiency report” time. Then the General Services Officer got an “unsatisfactory” report from the Administrative Officer, who also happen to be African-American. When I heard about the mess, I was surprised. I should have known, but didn't. I assumed wrongly that the Administrative Counselor and the DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission], who had an administrative background, were on top of things. When I asked the DCM what he thought I should do, he said since the GSO job was a very difficult and very responsible, if the GSO was incompetent, I ought to send her back to the States.

Before taking such an extreme step, I decided to talk to relevant people and get a much better appreciation of the problem. So on my own I interviewed the senior members of the Embassy staff and also all the senior black officers. Everybody agreed that I should transfer the GSO back to the Department. They were unanimous that she was incompetent and the source of much trouble for the admin operation.

Then, after carefully following the regulations and alerting George Vest, who was the Director General of the Foreign Service, I advised the GSO of my decision. She took it badly, claimed I was ruining her career. All hell broke loose. She stirred up a protest among a number of black Americans and Ivoireans who worked at the Embassy, charging my action was racist and an act of “imperialists.” It was a messy scene.

A few days later, when I was back in Washington for a Chiefs of Mission conference, Ron Spiers, the Under Secretary for Management, pulled me aside and wanted to know what was going on in connection with the GSO. I had an argument with the head of the EEO office who disputed my finding of incompetence. The EEO people then came out from the Department to investigate Abidjan. They claimed it was a mess of racism and 25 black Americans—a good portion of those assigned to the Embassy—signed a protest petition.

I remember receiving a letter from Mary Ryan, Spiers' aide, telling me that EEO had sent the problem over to the Foreign Service Inspector General's office. Mary Ryan wrote: “You probably haven't heard the last of this.” As it turned out, it was the last of it. The whole issue petered out and I heard nothing more. When we did have an inspection, they had plenty of suggestions on embassy management, but never formally touched on the GSO issue. They did agree informally that the Department should never have assigned an incompetent to manage a major GSO operation. I found it a very unpleasant situation because it was really the Department's fault. Then, of course, when the situation blew up, the people in the Department who should have dealt with it, simply ran away from it. In effect, nobody did anything about it. I felt that the EEO Office in Washington not only was of no help, but made matters worse in this particular case by taking a partisan and biased stand. As it turned out, the former General Services Officer filed an EEO complaint —not against me but against the DCM and the Administrative Counselor, who had been her “rating” officers. [The Administrative Counselor prepared the “efficiency report” and the DCM prepared the “reviewing statement.”] But I was really the person that took the action.

Sometimes, you are really faced with a hard choice. You have to decide what is best for the organization even if there are racial questions to consider. If a person has a job of importance and is incompetent, you have to do something about it. It's not a pleasure. The whole episode was nasty, but I needed to take action on the issue. It was an unpleasant part of being an Ambassador.

In any case, the Embassy staff reshuffled during the summer, and we had a new cast of characters in the second and third year of my assignment as Ambassador to the Ivory Coast. They were much better qualified and the whole situation and Embassy atmosphere changed for the better. About the GSO problem, a couple of the people most directly involved left the post, and the problem went away.

In terms of being an Ambassador, in Abidjan, the commercial role was the most important part of the job. The USIS [United States Information Service] role—showing the flag and

PR—was also important. I often gave talks and frequently appeared on television and felt that this was a major part of the job. The American community was also big enough—about 350 people—that I was, in effect, the “mayor” of the town, dealing with community issues and having people over to the residence. That was not something that I cherished but I felt that it was important to do this—to ensure that people felt “at home.”

Abidjan was a post that was comfortable, but it had a reputation as having low morale. Some of the neighboring posts in less pleasant surroundings had small American communities and everybody pulled together. Abidjan was big enough and had enough facilities that the American community didn't have to worry about itself constantly, which was all right.

There were two main problems. You needed to be able to speak French in Abidjan, and a lot of the Americans didn't. That was particularly true of the so-called “regional” staff who were dealing not just with French-speaking Africa but English-speaking Africa as well. They often felt lost in Abidjan. To make matters worse for the families, the employee was often on the road, traveling to other posts. The families were just left to fend for themselves in Abidjan.

Q: In 1990 you went to the National Defense University. Was this at your request?

Yes. I had always wanted to see whether I could write a book. Earlier on—before I went to the Ivory Coast—I had done some research on a book on US-India relations. When I came back to the U. S., I didn't want to go back into a regular job. I had remarried in Abidjan to a French lady and was thinking of retiring. Writing a book was something I wanted to do. Working in a tough State Department job was not something I was eager for. I spent almost two years at NDU. One thing that was good about the NDU Press was that they gave you an editorial adviser who would periodically review what I had written. In addition, the University paid for a professor—an expert who would read and then comment on I my manuscript. And then, it published the book.

I was advised beforehand that writing a book is tough. It is very different from writing a long telegram or article. If you have never done it, you are probably going to need help. I did. The writing style is different. You need to eliminate the “bureaucratese”. Also I am not a “natural” writer. It was a lot of work.

After two years at NDU, I went to the FSI [Foreign Service Institute] to head the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs. I continued to work on the book, part-time. I gave them the final text in June 1992. Then it was a year and a half before it was published. It was not till the fall of 1993 that the U. S. edition was published. I also arranged to have an Indian edition published, which came out later. Happily the book—a history of fifty years of US-India relations—was well received both here and in India. When the State Department and Indian Embassy started using it as a book of reference, I felt my time was well spent. I also knew I could continue writing in retirement.

I took the directorship at the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs because I was interested in staying on in the Department for a couple of more years. I wasn't too eager to go overseas again. Also I was not looking for a job which involved traveling such as the Inspection Corps. I had remarried, and my wife was not familiar with the United States. So I didn't want to be gone from Washington for long periods. One job that appealed to me was running the Senior Seminar at FSI which I thought would be a great way to end a career. So I saw Brandon Grove, the Director of the FSI at the time and expressed my interest in the Senior Seminar. Sometime later he gave me a call and said: “That is not going to be available, but the position of Director of the Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs will be available. Would you be interested in it?” After I learned a bit about the Center, I agreed.

The Center had been established as a mini “think tank,” to provide Foreign Service people with an opportunity to study and write, to be a bridge between the FSI and the “think tank” world, to give seminars and to supervise “gaming” for the State Department. It had, however, fallen on hard times and was in bad shape. They had an outside director who

didn't know how to operate in the State Department and run the Center into the ground. By 1992, the Center was drifting, and some people were trying to close it.

When Brandon Grove asked me to shape a new mission for the Center, I asked George Sherman, who came to the Center as a Fellow, to write a history of the Center, which he did. George was a former newspaperman who I knew in NEA as bureau spokesman and had later served in India. He spent a first couple of months interviewing people and finding out what had happened in the past and what had gone wrong. His paper was a big help when we reviewed what we might do. In the end the Center staff and the top people at FSI went off for a weekend retreat to brainstorm the future. We decided that the Center's purpose should be to help the State Department, the FSI, the Policy Planning Staff, and the regional bureaus by providing a venue to have policy-oriented seminars. We underlined the term “policy-oriented.” We would mix together, on more or less neutral ground, people from the Department and elsewhere in the government and put them together with academics and outside specialists for structured sessions on one subject or another. The key was ensuring that someone in the Department at the DAS level or in Policy Planning was interested in the topic—this was the key to making the Center relevant. We also sharpened up our formula for making the sessions useful.

After considerable study and firsthand experience, we eventually found the right formula. We would bring together 20 or 25 people officials, plus key outsiders. We limit the session to half a day, and ensure that the session end with a policy relevant comment by someone at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level. We structured the issues and the speakers carefully, ending the session by having the chief consumer speak to the group on U. S. policy on the particular problem.

I remember that we had such a conference on Iran—where is Iran going, and what should we do about it? Then we said: “All right, Mr. DAS, what should Uncle Sam do?” It was a useful technique. We held about 15 or 20 such conferences during the year, and succeeded in making them much more relevant and useful.We did one seminar on Islamic

fundamentalism for the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs—Ed Djerejian—which ran for three days. Out of that came, I think, some of the substance of a speech which the Assistant Secretary gave on dealing with Islamic fundamentalism. His comments very much reflected the tone of our session.

Then, parallel to the policy seminars, the Center did policy “gaming.” Fred Hill, a former newspaperman and Congressional staffer, was excellent at gaming. He had been doing it for some time and needed little supervision. It was only a question of making sure that the topics were things that people wanted to discuss. Fred Hill did a super job. The Center had very few resources for gaming but had a program that compared well with and achieved what the Pentagon did with huge staffs.

I think that our gaming efforts were well received. We tried to keep them short. All that we aspired to do was to allow people who were dealing with a policy problem to “role play.” The purpose is to gain a better understanding of what the dynamics of a situation might be. You can't do much more than that, but it is a useful way to allow practitioners to step back from their normal one-sided bureaucratic roles.

I think that the military type of “games” or exercises are too complicated. In fact, I doubt that you can do much more than take a situation and see how it will “play out.” For example, we did a “game” on increasing the size of the UN Security Council. The Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (IO) John Bolton was interested in gaming the US position—to support Japan only. So the “U. S. Team” played out that “game.” We had others playing the other country “teams.” It was quite a complicated exercise, involving a lot of people. The result was a total deadlock! This meant that the U. S. policy as advocated by John Bolton wouldn't work because there were too many conflicting views. The conclusion was that the policy was going to lead nowhere. Bolton wasn't too happy with the results, but events have proven the game accurate.

We also had FSO “Fellows” at the Center who were part of the program and wrote papers or books. George Sherman was one of them. He was not interested in writing a paper but was interested in programming the seminars. We insisted that the Fellows produce something that someone at the DAS or higher level was interested in. Here too we wanted relevance. We also worked closely with Personnel to stop using the Center as a dumping ground for senior officers and insisted that they have a real project.

After some months, I was satisfied that the Center was doing useful work. We even got more money from FSI for more programming. Brandon Grove was a good manager and very structured in the way he went about things. Once a quarter, we made a budget and program presentation on what we wanted to do and how much money we needed. He and his deputy decided how much money they would allot. He then left us alone to do manage our programs as we saw fit. However, he was available if we needed help. I thought that he did a very good job.

Then the Center “went off the rails” and was disbanded. As far as I can determine, what happened was that a feud developed between the Director General of the Foreign Service, Ed Perkins, and Brandon Grove. When Perkins tried to put the FSI under his own control, Brandon Grove was able to block this proposal. So it didn't happen. But Perkins had it in for FSI and Grove. As I mentioned earlier on, the Center had gotten a bad reputation. I felt that we had fixed up the Center and it was worth continuing. When John Rogers came in to be head of management, (he had worked for Baker earlier), Perkins got his revenge by getting his OK to shut down the Center. We argued against this and sent memoranda to the Under Secretary. We got assistant secretaries to weigh in on our behalf. Rogers didn't have the courtesy to invite us over to talk about it. He was equally rude discourteous to Brandon, let alone to me. Unfortunately, Rogers didn't have a clue about FSI. He thought it should be a vocational school and not spend time thinking about foreign policy problems. So the Center didn't fit into his concept and knocking it off saved a little money.

I was mad as hell about this. I thought that it was just stupid to shut the Center down. Just at a time when the world was radically changing, State needed to be thinking about “over the horizon” problems and reaching out to academics and think tanks experts. The decision wasn't made on the merits of the question as much as it was done as a way to “stick it” to Brandon Grove.

Q: Your assignment to the Center ended at the end of 1992.

KUX:I actually stayed on at the FSI, waiting for another assignment. I had plenty of things to do. I was active in running the Senior Foreign Service Association. Steve Low had come back to FSI some years after retiring and was running a private non-profit organization —”The Association for Diplomatic Studies” which he had established when he was Director of FSI in the 1980s. He was looking for a senior FSO to be the Executive Director and work with him. I knew and liked Steve and so I said I would join him. Technically, it was a “non reimbursable” detail to an external body, because the Association is a private entity. The Office of Personnel handled it. There was nobody else under consideration at the time. At least I was usefully employed and not merely wandering around the corridors of the State Department. It was interesting but difficult because it was a very different experience being in the private non-profit world. We had a secretary and an office manager. Steve was trying to raise money, and my job was to spend the money and manage the programs. The program of collecting Foreign Service Oral Histories was the major activity. I think that it is a very useful effort.

But while I was working at the Association, I ran into trouble because of my activities on the AFSA [American Foreign Service Association] Board. I had been elected to the Board of Directors of AFSA while I was Chairman of the Senior Foreign Service Association. When the new Clinton administration came into office in 1993, they gave a big push to the appointment of more “political” Ambassadors. In AFSA, we decided that we would oppose the nominee of the Clinton administration to be Ambassador to Switzerland, Larry Lawrence as unqualified. Tex Harris, the President of AFSA and I testified against

him. I did a fair amount of work, looking into Lawrence's past, and found that he had some 25 unsettled income tax cases, one of them amounting to about $76 million. He had a record that made you wonder whether he was an appropriate person to be a United States ambassador. So we testified against him and damned near blocked his appointment. There was a 10-10 vote in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. If one more Republican had voted the our way, we would have defeated the nomination.

That got Dick Moose, the Under secretary of State for Management and the White House mad, because this man was one of the major contributors to the Democratic Party. So my guess is that AFSA's opposition to the Lawrence nomination made the State Department look “disloyal.” The White House took over the handling of Larry Lawrence's confirmation. During the hearing on Lawrence, Senator Harlan Matthews, who had taken Senator Gore's place when he was elected Vice President, got nasty with us. He asked angrily: “How can you oppose the President's nominee? What right do you have to do this as a government employee?” The answer was that what we were doing it in our capacity as members of AFSA—a private organization. We were expressing AFSA's views and exercising our right of free speech. As a member of the union, I had no qualms, even as a Foreign Service Officer, on commenting on a potential ambassador's qualifications. But Senator Matthews raised hell saying that the Department was

It happened that I had a one-year detail to the Association, which was coming to an end right at that point. I had expected to stay on a few more months until retiring in mid-year, but Dick Moose decided not to extend my detail because of Senator Matthews' grousing. He handled this badly. I won't go into all the details, but I was pretty annoyed at Moose. The White House pulled out all the stops and Lawrence won handily when his name came before the full Senate. I still think that Lawrence was unqualified to be appointed ambassador. From what people had told me about him, he was always at the edge of the line of propriety as a real estate shark. He was pretty bad as an ambassador and an extreme example of the political payoff for big campaign contributions. He died a couple of years later, but not before his secretary quit complaining publicly that Lawrence was

inappropriately using her to handle his private affairs. This got into the Washington Post and the Herald Tribune. The end of my detail had nothing to do with the “Association for Diplomatic Studies.” It was strictly related to my activities.

The only thing that annoyed me about my experience in AFSA and the Senior Foreign Service Association related to the surplus of senior officers. It was clear the number of serving senior officers had to be reduced. We went to the management people in the Department and told them that we work with them because we knew that the reduction was going to happen. The view of the “number crunchers” in the Management Area in the Department was that this problem would take care of itself, and that therefore there wasn't anything to do. Basically, the DG Genta Hawkins said: “Go away.” I thought that management's attitude was not very smart, because there was a visible problem which needed resolution.

Then, paradoxically, I ended up spending three months as a judge in “Freedom of Information” cases. These were “appeals” cases. The Department of State looked bad, because there was a backlog of some 600 cases. The system was that you needed an deputy assistant secretary of State—or rank equivalent—to hear appeals, and they never could get a current serving DAS's to focus on it. So they said: “Let us take some unassigned former ambassadors.” The Department got three of us. It was interesting. Each panel had three judges—two ambassadors and one deputy assistant secretary. One of them was Mike McCurry, who was the spokesman for the Department at the time. Now he is the President's spokesman. He was the one who was really concerned about the process. Another member was Bill Walker, who had been Ambassador to El Salvador.

It turned out that it was not difficult to go through these cases. In effect, the work had been done already, and it was just a question of saying “Yes” or “No.” We did not have to write out a brief or anything like that. The staff work was all done, much of it by the Freedom of Information Office. In six weeks we cleared up a four year backlog. Mike McCurry took this terribly seriously. He would stay until 8:00 PM to do his share of the work, which was very

commendable. He was very pleased that we were able to make the Department current on appeal cases. Indeed, Dick Moose, of all people, sent a memorandum to Secretary of State Christopher, praising the wonderful job we had done. Ironically, I got a “thank you” letter from him to be put in my personnel file.

Then USIA [United States Information Agency] sent me on a speaking tour of South Asia for a month since my India book had come out and made a splash. When I came back, I entered the three month retirement program. This was a very helpful transition and I learned a good deal, in my case how to write grant proposals to fund my writing a second book, a history of US-Pakistan relations as a companion volume to the India study.

Looking back, the career was fun and rewarding, but I find there is less sense of dedication and a higher hassle factor in the 1990s than during most of the time I served. That is too bad but perhaps inevitable given the changes in communications and the failure of the State Department to gain the sort of political support for its activities that the CIA and the military seem to enjoy. But that is another story.

End of interview